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I. INTRODUCTION
Many, many years ago, in 1973, I was invited to teach for a full
academic year at the University of South Carolina. A former
American colleague from the times when the going was good in
Ethiopia a few years earlier encouraged me to come to Columbia,
South Carolina, as the weather there would allow us to renew our
epic tennis games all year round! Having accepted the invitation,
*
Professor of Law Emeritus, Free University of Brussels and University
of Moncton (New Brunswick).
This paper was delivered as the 35th John H. Tucker , Jr. Lecture in Civil
Law, at the Louisiana State University Law Center (2008).
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the next point was to decide what to teach. Comparative law and
jurisprudence were the usual choices for foreigners untrained in the
common law. In addition to these obvious choices a course in
African political systems was suggested in the Faculty of Arts. As
it turned out, I respectfully submitted a proposal to teach a course
on the law of common lands in South Carolina. This was unusual,
as the topic was governed by state law and not usually taught at the
law school. But these were also the years when Professor Sax was
developing his ideas about public trust as a legal status for the
beaches on the Pacific coast in Oregon or Washington states. The
Faculty in Columbia kindly accepted my suggestion and I started
my exploration of the law on common lands; this was in fact my
first experience in the direct tackling of a common law topic and
also my first direct acquaintance with the case method I had
decided to use in class. And there came the surprise.
The more I was getting lost in the South Carolina Law Reports
of the 19th century, the more I was fascinated by the contents of
the law. I discovered that the State Supreme Court had indeed
formulated the doctrine of the public trust for common lands in the
early years of that century, but I was also puzzled by the scarcity of
references to cases in the decisions and the abundance of
quotations of Blackstone‟s and, later, Kent‟s classical
commentaries. These two authors, and also some less-known ones,
provided the starting-point of reasoning which appeared to me
much more deductive than inductive.
I made a note of it for a possible further study, but more than
thirty years went on without a chance of going any further in the
matter although my South Carolinian experience still lingered in
the back of my mind. In the course of these years I also developed
my familiarity with the common law and my liking for comparison
at the level of legal systems as a whole and for their taxonomy.1
Finally I am perfectly aware of the fact that even if that type of
exercise has gone out of fashion today, everyone still speaks of
legal systems belonging to different families of laws as something
self-evident.
Having reached the end of a half-a-century career as a law
teacher and not having much to lose, I accordingly decided to take
advantage of the great honour bestowed upon me by the Paul M.
Hebert Law Center in asking me to deliver the 35th Tucker
Lecture, to present in full the problem arising out in my view from

1.
See J. Vanderlinden, Religious Laws as Systems of Law: A
Comparatist’s View, in RELIGION, LAW AND TRADITION: COMPARATIVE STUDIES
IN RELIGIOUS LAW 165-182 (A. Huxley ed. 2002).
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of the practice of considering the pre-20th century American law
system as a common law system.
This, of course, requires a definition of the class “common law
system,” in which we envisage the classification of the
species “pre-20th century American law system.” There‟s the rub.
Of course, there‟s no place here for a theoretical discussion on the
“true” nature of a common law system, if there is one. Defining a
system is a risky task, but it has to be done if the language of the
law has to come out of the messy situation described by Karl
Llewellyn in The Bramble Bush.2 My own assumption is that there
are a few possibilities. The essential characters of the “pre-20th
century American legal system” may coincide with those of
the “common law system” and the question asked in the title of this
talk will be answered positively, or they won‟t and the only
solution, if we stick to the idea, will necessarily lead us to a
redefinition of what is common law system as a whole. Another
possibility is to consider that the American legal system is a
system sui generis which escapes classification, as obviously I
would not contemplate classifying it in the civil law systems. The
last possibility is to consider that such taxonomic game is not
worth playing and that not only my time, but also yours
unfortunately has been totally lost. If such is the case, please,
accept my most embarrassed apologies. Yet, allow me to take up
the challenge of defining the class, “common law system,” if only
for the sake of this essay.
The easiest way to characterize the common law is to use the
well-known expression “judge-made law,” which would however
not satisfy me fully as a person interested in comparison for two
reasons. One is that, contrary to the theory which pretends to
consider the judges‟ dicta as simple authorities and not “sources,”
the judges tend to play such a role in the production of the socalled “codified systems,” that the contents of the latter cannot be
satisfactorily apprehended on the face of the code sections and, in
many cases, require, in the most absolute manner, a maze of
statements produced by the courts in order to be properly
understood.3 Two is that English judges never miss an opportunity
to assert the pre-eminence of the legislator in the law-making
process and have as frequently repeated that if there was a gap in
the law it was not their duty to fill it, but that such task was
exclusively that of Parliament. Thus to give the impression that the
2.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83 (Oceana 1978).
3.
J. Vanderlinden, The Law-Making Power of the Judiciary in French
Law, JURIDICAL REVIEW 1-20 (1967).
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common law is judge-made seems to be an oversimplification
which does not provide a satisfactory criterion in the comparison
of legal systems.
It is more useful to consider the steps followed by the English
judge in his production of the cornerstone of the system, the
precedent. If I am repeating it here, it is not to teach anything to
anyone in this audience, it is only to make my reasoning as clear as
possible. The English judge normally starts from facts brought to
his attention. He is careful to present them at the opening of his
judgment in the clearest and most possibly complete way; this is
also, possibly, an opportunity to reveal his true personality as Lord
Denning did so frequently and wonderfully in his opening
statements. Once the facts of the case are clear, the judge goes on a
search for previous decisions based on similar facts. Obviously he
will very rarely, if ever, find absolutely similar facts. Thus he will
have to decide upon the degree of satisfactory similarity existing
between the facts at hand and the facts in the previous case. Once
he is satisfied, he will look at the legal solution adopted in the
previous case and will apply it to the instant case. It is only at that
moment that the precedent is born; until then it is but a judgment in
a maze of decisions in which the judge has to sift out the best from
the worst, the technique of distinctions allowing him to navigate
through the impossible total similarity between factual situations.
In conclusion allow me to quote two famous authors located at
the beginning and the end of the long process of the history of the
common law. Henry de Bracton4 recommended to the lawyers of
his times to proceed “a similibus ad similia”, from the same facts
to the same solutions. Jeremy Bentham5 characterized the common
law as being an “ex post facto law.” These two terse formulas
encapsulate what I have just written as to the nature of the common
law. Let us turn now towards the late colonial and 19th century
United States. Consider five major periods: the period of colonial
America, the early post-independence period, the period preceding
the civil war and, finally, the period following it up to the reform
of legal education generally attributed to Langdell.
But, before entering the heart of the matter, let me express an
important caveat. Is one able to write any statement which is
globally valid for “the American colonies” as they progressively
take shape during the two centuries separating the late 16th from
the late 18th century and between what is now Maine down to
South Carolina? The diversity of the colonial settlements
4.
5.

Circa 1210-1268.
1748-1832.
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amalgamated in what is known in common parlance as British
North America is huge whether from a cultural, economic, political
or social point of view even if they have a common language and a
common origin. Envisaging the problem from the angle of the
legal historian is even more difficult due to the scarcity of the
readily available sources as to what the administration of law
effectively was in each colony or later, state. This fundamental
problem has not yet really frightened all those who have written
volumes about colonial America or the United States at large.
We‟ll meet in this short and necessarily summary presentation an
example in the field of reactions towards Loyalists after
independence of how the situation in one state, in the case
Maryland, can radically differ from what is assumed to be a
“national” situation. Nevertheless I‟ll follow the example of my
colleagues who assume that one can generalize some conclusions
at the level of the United States, while being fully aware of the
high relativity of whatever I write under such heading. This had to
be said before venturing in this brief presentation.
II. THE COLONIAL PERIOD
There are many ways through which the English common law
came into the American colonies. The earliest and most common
was the so-called birthright implying that every settler carried at
his shoe soles the law under which he was born. One often quotes
in that respect the article of James the First‟s Charter of Virginia,
1606 which runs as follows:
Also we do, for Us, our Heirs, and Successors, DECLARE,
by these Presents, that all and every the Persons being our
Subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within every or any
of the said several Colonies and Plantations, and every of
their children, which shall happen to be born within any of
the Limits and Precincts of the said several Colonies and
Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties,
Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other
Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been
abiding and born, within this our Realm of England, or any
other of our said Dominions.6
Obviously the text doesn‟t refer to the common law as such,
but rather to the “Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities” of all
English subjects of the Crown. But that general statement is often
6.
Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/va01.htm
(last visited April 21, 2011).
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supplemented by provisions in the charters given to colonies and
referring to the application of English Law or, at least, to a law,
either imported or established locally, being “as near as may be” to
the laws of England.7
If our perspective is narrower, what we must look for are court
decisions which stand at the very beginning of a possible inductive
process towards precedent. There‟s the rub. What we are looking
for is what Sir John Holt, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales
between 1689 and 1710, described as: “these scrambling reports
[which] will make us to appear to posterity for a parcel of
blockheads.”8 Not only are they scrambling but also they are
numerous. A quick and quite summary count of the pages included
in the 120 volumes or so of law reports published in England prior
to 1776 comes up to a total of many tens of thousands pages of
which no common index existed. There were not many lawyers in
colonial America who could afford such a collection outside the
main economic or political centers of the Northeast.
Law schools or law libraries did not exist at that time and
everyone wishing to go into the business of law had to master his
own documentary resources. The happy few, some 150 of them,9
who went to England were perhaps better placed as originating
from reasonably affluent (and influent) families, but these were the
exception.
The example of the resources available to John Adams, future
vice-president and president of the United States, when he was
articling is well known and fairly documented through his diary.10
Among all sorts of books, he successively reads Justinian‟s
Institutes (in Latin), Gilbert‟s Tenures (at night), Wood, two
7.
For example, in the charter of the same Queen to Sir Walter Raleigh
which reads when dealing with the latter‟s legislative power: “So always as the
said statutes, lawes, and ordinances may be as neere as conveniently may be,
agreeable to the forme of the lawes, statutes, governement, or pollicie of
England”, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/16th_century/raleigh.asp (last
visited April 21, 2011); see also BARNES T.G., “As Near as May be Agreeable
to the Laws of this Kingdom:” Legal Birthright and Legal Baggage at Chebucto,
1749, in LAW IN A COLONIAL SOCIETY: THE NOVA SCOTIA EXPERIENCE (Waite
et al. eds. 1984).
8.
Slater v. May, 2 Ld. Raym 1072.
9.
CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 188-189
(1911).
10. See John Adams, Experiences as a Law Student, 1758, in 1 THE
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND
PRIMARY SOURCES, 93-106 (Steve Sheppard ed. 1999); see also, Daniel R.
Coquillette, Justinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning and Legal
Elitism 1758-1775, in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 75-92 (Steve Sheppard ed.
1999). This volume includes similar testimonies by two other famous lawyers,
John Marshall and James Kent.
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volumes of both Coke‟s Reports and John Lilly‟s Practical
Register or General Abridgment of the Law (1719), Hawkins‟
Pleas of the Crown, and Fortescue; he also recites aloud Cicero‟s
discourses against Catilina to improve his pulmonary capacity and
speaking abilities. When he comes back to Boston, his first reading
is, again, Justinian‟s Institutes with the hope of gaining the support
of two veteran lawyers from the local bar. The reports are not
much in the picture.
But, had they been on the shelves, finding the cases of which
the facts were similar to those you had to deal with was another
nearly insuperable challenge. It may accordingly be assumed that
their current use at the level of practitioners outside these main
centers was minimal and excluded.
Thus many people who wanted to become acquainted with the
common law would certainly have been inclined to follow the
advice to his nephew of another respected judge of these times,11
Lord Thomas Reeve, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (17361737) encouraged him at the beginning of his legal career12 to only
tackle the Law Reports after having perused and mastered Thomas
Wood‟s Institutes,13 Jacob‟s Dictionary,14 Littleton‟s Tenures, and
An abridgment of the first part of my Ld. Coke's Institutes by
William Hawkins! Obviously, there was not yet any idea of a case
method.
This does not mean that where precedents were available,
lawyers would not respect them. But they were not conceived as
the starting point of a deductive process. They were only there to
allow a discovery of what the common law was through their
rationale.
Thus most lawyers of these times, especially in what was then
the south of the country, e.g. the Carolinas, would rather or had to
(if only by the lack of English reports) rely upon a short practical
presentation of the law of the kind cited in the last paragraph. In
that respect, the real turning point is the publication in England,
then in the United States of Blackstone‟s Commentaries published
in four volumes between 1765 and 1769 at the Cambridge
University Press; to Blackstone I‟ll come back in the following act.

11. 1 HARGRAVE F., COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 79-81(1791).
12. The letter was also given to be read by the first lawyer who accepted
to take John Adams as an apprentice in Boston. See supra note 8, at 100.
13. Who also appears in the readings of John Adams.
14. References to this apparently well-known dictionary in his time are
also found in the first judgments of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, the first
one established by a British Government in what was still the colony of Nova
Scotia, long before Canada was created in 1867.

8

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

But what about the knowledge and use of the common law in the
meantime?
The impression which prevails is that we are confronted with
what I would call on the one hand a “folk” knowledge of the law at
large by non-lawyers and on the other hand a very indirect
knowledge of an embryonic legal profession through the use of
works like Wood‟s Institutions at the best from a scholarly point of
view and like those of Jacob‟s New Law Dictionary at the best
from a practitioner‟s one. Wood‟s is, in many respects a pioneer
and an ardent supporter of the common law from whom
Blackstone must have drawn much inspiration and Jacob‟s New
Law Dictionary, published in 1729, reached five editions before
1744 and was continued by T. E, Tomlins, who published its first
American edition in six volumes in 1811 under the title The Law
Dictionary. Whether one looks at the educated public or at the
lawyer, the approach to the common law is essentially practical in
everyday life.
Behind this earthly concern was a solid cultural background of
basic principles about what justice should be in accordance with
deep religious feelings. They included not only the law of God, but
also “principles, that are permanent, uniform and universal.”15
Hence a fundamentally deductive approach going from the top,
God, to the subject of the Crown in his daily activities. A high
respect for what law should be in such surroundings certainly
trumped technicalities and the doctrine of precedent (assuming it
did exist at that time and is not a projection in history of more
recent doctrines). One looked for the law in a diffuse corpus of
Godly natural law or of reason, the lay face of which we profusely
find in the English cases of the time.16 If they could support
through a quotation or another a common cultural and obvious
doctrine, thus making it “legal,” so much the better. The result was
a narrow conception to the judge‟s role. He was, as one often says,
a “discoverer” of a common law which fitted with his cultural
background. His task was not to innovate or create law and he
accordingly most willingly practised a strict doctrine of stare
decisis.17
Quite different was the frontier lawyer. The concept of frontier
itself is not altogether well defined, but let us consider that it
15. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 7 (1992).
16. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Judicial Precedent in the Late Eighteenth and
Early Nineteenth Centuries: A Commentary on Chancellor Kent’s
Commentaries, (2006) University of St. Thomas School of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 06-28, specially at 16-27.
17. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 8-9.
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encompasses the territories on the western edge of the 13 colonies
where progressively settlers established themselves before its parts
progressively obtain the status of territory, followed by that of state
in the Union at the very end of the 18th and the early 19th century;
that first frontier will give birth to States like Alabama, Missouri,
Ohio, or Tennessee.18 From then on the frontier would carry on its
progressive march westwards. As for the Frontier or Pioneer
(Adventurer in the sense of the Merchant Adventurer of the 15th
century and later would be an as good or even better qualification)
lawyer.19 The generally young man with a fairly recent legal
baggage acquired by articling or passing through one of the early
law schools, one can easily imagine that his luggage strapped near
his saddle would not leave much room for many books, even of the
size of Jacob‟s Dictionary or—but this was much heavier—
Blackstone. The Bible (indispensable to administer oaths or be
read in the last minutes before the hanging of a murderer among
other things) was more likely to be in the bags in front of or behind
his saddle.
III. FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY
The period around the Declaration of Independence by the
American colonies in 1776 and the 1820‟s opened up from the
point of view of the production of law with five major events
which may be seen as somewhat linked together by a common
starting point: the Declaration of Independence itself and its legal
form, the Articles of Confederation, followed by the Constitution
of the United States. Centering on these fundamental texts, let us
only mention these five major events: in chronological order, 1)
the adoption of constitutional texts; 2) the departure from the legal
scene of many prominent lawyers of the times; 3) the increased
lack of law reports; 4) the rise of major treaties; and 5) the creation
of the first law schools.
A. The Adoption of Constitutions
I am not going to elaborate on this, but let me just remind the
reader of the importance, from the point of view of the formal
sources of law, of the appearance of a text encompassing all the
fundamental features of the structure of the State. It was of course
known in the English legal history since the passing of the
18.
19.

In alphabetical not chronological order.
See, e.g. WILLIAM FRANCIS ENGLISH, THE PIONEER LAWYER AND
JURIST IN MISSOURI XXI 2 (1947).
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Instrument of Government of 1653, but had been deliberately
wiped off from memory as unconstitutional and thus, altogether
with all the laws of the Commonwealth, sent back to the limbos of
non-existence. Whatever “legal” had taken place during a period of
some fifteen years was replaced by the first “legal” years of the
reign in absentia of Charles II in exile in the Netherlands.20 From
then on and until today, England (and later the United Kingdoms)
never felt the need for a single constitutional document, although
its constitution is far from being totally unwritten.
On the contrary, as from the Articles of Confederation the
United States (and, in the immediately following years, their
thirteen members) were living under a basic legal document. Even
if at the beginning it did not matter much for the current
adjudication of litigation between common citizens, it laid next to
the principles of justice and natural law inherited from colonial
times as another term of reference when starting the quest for law.
That is, as a document where one would find some principle from
which to deduct a possible solution to a legal problem.
B. The Departure from the Legal Scene of Many Prominent
Lawyers
One of the first results of the American Revolution was the
Loyalist diaspora which, for example, led to Canada between forty
and fifty thousand British subjects who were faithful to the Crown.
Among them were many lawyers of whose the exact number seems
unknown although they have recently attracted more interest,
especially insofar Nova Scotia is concerned.21 Among those who
remained many went into politics or the judiciary at a high level.
The names of Adams, Kent and Marshall, each in its own sphere,
the State, and/or the Judiciary, have become the most glaring
examples of that phenomenon. But it is likely that these are the
trees concealing the forest. Finally, many Loyalists who had
reached a respectable status in the profession and could or would
not migrate for various reasons preferred retirement to the risk of
being disbarred for their political opinions. Some of them
depending on where they resided, were effectively expelled from
the bar, but this attitude was far from making unanimity. Major
20. The first acts passed by Parliament after the return of Charles II in
1660 were numbered 12 Charles II.
21. See, among others, the recent article, Jim Phillips, The Court and the
Legal Profession: Loyalist Lawyers and the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, 1785–
1790, The Promise and Perils of Law: Lawyers in Canadian History (Wesley
Pue & Backhouse eds. 2009); see also www.loyalistresearchnet.org (last visited
April 21, 2011).
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figures, like Alexander Hamilton took a clear stand against it and
he was not alone in his stand. As a result, for some authors,
independence “wrought havoc upon the American legal
profession;” this quantity-wise, the quality-wise approach being as
strong under the pen E. Griswold, “There is no doubt that this was
a serious set-back to the overall calibre of the profession in
America.”22 Such statements, which are common saying among the
most prominent legal historians of the period, must be taken with
caution, as Nolan has quite convincingly demonstrated by showing
how different the situation was in Maryland.23 One thing, however,
may be accepted: training for the bar through apprenticeship
became more difficult, which does not mean that it disappeared.
C. The Increased Lack of Law Reports
We have seen that in the previous period referring to cases was
not an easy task for various reasons. The quasi-permanent conflict
with Britain until the end of 1814 just accentuated the problem.
Not only would English reports arrive with more difficulties, but
the revolutionary spirit was prone to reject English law as such, it
being one of the symbols of previous oppression. As for local
reports it took some fifteen years for the first ones to appear in
many states and one could not expect decided cases by the
supreme or appeal courts to immediately cover the whole field of
law. As Kent wrote at the end of the century, “one never dreamed
of volumes of reports and written opinions.”24 Thus the ground
was not yet ready for the development of a possible inductive
approach.
D. The Rise of Treatises
Five years before independence was proclaimed and two years
after the publication of its last volume by the Cambridge
University Press, William Blackstone‟s four volumes of his
Commentaries were published in Philadelphia and had an
immediate success in the United States: 1400 copies were rapidly
sold, supplemented by 2500 before 1776. Very quickly, Wood and
Jacob were forgotten. Here, at last, a handy (four in eight volumes,
instead of the similar folios of Wood) and systematic (as we have
22. The two quotations are in the seminal paper Dennis R. Nolan, The
Effect of the Revolution on the Bar: the Maryland Experience, 62 VA. L. REV.
969 (1976).
23. Id.
24. See James B. Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at the
Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169, 170 (1895) (quoting Kent).
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seen the plan of Justinian‟s Institutes, which Blackstone follows,
was familiar to colonial lawyers) description of the common law
was available. No wonder that the frequency of the references to
the Commentaries had so quickly struck me when ventured for the
first time in the South Carolina law reports many, many years ago.
There is no need to elaborate on that success story which appears
in all text-books about early American legal history. Blackstone
was not only a source for judges. It also struck young men either
articling or studying in one of the early law schools, or even some
of them temporarily lost in the countryside because of the War of
Independence.25 As Nolan quite convincingly showed, his
influence was “more indirect and far more diffuse, but no less
significant, than is usually claimed.”26
But Blackstone presented a major problem as of 1776. The
public law part of his work was pure blasphemy in the Republic.
There was also a point here and there where the clause “as near as
may be” had transformed English common law in American
common law. No wonder thus that “annotated” versions of the
Commentaries appeared rapidly, the best known being that of StJohn Tucker published in 1803. Interestingly enough the notes
updated Blackstone in accordance with the American constitution
and laws, but also with the same of the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
If Blackstone‟s work played a fundamental role in the shaping
of American legal minds—one must not undervalue from our point
of view, the influence of the many specific treatises—at first
directly imported from England or locally republished and later on
more or less adapted to the local law. To cite two examples, in the
first group we find some standard textbooks like Gilbert‟s Law of
Evidence, and in the second one, Chitty‟s A Treatise on the Bills of
Exchange.27
E. The Creation of the First Law Schools
Legal education in the common law as it was practiced in the
colonies was not organized on a collective basis before
independence. It appeared in Connecticut in 1784 in the town of
Litchfield and was an initiative of a practitioner of high local
25. Id. at 170, still quoting Kent discovering “with awe” the
Commentaries and “reading them again and again” in his later life.
26. Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American
Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y. U. L. REV. 731, 767 (1976);
Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
27. Quite interesting in that respect is A.W. Brian Simpson, The Rise and
Fall of the Treatise, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 668-671 (1981).
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reputation, Tapping Reeve. It lasted for nearly fifty years and
trained a thousand or so lawyers among whom many achieved a
reputation in the legal profession and beyond it.28
For the first time, the definitely erratic articling system which
is reflected in some diaries like the one of John Adams gave place
to a systematic overview of the law spread on two years at the rate
of a lecture a day delivered in the morning by Reeve or, later, by
his associate John Gould. Afternoons were spent at questioning
teachers, discussions between students and reading books or cases
in the school small library which was also its only classroom
located next to Reeve‟s house. Weekly examinations and moot
courts also prepared the students for a career at the bar. The focus
in the lectures was on principles corroborated by references to
authors (Blackstone was prominent among them) or cases.
The impact of the school on American law can be appreciated
by the careers of its graduates who came from all around the
United States: three became Supreme Court Justices and thirty-four
sat on state supreme courts, while scores of them became lower
court judges or law professors. Finally, looked at from our point of
view, it was very much in the traditional pre-independence
approach of looking for or at principles when confronted with a
case and buttressing the deducted solution by a reference to books
of authority.
The case of small professional law schools like Lichtfield is not
unique,29 but other forms of formal legal education appeared
during the period. They range from the setting up of a course of
law in an Arts Faculty, the appointment of a professor of law or the
beginnings of institutions such as Yale or Harvard Law Schools.
Some of these ventures, including a first try at Harvard, aborted
more or less rapidly. But they all shared a similar deductive
approach when dealing with the production of legal solutions: from
the facts of the case directly up to the principle and from the
principle down to the solution of the case.
IV. FROM EARLY-19TH CENTURY TO LANGDELL
From our point of view, three points emerge from the halfcentury or so which separates the definitive independence of the
United States from Britain at the end of the Anglo-American War
28. See Andrew M. Siegel, To Learn and Make Respectable Hereafter:
The Litchfield Law School in Cultural Context, N. Y. U. L. REV. 1978 (1998).
29. See ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE
LAW 132-150 (The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
1921).
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from the appointment of Christopher Columbus Langdell as
professor at Harvard: 1) professional lawyers take control of the
production of the common law; 2) specific treatises flourish; and 3)
formalism prevails.
A. Professional Lawyers Take Control of the Production of the
Common Law
If no real change appears in principle in the way of producing
the law, something different but fundamental resulted from the
change in legal education which characterizes the previous period.
A class of professional lawyers was born endowed with a similar
way of dealing with legal problems in times of deep changes in the
cultural, economic, political and social features of American
society. That class of lawyers was to provide to these changing
times not only the legal superstructure and judiciary it needed, but
also a good deal of its political elites. And when the latter would,
in their view, default at the legislative or executive levels, the
activism of the former would be there to supplement their
shortcomings. Such approach was needed. Changing circumstances
which characterize the first half of the 19th century required legal
solutions which Blackstone could not necessarily provide. Or, if he
could, at least come reinterpretation was needed in order to tackle
these new challenges. This was an intense period of legal activity
which shaped American law. It was based, like previous ones, on
new credos which in turn were formulated in legal terms by the
judiciary.
As Horwitz writes, “[w]hat dramatically distinguished
nineteenth century law from its eighteenth century counterpart was
the extent to which common law judges came to play a central role
in directing the course of social change.”30 Horwitz considers quite
validly that judges have taken the place of the legislator by
“establishing rules of very general application.”31 These rules were
equivalent to legislation and became the basic term of reference
towards which one would turn to solve legal problems. Thus the
judge begins to consider himself as a legislator, someone who
provides “remedies according to the growing wants, and varying
circumstances of men …”32

30.
31.
32.

HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 23.
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B. The Triumph of Formalism
Once the transformation was achieved, the judiciary took up
the task of buttressing the new legal framework he has contributed
to create for the advantage of “men.” Horwitz‟s phrase has to be
completed by defining which men he refers to. The answer comes
some two hundred pages later in his book. The beneficiaries of
judicial activism are the ones who hold “political and economic
power,” the “merchant and entrepreneurial groups” who manage
“to forge an alliance with the legal profession.” One thinks
irresistibly of what happened during the Tudor period in England
when, in the 16th century, merchants, parliamentarians and
lawyers joined in a ruling cultural, economic, political and social
class. In the United States, the legal tool used for the purpose was
formalism. The growing wants and varying circumstances of a
class of men were satisfied and the resulting legal system took the
new dimension of being self-evident and rational, thus completely
objective and detached from the state of the Union. And so were,
in principle, its fundamental values which, from then on, supported
its development through interpretation. The latter became highly
“rational” and “formal.”
In such framework, arguments of “justice,” “morality,” and
“equity” were preposterous, and the latter, considered as a distinct
mode of production of law would rapidly disappear being merged
into the common law. They were replaced by a “scientific”
approach to law, which was reflected in the treatise literature as we
shall see. Such an approach implied a deductive method where
solutions inexorably flow from pre-existing principles.
C. The Flourishing of Treatises
As we have seen specific treatises directly inspired from
English law were known and used in the previous period alongside
with major works offering an overall view of the same. We also
had a glimpse at the progressive americanization of these doctrinal
contributions. Thus the time had come for genuine American
specific treatises. The first step, very much in the line of the
previous period, was the publication of Kent‟s Commentaries
during the years 1826 to 1830. Then followed more specific
writers: The most prolific of these was Joseph Story, Justice of the
Supreme Court since 1811 and concurrently Dane Professor of
Law at Harvard since 1829. In thirteen years, he published nine
major treatises. From then on, treatises were part of the American
legal landscape. From our point of view, they did not encourage a
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deductive approach in the production of the common law. In spite
of a growing load of State case law. It was not used much when
confronted with concrete problems in order to launch an inductive
process.
The apex of that doctrine characterizing the treatise tradition of
the pre-civil war period which concentrated on the principles from
which solutions were deduced is perhaps best described by
William W. Story, a son of the previous one, in his A Treatise on
the Law of Contracts not under Seal:33 1) principles come before
cases; 2) cases, even the most interesting ones, are purely
illustrative of the principle; 3) accordingly the place of cases is in
the footnotes. Such a description would perfectly fit (but for the
replacement of principles by articles of a code) any French treatise
of the same period. This approach of law resulted of a strong belief
in the “scientific” character of law and the correlated idea that the
objective of any science was the discovery of fundamental
principles from which the practitioner would deduct logical step by
logical step a solution to the concrete problem he was confronted
with in daily life. Thus principles established by the science of law
would replace those which, in the previous period, came from God
or non-religious natural law.34
***
During that period, Louisiana constitutes a well-known
exception on which there is no need for me to expand in front of
auditors or readers of whom I am only a most grateful and humble
guest. Louisiana stands at the confluent of three legal traditions
which have their own laws even if two of them belong to the same
“family;” it explains its qualification as a “mixed” system on
which I‟ll come back in my conclusion.35 The contributions of
Spanish and French law and lawyers to the development of
Louisiana‟s legal system are well-known.36 Blackstone and his
commentaries (or his followers) were nevertheless not completely
absent from the picture. There are good reasons to this as much of
Louisiana‟s law is indeed common law. Thus, no wonder that if

33. WILLIAM W.
UNDER SEAL (1844).

STORY A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT

34. Simpson, supra note 27, at 671-672.
35. On this evolution which has given rise to a huge amount of literature,
see, for example, volume 63, issue 4, of the University of Chicago Law Review
(2003).
36. See, among so many others, the contribution of one of my
predecessor in the Tucker Lectures, Professor Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil
Code and Us, 59 LA. L.REV. 301 (1998).
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one looks at cases from the State Supreme Court between 1809 and
1834, one finds some 30 references to Blackstone, but also 39 to
Kent‟s Commentaries, or other specific treatises written by wellknown English jurists supplementing the Code provisions.
V. THE TIMES OF LANGDELL
(THE LAST QUARTER OF THE 19TH CENTURY)
Some ten years, after Christopher C. Langdell was appointed
Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University, Holmes reacted in
his The Common Law against what Horwitz characterizes as the
development by judges and jurists of “a small group of
fundamental conceptions—fault, will, property rights—from which
one could logically deduce virtually all legal rules and doctrines.”37
If one accepts that perception of the common law at the origins of
our last act, there is no doubt that the assumption that American
law is founded on an inductive method progressing from case to
case towards a formulation of what law is in a specific case was
still highly challengeable when Langdell enters the stage at our
fourth and last act.
Langdell shares the belief of his contemporaries that law is a
science and that accordingly the task of scholars is the discovery of
the principles governing its object, i.e. the law.38 There is however
a reaction on Langdell‟s part which is twofold: 1) the number and
volume of the law reports in which the principles were to be found
became difficult to master by the students and 2) that intellectually
the re-discovery of the principle by the student through the study
of the judge‟s reasoning was educationally more fruitful than the
reading and memorization of what the treatise said. As Langdell
himself put it: “The object of the case system is to compel the
mind to work out the principles from the cases.”39 Complementary
to that statement, came the fact that, in the mass of the decisions,
only the “leading cases” had to be studied and studied in depth.
The direct result for the teacher was his responsibility to provide
classes with casebooks in which the student could find the path (or
the successive stages) which led to a principle.
The question, from our point of view is: Has Langdell, through
the establishment of a method of legal education (the presently
everywhere practiced in the common law world case-method)
37. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 129.
38. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid Jr., The Transformation of
English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L. J. 438, 513-514
(1996).
39. Cited in The Increasing Influence of the Langdell Case System of
Instruction., 5 HARV. L. REV. 89 (1891).
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brought a fundamental change in the way the common law is
produced? In other words has the production of the law by
American judges become inductive?
I am in no position or ability even to risk an assessment of
Langdell‟s contribution to a possible change in the nature of
American law as a common law system; some of my most
distinguished colleagues have been tempted by the challenge,40 but
again I have neither the wish nor the means to support or not their
conclusions. Let me only mention them in their essentials.
Horwitz, speaking of the structure of legal reasoning in the period
1870-1905, refers to the “[d]eduction from general principles and
analogies among cases and doctrines” which he sees as “the
crystallisation of a „legalistic‟ mindset” which, as we have seen,
had emerged in the previous half-century. In a totally apparently
contradicting way, Kimball speaks of Langdell‟s “inductive
approach” which differs so much from the previous ones.41
Kimball insists on that character of Langdell‟s approach in the
discovery of principles, but, once they are established, he admits
that it turns deductive in the application of principles to facts. Thus
it appears that pre-existing principles still govern the production of
the law.
In spite of the impossibility for me to propose a clear-cut
answer to the question of Langdell‟s position and before
concluding this presentation, I would like to offer a few personal
remarks on the subject. Assuming that Langdell‟s supporters are
right, his induction process seems to focus on extracting principles
from the solutions offered by the courts; hence the need of a
careful study of case-law; hence the case method while training
lawyers. While fully supporting that method—which I have been
applying to my teachings ever since I got familiar with it in South
Carolina—I would only most carefully and humbly suggest that
this is not starting from the facts, looking for similar facts, then for
the legal solution resulting from the latter and finally applying it
with possible distinctions to the pending case thus erecting the
previous one to the status of precedent. Mutatis mutandis
Langdell‟s inductive approach appears to me nearer to that of Lord
Atkin in Donoghue when he suggests a quest for the general
principles of tort law as they can be found in the existing cases.
But as much as I am willing to admit that my reading of Langdell
40. See, e.g. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 16-17; Bruce A. Kimball,
Langdell on Contracts & Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian
Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345 (2007); see also Berman & Reid, supra
note 38, at 513-515.
41. Id. at 349.
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is erring, I am also willing to admit that I am misreading Lord
Atkin.
VI. CONCLUSION
What American practitioners and scholars developed during
the 19th century can be characterized by many features of the
“classical” common law system as it was born and grew up in
totally different surroundings in England during some five or six
(my starting point is either Henry the First or Henry the Second)
centuries or so until the eve of the American Revolution. There is
no doubt that one may say that what followed in the two countries
was a “judge-made” system of law, even if there can be differences
in the meaning of the adjective on both sides of the Atlantic and
also some general reservations as to its inapplicability to civil law
systems.42
One may also maintain the opinion that preceding cases play an
important, if not fundamental, role in the solution the judge will
build up when confronted with the facts of a case. But, if one refers
then to “precedent,” things change radically. The English
precedent is indeed fundamental. So are facts. The American
precedent is quite different, as it appears ancillary to the principles
while the English lawyer is reluctant to refer to principles possibly
deducted from precedents. Nothing is further away from facts than
principle. This difference cannot be ignored as the latter inevitably
provides a starting point for a deductive process while the latter
remains deeply rooted in induction. And, for reasons which I
believe I have shown to be obvious, the American system has
developed around principles.
Now, all this relies on a choice made by the outside observer as
to which factors matter in the definition of systems or families of
laws and, of course, on the validity or even interest of taxonomy in
its application to social phenomena. It could very well be that the
latter are totally impervious to such approach. Or that the latter is
totally out of fashion if not preposterous. I am most willing to
accept all these.
The introduction of taxonomy in the field of legal systems is
fairly recent; it dates back to the beginning of the previous century
when the comparison of legal systems took a new start. Since then
the taxonomy has developed and various combinations of some 19
criteria were proposed as a basis for the classification of legal
systems. Among these, one found all sorts of possible
42.

See Vanderlinden, supra note 3.
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characteristic of laws or legal systems: their conceptual apparatus,
their stage of development, the place they gave to fundamental
rights, their dynamism, the hierarchy of their formal sources, their
history, their economic, political or social ideology, their
characteristic institutions, the development of their legal language,
their way of thinking the law, their methods of interpretation, their
way of reason, the number of people they governed, the place they
left to religion, the race of the people they governed, their
economic system, the role of the lawyers in their development,
their material sources and, finally, their structures. Among all
these, the specialists would combine a number of them ranging
from one to seven.
As for the “families” accordingly constituted there were 20. In
most cases, reference was made to a geographical area: Africa,
Africa and Asia, Europe and America, the Far-East, Nordic
countries, Western countries, and Scandinavia. Culture was
involved when referring to religious laws or one of them,
specifically Islamic law or languages when speaking of Slavonic
laws. Then came an economic reference with the Socialist laws;
oddly enough no one ever referred to a family of capitalist laws!
There were also some odd families, like the Classical Antiquity
one, that of the “civilized” laws which was easily opposed to the
family of “primitive” laws, or, finally, that of the “other laws”
regrouping all laws which would not fit into the other ones! As for
the last four, they were, at last, referring to laws (or legal
traditions): the common law family, the Germanic laws family, the
Romanist laws family, and a combination of the last two, the
Romano-Germanic legal family.
Such taxonomies did not make much sense. Finally the most
often mentioned were the common law, Islamic law, romanogermanic and socialist families, but quite frequently selected on a
different mixture of characteristics. This also was, in my view, not
satisfying. If we bring laws together in “families,” there must be
some logic in the selection justifying this or that grouping. The
logical inescapable conclusion of such process is that every single
potential member of a family must satisfy the requirements set
down for entering the family as defined in its characterization. If it
doesn‟t, it has to find another family or build a family of its own.
Or we have to change the requirements asked for entering the
family, thus its essential features. This is the choice I believe we
are confronted with when looking for a family for the 19th century
American legal system.
Thus, either the latter meets the requirement of a so-called
common law family, including that fundamental one which is the
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inductive method of law producing. Or it does not, which is what I
tend to believe having read my fellow legal historians specializing
in American legal history. Or, if we absolutely want to include
American law in the common law systems, we have to exclude the
inductive method from the essential characteristics of a common
law system, which I am not willing to do when reading my fellow
legal theorists of the English legal system which I still consider to
be the archetype of common law systems.
Perhaps is it also true that logic itself is not any more part of
the grid we are tempted to apply to social phenomena. We live in a
time of disorder not of order, of irrationality not of rationality. It
could very well be that if we look at the producers, forms, contents
and processes characteristic of every law, each of them will appear
as a mixed system—would I dare to say a bastard as it would have
no real family. What we are contemplating today is, nearly
everywhere, a complex ever-moving thoroughfare of producers,
forms, contents and processes fighting and fertilizing one another.
If this is the case, I would be completely satisfied. Being myself
convinced, as a radical legal pluralist, that, in many cases if not
most of them, law is but what every individual claims it is, I would
appear so much contradicting myself when pleading for taxonomy,
that I feel it much better to stop here before making a complete
fool of myself.
Here cracks a noble scientific process
Good night sweet taxonomy
And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest.43
Baton Rouge, May 16 2008Brussels, March 10 2011

43. I hope the bard of Stratford-upon-Avon will forgive me this free
adaptation of the closing sentence of his Hamlet.
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You will take him in your arms, embrace and caress him the
way a man caresses his wife. He will be your double, your
second self, a man who is loyal, who will stand at your side
through the greatest dangers. Soon you will meet him, the
companion of your heart.
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See GILGAMESH 83-84 (Stephen Mitchell trans., Free Press, New York,
2004). The earliest surviving texts relating legends of Gilgamesh date from 2100
BCE. Id. at 3. The Standard Version of the Epic of Gilgamesh dates from about
1200 BCE. Id. at 6. The story of Gilgamesh is his relationship with Enkidu with
whom Gilgamesh has a homoerotic and, perhaps, homosexual bond. Id. at 13.
Yet, his physical bond, as this text indicates, nourishes fides–the fidelity of a
loyal and intimate companion. The battle of these heroes is ―an entrance into
intimacy, and as close to lovemaking as to violence.‖ Id. at 23.
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I. INTRODUCTION: PERSONS AND PERSONALITY
It is best to begin boldly.
What is the law? Is it nothing more than a particular system of
principles, rules, and standards, enacted by a constituted authority,
that govern people at a particular time and in a particular place? On
Main Street, people may think of the law as such, as a set of
sovereign pronouncements without ethical direction. Or, like many
private-law practitioners, they may think of the law as a random
scheme of rules of allocative efficiency and maximization of
wealth.
Thoughtful citizens, however, know that the law‘s empire is
more than a grouping of prescriptions and sanctions. Throughout
the ages, they have talked about the law as a complex of truthful
ideas and moral propositions of ways to regulate the conduct of
people in society amongst themselves, in their relations to things,
and in their dealings with the sovereign. Thus, it is only in a highly
limited, indeed unnatural, sense that the law, as a topic and as a
system of rules, can be said to be purely positivistic1 and valuefree.2

1.
Positivism is popularly perceived both as a denial that equity, justice
and reason form part of an imperative ius commune and as an assertion that there
are no supereminent principles to which legislation must confirm. Yet,
positivism does admit that there may be some moral and ethical content to law
or, at the very least, that positive laws make moral norms effective. See Brian H.
Bix, Natural Law: The Modern Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 60, 95-98 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., Oxford University Press, 2002) (summarizing the modern tradition
of the natural law theory and its relation to positivism). As Bix notes, the
positive law school has two major approaches (inclusivism and exclusivism) to
the treatment of moral and ethical matters. Id. at 7-8. Even where it is admitted
that law may have some moral and ethical content, positivism, at first blush,
would seem open to a plurality of moral and ethical standards or at least open to
as many such standards as there are systems. Can many moralities be compared?
For an assessment of positivism within the context of comparative law, see
Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence–The
Comparability of Legal Systems, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 713, 724-731 (arguing that
positivism, by reason of the plurality of approaches, does not allow for
comparison of legal systems).
2.
Finnis has an appealing definition of law that refers to both enacted
rules but also to un-enacted, community-regulating norms that are not (or have
not yet been) recognized by the constituted authority. Although the thrust of his
definition seems highly positivistic, the reference to the ―common good‖ as the
telos of the law is the definition‘s focus and is, of course, the definition‘s
contentious core. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 276-281 (Oxford University Press, 2000). His definition is:
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As it happens, earnest debate on the nature of the law gives
every indication that the law is ethically ambitious and that it
aspires, in very practical ways, to put in place love-based3 rules for
good social order. Good law does not adopt single-value
approaches. It harkens for a healthy relativism attuned to the
community. It accepts the pluralism of moral values, and it
acknowledges that the source of these values is likely both secular
and theological.4 Thus, good law is polycentric, facilitative, and
responsive to personal autonomy.5
[The law] refer[s] primarily to rules made, in accordance with
regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective authority
(itself identified and, standardly, constituted as an institution by
legal rules) for a ‗complete‘ community, and buttressed by
sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of
adjudicative institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions
being directed to reasonably resolving any of the community‘s coordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulating, or
overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or
sources of norms) for the common good of that community,
according to a manner and form itself adapted to that common
good by features of specificity, minimization of arbitrariness, and
maintenance of a quality of reciprocity between the subjects of the
law both amongst themselves and in their relations with the lawful
authorities.
Id. at 276-277.
3.
See HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION
OF LAW AND RELIGION 313-318 (1993). ―I would contend that law, understood
in a Christian perspective, is a process of creating conditions in which sacrificial
love, the kind of love personified by Jesus Christ, can take root in society and
grow.‖ Id. at 313. Sacrificial love is agape. Again, from a Christian viewpoint, it
is by loving our fellow men and women that we know God. To love is to
cooperate.
4.
See generally George P. Fletcher, What Law is Like, 50 S.M.U.L.
REV. 1599, 1610-1612 (1997). ―The law is more like religion than the
practitioners of either are likely to recognize.‖ Id.at 1611. ―But lawyers and
theologians share a pursuit of ultimate truth in the context of culture-specific
traditions. They must mediate between the demands of universal reason and
their localized respect for particular sources.‖ Id. ―Because their authorities are
not always moral, both law and religion end up endorsing views that sensitive
free-thinkers find abhorrent.‖ Id.
5.
Polycentricity looks at legal relationships as relationships between
the normative orders of a particular society. It seeks the recognition of these
relationships within the legal system of that society. See generally SURYA
PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY 1-17 (1996). Legal polycentricity
accepts the pluralism of moral values. Id. at 6. It does not accept that ―. . .
conflicting values are reconcilable under one truth.‖ Id. at 3. Legal
polycentricity ―provides facilities to persons for realizing their particular
objectives.‖ Id. at 13. It accommodates personal autonomy. Id. The Law Reform
Commission of New Zealand acknowledges law‘s facilitative function. See
generally The Law Reform Commission of New Zealand, Recognising Same–Sex
Relationships, Study Paper 4 (Dec. 1999). ―The history of mankind
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So, the law in motion endeavors to bring about the common
and actually6 moral good, as this good is tentatively and modestly
understood and experienced in today‘s context. In this regard, the
law is meekly cognizant of its own forward-looking—indeed, one
might say—its own eschatological dimensions.7
One of the subject matters of the law is personhood.
―[A]person in law is one who can play a part in the life of the
law.‖8 The law asks: who is a person, and what is her condition? It
addresses this question by considering the essential qualities of a
demonstrates that one of the ways in which human sexuality manifests itself is
in the formation of publicly avowed and socially recognised relationships
intended to be enduring. The legal code of a state properly responsive to the
aspirations of its citizens will make provision for such relationships be they
heterosexual or homosexual.‖ Id. at 9.
6.
―Actually‖ means a ―good‖ rooted in actual persons‘ desires and
experiences. See Steven D. Smith, Natural Law and Contemporary Moral
Thought: A Guide from the Perplexed, 42 AM J. JURIS. 299, 316-330 (1997)
(book review) (questioning the value of the ―objective‖ account of sexual
morality, and advocating a discourse of ―good‖ where ―good‖ is personal and
subjective in some important sense). ―[T]he natural lawyer severs goods from
our language and understanding, in which things are ―good‖ to and for persons
and as experienced by persons . . . To put the point differently, our moral
discourse is conducted by us, for better or worse, for our purposes and subject to
our understandings.‖ Id. at 320.
7.
See Michael McAuley, The Gay Man and His Civil Code, 64 LA. L.
REV. 443, 449 (2004) (stating that culturally constructed identities will not
survive the grave and that the eschatological vocation of a good civil code means
that people must learn to live with each other here and today). See also GARETH
MOORE OP, THE BODY IN CONTEXT–SEX AND CATHOLICISM 2-3 (Continuum,
London, 2001) (1992). ―To be fit to live in the kingdom is to live with others in a
particular way or range of ways. If a Christian ethic may be seen as
eschatological, it is also social. It is about learning to be with each other.‖ Id. at
3. On the relationship of eschatology and ethics, and on ―action for the world‘s
betterment,‖ see Kathryn Tanner, Eschatology and Ethics, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 41, 52-56 (Gilbert Meilaender & William
Werpehowski eds., Oxford, 2005). See also Margaret A. Farley, New Patterns of
Relationship: Beginnings of a Moral Revolution, 36 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 627
(1975).
If the ultimate normative model for relationships between persons
is the very life of the Trinitarian God, then a strong eschatological
ethic suggests itself as a context for Christian justice. That is to
say, interpersonal communion characterized by equality,
mutuality, and reciprocity may serve not only as a norm against
which every pattern of relationship may be measured but as a goal
to which every pattern of relationship is ordered.
Id. at 645-646. It should be noted that Farley‘s observations focus on malefemale relationships.
8.
H., J., AND L. MAZEAUD, LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, t. 1, v. 2, no. 438
(trans.) (7th ed., Montchrestien, Paris, 1986), cited in QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW 203 (John E.C. Brierley and Roderick
A. Macdonald, eds., Emond Montgomery, Toronto, 1993).
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person under a topic called personality. When talking about
personality, the law calls persons actors or subjects and says that
they must be free in order to have full personality since the law has
had, at times, relatively developed notions of deprivation or
absence of personality.9
Each citizen is one-of-one, but each is also one-of-many since
all citizens belong to political, social and economic communities.
In one sense, a person is a citizen because she belongs to one of
these communities, and her rights and duties are specified by that
community. In another sense, her citizenship is coextensive with
her personhood and extends beyond national boundaries. Her
citizenship reflects her participation in communities and her
implication in their life.
In these communities, citizens are called to cooperate with each
other.10 The nature and scope of the right-owning and duty-owing
attributes of a citizen‘s personality are determined on the basis of
her status (or statuses) in these communities. Across the board,
family status largely determines a person‘s capacity to enjoy and
exercise rights in the society where she lives.
In civil society,11 in contemporary12 private law,13 and in the
West,14 the family is the benchmark that indicates people‘s
9.
At times, the attributes of personality have not been extended to noncitizens, outlaws, the imprisoned, and the enslaved. Personality has also been
interested in human physiology. For example, in Roman law and in the ancien
droit of France, monstres (monsters, in the sense of deformed neonates) had no
personality. See AUBRY & RAU, 1 DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 363 n.10 (7th ed.,
André Ponsard ed., Paris, 1964).
10.
In the context of property law, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE
EDGES OF THE FIELD-LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 20-25
(Beacon Press, Boston, 2000). ―Rights must be limited to protect rights. This
paradox arises because we do not live alone. The law–including the law of
property – recognizes that our fate is tied to the fate of others. Moreover, the law
does not exist only to protect our interests; it exists also to promote liberty and
justice. These goals cannot be realized unless we act in ways that respect the
interests of others.‖ Id. at 20.
11.
Civil society is a society governed by civil law–ius civile. In this
sense, the civil law means the secular law applicable to citizens of a particular
place that regulates their public and private lives and that accords to them certain
civil rights and freedoms. On the history of the meaning of civil law, see
generally Alain Sériaux, Droit civil, in DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE
JURIDIQUE 435 (Denis Alland & Stéphane Rials eds., Presses universitaires de
France, Paris, 2003).
12.
Roland Barthes asks: ―De qui suis-je le contemporain? Avec qui estce que je vis ?‖ (Who is my contemporary? With whom do I live?). See ROLAND
BARTHES, COMMENT VIVRE ENSEMBLE–NOTES DE COURS ET DE SEMINAIRES AU
COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1976–1977 36 (Éditions du Seuil 2002). Barthes states
that contemporaneousness is a very complex and little examined topic. Id.
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personal status, and the rights and duties related to that status.
Accordingly, personality usually is discussed in a traditional
family context,15 dominated by the metanarrative of marriage16 as
13.
Private law is the ensemble of legal rules governing relations among
persons and, sometimes, between individuals and public bodies. Private law
usually encompasses civil law, commercial law and, perhaps, judicial law. See
the entry for ―private law‖ in PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL
LEXICONS 339 (2d ed., Les Éditions Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 1991). See also
Introduction, in 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW XXXVI (Peter Birks ed., Oxford
University Press, 2000). ―The whole of the law is either public law or private
law. There is no need to pause on this, nor to investigate the boundary disputes.
Our present business is only with private law. English Public Law will deal with
the other side. It will deal with constitutional law, human rights, administrative
law, and criminal law.‖ Id. English Public Law seems to take the position that
the sources of fundamental rights are found either in constitutional documents,
statutes or case-law. In the absence of a written constitution, as is the case for
England, judges have exclusive control over the sources for legal justifications.
See Evelyn Ellis, Constitutional Fundamentals: Sources of Law and the
Hierarchy of Norms, in ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW 3, 44-45 (David Feldman ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2004). Quaere, where do judges find their sources?
From a certain perspective, the British inability to protect fundamental rights
(owing to the absence of written constitutional documents) has been somewhat
mitigated by the Human Rights Act 1998. Under the terms of this Act, specified
rights were adopted into municipal law. Presumably on account of the
parliamentary adoption of certain provisions of the European Convention, Ellis‘
co-contributor and the volume‘s general editor, David Feldman, deals with the
topic of privacy, lifestyle, personal integrity, status, gender, sexuality, and family
life solely under the Convention and the Act. See David Feldman, Rights to Life,
Physical and Moral Integrity, Freedom of Lifestyle and Religion or Belief, in
ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW, supra at 471-479. Feldman does not discuss the topic of
the origin of the rights or the notion that human rights might be innate in the
persona (personhood) of the human person (and not conferred by the sovereign
or otherwise formally justified).
14.
Where is the West? It is a hemisphere. It indicates a direction on a
compass, but also a metaphorical direction: ―Go West, young man.‖ However,
the West, in the law, might be taken to mean all those traditions and systems that
have a like approach to issues and that have a common mentalité (mental, or
intellectual, disposition) characterized by their attention to personalism
(individual freedom and social duty), legalism (the need to base decisions on a
general rule of law), and intellectualism (conceptual and systematic legal
methodology). See Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, 38
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 19-27 (1990). See also BERMAN, supra note 3 at 23-33
(describing the characteristic elements of the Western legal tradition). On
modern perspectives of the nature of a legal tradition, see Ugo Mattei & Anna di
Robilant, The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: Postmodernism and
International Style in the Legal Architecture of Europe, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1053,
1071-1077 (2004). ―Membership in one legal tradition is not exclusive, because
tradition is not an ontological entity; rather, it is an interpretive entity largely
defined by a sense of belonging and identity.‖ Id. at 1072.
15.
―Tradition‖ and ―traditional‖ are unsafe words, especially in the
domain of intimate personal relationships. One might sensibly propose the
following definition. ―Tradition‖ is a complex of customs and practices handed
down from one living generation to another living generation, the elements of
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related by its mythweavers.17 This is so notwithstanding modern
disestablishment of the conventional marriage model.18
The personality in the law, or juridical personality, of the
human person is a personality of a person who has human selfconsciousness, self-identity, and center of reference.19 It deals with
which can be found in the actual experience of a living generation or the accurate
memory of a living generation of the historically verified experience of a former
generation or generations. Can ―tradition‖ mean anything more than this?
Today‘s lawmakers and popular media use ―traditional marriage‖ in the sense of
marriage as experienced everywhere since the beginning of time and, of course,
as linked to the ―intelligent design‖ of human existence. The tedious and mantric
repetition of ―traditional marriage‖ (and its imagined, immemorial incidents and
effects) constitutes not only a mistaken reality but a clearly invented tradition.
On the nature of an invented tradition, see generally Eric Hobsbawm,
Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1-14 (Eric
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Hobsbawm states:
‗Invented tradition‘ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms
of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity
with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to
establish continuity with a suitable historic past.
Id. at 1.
It is the contrast between the constant change and innovation of
the modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts
of social life within it as unchanging and invariant, that makes the
‗invention of tradition‘ so interesting for historians of the past two
centuries.
Id. at 2.
16.
Fineman discusses social and cultural ―narratives‖ about the family
and marriage as an institution. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 145-176 (1995).
17.
For the word ―mythweaver‖, see IF NOT, WINTER–FRAGMENTS OF
SAPPHO 353, 382 (Ann Carson trans. 2002).
18. Cott summarizes various reasons for the disestablishment,
dejuridification, delegalization, and privitization of marriage in the United
States. See generally, Nancy F. Cott, PUBLIC VOWS-A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE
AND THE NATION 200-227 (2000). For the use of disestablishment and its
synonyms, see id. at 283, n.17. Most of the reasons are economic. They include:
two-earner families; households of unrelated groups; cohabiting couples; more
than one generation living together; single-person households; single mothers
and fathers; transgressive (italics added) sexuality; and enforcement of support
obligations outside of the marital bond. Id. at 214-215. When Cott uses the word
―transgressive,‖ does she mean sinful sexuality or sexuality not conformable
with certain societal expectations?
19.
See GERALD O‘COLLINS, S.J., CHRISTOLOGY–A BIBLICAL,
HISTORICAL, AND SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF JESUS 224-249 (Oxford University
Press, 1995) (discussing the divine and human natures of Christ). ―The ego of his
human consciousness is also the Word of God as humanly conscious and selfconscious, that is, as operating in and through this human awareness. God the
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her existence, her voluntary action, and her rights and
obligations.20 It is the free action of the citizen and her free access
to legal institutions. Juridical personality is also her free enjoyment
and exercise of civil rights, and her freely assumed obligation to
undertake and discharge her civil duties. She has a patrimony21
and, in the private law, rights and duties relate either to her
patrimonial assets and debts or to her extrapatrimonial rights (and
concomitant duties) to the respect of her personal dignity, integrity
and privacy, as well as to the respect of her other civil rights and
fundamental freedoms.22 In public law she also has a patrimonial
stake in property that belongs to the community whether local,
regional or international. She and all others are stakeholders and
are entrusted to preserve and safeguard the common patrimony for
transmission from generation unto generation.23
Son takes as his own this human self-consciousness, self-identity, and centre of
reference.‖ Id. at 247.
20.
The law is interested in a person‘s existence, identity (name,
domicile or residence, civil and family status, and sex), and her attributes
(subjective rights). See generally JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 1: LES
PERSONNES 15, 19-177 (21st ed., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2000).
The objective law attributes subjective rights. Id. at 15. Modern French
scholarship still adheres to a formal definition of law. Law is a series of
prescriptive rules for social conduct that are sanctioned by a public authority.
The French carefully distinguish legal and moral rules: their objectives are
different. See generally JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, THEORIE GENERALE DU DROIT 4252 (4th ed., Dalloz, Paris, 2003).
21.
A patrimony is the aggregate of a person‘s rights and obligations
determined or determinable in economic or pecuniary terms. ―Extrapatrimonial‖
primarily refers to rights that are ―out of commerce‖ and have no monetary
value. See generally the entries for ―patrimony‖, ―extrapatrimonial‖, and
―extrapatrimonial right‖, supra note 13, PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND
BILINGUAL LEXICONS at 157, 311-312. A breach of an extrapatrimonial right has
patrimonial implications.
22.
―Civil rights,‖ ―civil freedoms,‖ ―fundamental freedoms,‖ ―civil
liberties‖ and other terms of like ilk are often used interchangeably. As used in
this paper, ―civil rights‖ refers to those ―rights‖ recognized explicitly or
implicitly by the private law, and ―fundamental freedoms‖ to those ―rights‖
formally or informally present in the public law and, in particular, in the
constitutions, written or unwritten, of sovereign bodies. Of course, there is
considerable travel between the private and public spheres of the law, and it is
often difficult to determine whether the private law or the public law first
recognized any particular right. For a short, readable account of the various
senses of ―rights‖, see MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 19-24
(The Bodley Head, London, 1973).
23. The notion of ―patrimoine commun‖ (common patrimony) is
particularly useful in connection with environmental protection issues. See
generally Marie-José Del Rey, La notion controversée de patrimoine commun,
D. 2006, No. 6, 388. As a juridical conception, the idea of common patrimony
promotes awareness that every individual is a stakeholder. Id. at 389. Although
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This paper examines intimate association, under the rubric of
intimacy, as the actual, aspiringly good experience of people in the
law. In this paper, intimate association is unmoored from legal
abstractions of an ideal or canonically imagined society of robotic
citizens and released from any pre-existing or pre-conceived
morality that militates in favor of a single form of intimate
association. It is transsystemic24 and cross-disciplinary in that it is
interested in the best approach to intimacy in Western legal
traditions and systems25 and in the social sciences. The best
approach is supranational and is fashioned from a ius commune
that is a ―shared international fund of private law [thinking].‖26
Accordingly, this paper first discusses the relationship between
juridical personality and intimacy. It then sets out to identify the
contours of juridical personality and further define its attributes.
Third, it looks at the right of intimacy, considered as an attribute of

touted as a novel conception in civil law scholarship, its notions are similar to
those that have long been known to underscore the chthonic legal tradition. See
generally H.P. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD–SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN THE LAW 59-91 (2d ed., Oxford University Press, 2005).
24.
On the meaning of the word ―transsystemic‖ as a way of knowing
the law, see generally Nicholas Kasirer, Bijuralism in Law‟s Empire and in
Law‟s Cosmos, 52 J. LEG. EDUC. 29 (2002).
25.
The notion of a legal system is roughly understood as an
interconnected and interrelated body of institutions, rules and norms that
formally or informally govern society in a particular place. A University of
London student subject guide nicely describes a legal system as ―a complex of
operations, processes, human actions, institutions and ideals.‖ See WAYNE
MORRISON ET AL., COMMON LAW REASONING AND INSTITUTIONS 26
(Publications Office, The External Programme, University of London 2004). A
legal tradition has been well defined by Merryman. See John Henry Merryman,
The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western
Europe and Latin America 1-4, in THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
AMERICAN, AND EAST ASIA-CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (John Henry Merryman et
al. eds., The Michie Company, Charlottesville, 1994, 2000 repr.).
[A legal tradition] is a set of deeply rooted, historically
conditioned attitudes about the nature of the law, about the role of
law in society and the polity, about the proper organization and
operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be
made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught.
Id. at 3-4.
26.
See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE
JUSTICE 193 (Martinus Nijhoof Publishers, The Netherlands, 1993). Juenger
proposes a new methodological pluralism for the resolution of choice-of-law
issues in American conflicts law. Id. at 191-194. For the use of the word ―best‖
and for a methodological approach similar to Juenger‘s proposal, see generally
L. McDougall III, Toward Application of the Best Rule of Law in Choice of Law
Cases, 35 MERCER L. REV. 483 (1984) (advocating that courts should apply the
best rule of law in choice-of-law cases).
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juridical personality and as a private-law right of intimate
association. It endeavors to locate the formal and informal sources
of intimacy in close, personal relationships. The paper next tries to
specify intimate associations. By way of conclusion, it restates the
nature of juridical personality and its intimate components.
II. JURIDICAL PERSONALITY AND INTIMACY
Juridical personality recognizes that the citizen has important
rights of intimacy in her life and at home. These rights include the
right of intimacy, expressed as a right at large, and particular rights
of intimacy. Particular rights, for example, relate to the protection
of her physical and intellectual intimacy, the intimacy of her
appearance, image and reputation, the protection of her intimate
private life against undue public scrutiny, her intimacy as an
expectant mother concerning the circumstances of conception and
birth, and the intimacy relating to her personal health, especially
her decisions for final care.27
There is no set classification of rights. However, in this list of
particularized rights, there are rights that might be recognized as
rights of privacy; there are also other rights, sometimes referred to
as personality rights, e.g. privacy-based and property-based
protection of her image, and the protection of her reputation; and,
there are rights that relate to her physical integrity, e.g. the
intimacy of her body and the circumstances of conception. Indeed,
intimacy, privacy, and integrity often are used synonymously.28
27.
The discussion draft of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico refers to the
right of intimacy (intimidad) as a fundamental right (derecho esencial) in the
text of its art. 8 of Book One (Jural Relations). See Comisión Conjunta
Permanente para la Revisión y Reforma del Código Civil de Puerto Rico,
Memorial Explicativo, Código Civil de Puerto Rico (Borrador para discusión)
(revised March 5, 2003) 14, available at http://www.oslpr.org (last visited
February 21, 2011). See also the comments on various rights of intimacy. Id. at
9, 10, 11, 20, 33, 39, 41 and 42. Both dignity (dignidad), joined to the concept of
honor (honor), and physical and moral integrity (integridad fisica y moral) are
specified rights in art. 8. Id. at 14. Dignity and intimacy are used to describe the
rights of an expectant mother. Id. at 10. Respect of dignity and integrity is
required for autopsies and for the disposal of remains and bodily parts. Id. at 37.
28.
There are language problems when talking about intimacy. Although
intimacy, in English and Spanish, embody similar notions of close friendship and
sexual relations, the words ―privacidad” and ―intimidad,” in Spanish, both
express the idea of ―privacy‖ in English. See THE OXFORD SPANISH DICTIONARY
1593 (3d ed., Oxford University Press, 2003). The French Civil Code relates the
concept of ―intimité” (intimacy) to the concept of ―vie privée” (private life). See
art. 9, Code Civil 2010 (Éditions Dalloz, Paris, 2009).
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They are all attached to the general notion of dignity,29 and dignity
is itself identified both as a separate attribute of the person and an
overarching notion of the human condition. Indeed, dignity-atlarge patently requires a high level of respect for the way by which
a person fashions her private life and the degree to which her
private life is, aptly and fortunately, strange. It is her étrangeté that
announces not only her diversity and her choice of intimacy, but
also her enigma and her mysterium.30
Yet, in a person‘s private life, intimacy is not limited to her
emotions or sentiments or to her privacy. Nor is it limited to her
right of privacy of sexual intimacy. It goes beyond her sexuality
and sexual conduct.31 Its expression, in general terms, as a right,
embraces a right of intimate association between adults and a right
of choice of a close personal, economic, social, and sexual
relationship32 with another person. It also refers to other close or
29.
The Supreme Court of Canada has defined ―dignity.‖ See M. v. H,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 261 (Supreme Court of Canada). “The central purpose
of the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) of the Charter is the protection and
promotion of human dignity. The concept of human dignity is concerned with
the autonomy, self-worth, and self-respect of individuals. As Iacobucci J. points
out in Law [Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1
S.C.R. 497], . . . ―[h]uman dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon
personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs,
capacities, or merits.‖ Id. Iacobucci, J.‘s conception of human dignity would
seem to reflect the thin meaning of this term. See Doron Shultziner, Human
Dignity–Functions and Meanings, GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 12-16 (vol. 3, issue
3, article 3) (2003) (defining the thin meaning of human dignity as a meaning
related to humiliation and self-worth). Shultziner explains how the thin meaning
relates to other meanings:
Whereas rights and duties, and honor, are contained within the
upward wide moral view that is meant to harmonize human
moral worth and one‘s proper social-political relation with other
human beings, the thin meaning is contained within a thin moral
view that is focused on the crude violation of that basic moral
worth.
Id. at 12.
30.
Didier Eribon quotes the French poet René Char (1907–1988) as
saying: ―Développez votre étrangeté légitime.” See DIDIER ERIBON, REFLEXIONS
SUR LA QUESTION GAY 486 (Fayard, Paris, 1999). The French word ―étrangeté‖
embraces, as perhaps the English ―strangeness‖ does, meanings of singularity,
originality and, of course, eccentricity. See also M. v. H., supra note 29 at para.
260 (Gonthier J.) ―It is important to note that it is not a denial of human dignity
to recognize difference; to the contrary, acknowledging individual personal traits
is a means of fostering human dignity. By recognizing individuality, and
rejecting forced uniformity, the law celebrates differences, fostering the
autonomy and integrity of the individual.‖ Id. at para. 262.
31.
See infra Part. III & IV.
32.
For the right of choice of a sexual relationship, see, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). ―The fact that
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intimate associations that encompass most, but not necessarily all,
of these relational aspects. These associations involve living
together.33 They do not imply and are not predicated on sexual
relations, although access to state-administered benefits may
require some sort of sexual relationship.34 This right of intimate
association might be said to belong to a new category of privatelaw rights—civil equality rights. These rights are linked to notions
of equality before the law and to protection against unlawful
discrimination.35 The notion of civil equality rights relates to the
following question and answer. Who is entitled to civil rights?
Everyone.
The right of intimacy, at large, relates to status and to the
capacity to perform specific activities. Status is understood to have
two classic components: status civitatis (nationality) and status
familiae (family status) although other notions of status, such a
person‘s age, health, profession, or occupation, have surfaced.36
Status answers the questions: who is a legal subject, and who
possess rights? In the 19th century, non-nationals had limited civil
rights in many legal systems. In modern law, the concept of
nationality as a portal to capacity has been largely displaced by

individuals define themselves in a significant way through their sexual
relationships suggests...that much of the richness of a relationship will come
from the freedom to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.‖ Id.
33.
On the rational and sentimental meaning of ―living together‖, see
generally Nicholas Kasirer, What Is Vie Commune? Qu'est-ce que living
together?, in MELANGES PAUL-ANDRE CREPEAU 487 (Cowansville, Yvon Blais,
1997).
34.
For example, private-law and public-law benefits and obligations, in
Canada, under the federal authority and administered by that authority, have
been extended to ―. . . all couples who have been cohabiting in a conjugal
relationship for at least one year, in order to reflect values of tolerance, respect
and equality, consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.‖
See Summary, An Act to modernize the Statutes of Canada in relation to benefits
and obligations, S.C. 2000, c.12 (Bill C-23). What is ―a conjugal relationship‖?
It has long been presumed that this type of relationship must be marriage-like
and involve sexual relations. For a discussion of conjugality and nonconjugality, see generally Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder, What is MarriageLike Like?, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269 (2001). The Supreme Court of Canada has
observed that a conjugal relationship may exist even in the absence of a sexual
relationship. Id. at 291-300 (discussing the Court‘s views of conjugality in the
context of a same-sex relationship).
35.
See Carbonnier, supra note 20, at 158-163, 174177.
36.
But see Aubry & Rau, supra note 9, at 355-357 (arguing that notions
of the physical state of a person, her age, health, social position, religion,
profession or occupation, are not status matters).
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domicile. Today, status is mostly concerned with acts of civil
status that identify the person as born,37 married, or dead, provide
her with a name, fix her domicile, and sometimes identify her
ethnic or cultural group.38 Capacity answers the questions: who is
able to enjoy civil rights, and who can exercise these rights?39
The right of intimacy has patrimonial and extrapatrimonial
consequences in that, patrimonially, an intimate association refers
to a person‘s voluntary undertakings to acquire assets and assume
liabilities in the close presence of another (and to that person‘s
profit or detriment) and, extrapatrimonially, intimacy relates to her
right of privacy of the personal, economic, social and sexual
aspects of her intimate association (and the duties of recognition of
others‘ intimacy). Her rights commit her to the discharge of her
duties. The respect of her intimacy is companion to her respect of
the intimacy of others in whose favor her rights are impressed with
a trust.40
For the most part, the meaning of intimacy has been understood
either in terms of fundamental freedoms and the public law‘s
approval or disapproval of intimate sexual relations, or in terms of
37.
The act of birth will be the first act of civil status to indicate a
person‘s sex: male or female. However, there are intersexual children, and there
is a wide range of intersexual states. Chau and Herring have recently examined
the topic and advocate a legal definition of sex that recognizes a scale of sexual
identity or a sexual continuum. They admit that this has obvious consequences
for marriage. See Pak-Lee Chau and Jonathan Herring, Men, Women, People:
The Definition of Sex, in SEXUALITY REPOSITIONED–DIVERSITY AND THE LAW
187 (Brooks-Gordon et al. eds., Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland, 2004). As a
result, the law will no longer place any legal significance on sexual differences.
Id. at 206. ―Instead of talking of men and women the law will treat each
individual as a person...‖ Id. at 207.
38.
On the interdependence of culture and national law, see Marie-Noël
Capogna, Identité juridique et identité culturelle de la personne physique: quels
rapports?, in L‘IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE–ÉTUDE DE DROIT
FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 911, 919-922 (J. Pousson-Petit ed., Bruyant,
Brussels, 2002).
39.
The capacity to enjoy civil rights is sometimes referred to as
―aptitude.‖ See CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, REPORT ON THE QUEBEC CIVIL
CODE–VOLUME II–COMMENTARIES–Tome 1, Books 1 to 4 (Éditeur officiel,
Quebec, 1977). Id. at 23. See also Aubry & Rau, at 357. ―[La] capacité juridique
est l‘aptitude à devenir le sujet de droit et d‘obligations et à les exercer.‖ Id.
Important, however, is the distinction between status and capacity. Id. 357-358,
note 13.
40.
See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 1 at
1, 51–2 (discussing the philosophy of property law and its moral content). ―[A]t
the same time [property rights] are morally subject to a kind of inchoate trust,
mortgage, lien, or usufruct in favour of all other persons.‖ Id. at 51.
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marriage and the private law‘s disapproval of non-marital relations
and its sole regard for marriage as generative of the family and,
hence, of the personal status of a citizen and home of her juridical
personality.41 The law imagines and images intimacy
horizontally.42 Therefore, it is no surprise that the institutions of
marriage and the husband-wife-child family, in much of the secular
positive law of the West, have been classically considered as the
ideal, if not sole, repositories for husband-wife sexual action.43
Indeed, historically and in the Common Era, the secular West has
considered the disembodiment of sexual action from the institution
of marriage as dystopian.
Until recently, the sexual action of marriage has been an idée
fixe underscoring the private law of persons. It has been framed as
―an act which in its intentions and kind is apt to actualize, express,
and allow the spouses to experience their friendship, commitment,
and openness to procreation of offspring.‖44
41.
See also Fineman, supra note 16 at 145-147. Moreover, Borrillo
states that early Christian thinkers originally considered the sexual action of
marriage as a necessary sin; it was necessary to contain luxuria (lust, wantonness
or concupiscence)–and, of course, to direct it to propagation. See generally
Daniel Borrillo, La luxure-L‟orthodoxie matrimoniale comme remède contre les
errances de la passion, in LES SEPT PECHES CAPITAUX ET LE DROIT PRIVE
(Fortin et al. eds., Éditions Thémis, Montreal, 2007).
42.
See Fineman, id., at 145-146.
. . . the family is experienced as an institution of primarily
―horizontal‖ intimacy, founded on the romantic sexual affiliation
between one man and one woman. The dominant paradigm,
however, privileges the couples as foundational and fundamental.
. . . Intergenerational relationships–vertical lines of intimacy–may
be temporarily accommodated . . . Children achieve adulthood and
go on to form their own discrete, primary, horizontal and sexual
connections . . .
Id. at 146.
The image of horizontally organized intimacy is a crucial
component of contemporary patriarchal ideology in that it ensures
that men are perceived as central to the family.
Id. at 147.
43.
Fineman proposes the re-orientation of the concept of the husbandwife-child family (and the constitutional and common–law protection of its
privacy) towards a core family unit of mother-child. See Martha Albertson
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23
CONN. L. REV 955 (1991). ―Family and sexuality would not be confluent, rather,
mother-child formation would be the ―natural‖ or core family unit; it would be
the base entity around which social policy and legal rules are fashioned. The
intergenerational, nonsexual organization of intimacy is what would be protected
and privileged in law and policy.‖ Id. at 971.
44.
See Finnis, supra note 40 at 42. Finnis discusses the meaning of fides
in Thomas Aquinas as one of marital friendship. ―This positive fides is the
willingness and commitment to belong to, and be united in mind and body with,
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This rigid conception is, for all intents and purposes, the idea
of the sexual action of marriage prevalent both in the secular
tradition of the West and in the catechetic tradition of most of the
Christian West.45 From a certain perspective, marriage is a truth
claim–a claim, like all truth claims, that is a ―compelling story told
by persons in positions of power in order to perpetuate their way of
seeing and organizing the natural and social world.‖46 Today,
powerful marriage-narrators are inciting people to attribute social
ills and to project the failures of marriage onto other intimate
associations. In this way and as René Girard might say, people
mimetically channel the deficiencies of marriage onto legally
vulnerable relationships. These relationships become institutional
scapegoats.47
one‘s spouse in the distinct form of societas and friendship which we call
marriage.‖ See John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual
Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97,
108 (1997). Fides is ―the whole justice, usefulness, pleasure …, and delight…in
shared virtue which can be found in a good marriage with its division of
complementary roles.‖ Id. at note 40. For Finnis, sexual acts are not unitive
unless they are marital, and they are not marital unless they involve fides and
procreation. Marital sexual acts have ―procreative significance‖ because they are
―. . . actualizations, so far as the spouses then and there can, of the reproductive
function in which they are biologically and thus personally one.‖ See John
Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1049, 1067 (1994).
45.
There are said to be two ethical traditions in the Christian West:
Catholic and Protestant. See ERIC FUCHS, SEXUAL DESIRE & LOVE 149-167
(Marsha Daigle trans., 1983). ―. . . Catholic ethics remain faithful to the patristic
tradition: sexuality belongs to the order of impurity having no justification other
than procreation. . . ‖ Id. at 150. The Protestant tradition focuses on the couple.
Each owes the other affection and tenderness, Id. at 161. ―Thus begins a
reflection on the couple, which aims more and more at bringing out its value, by
going beyond the traditional notion of procreation as the primary justification for
conjugal life.‖ Id. For Fuchs, the West does not appear to include the East, that is
to say, the Eastern and Oriental Churches, notwithstanding the Eastern
ecclesiastical tradition of some European countries, e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, and
Greece. Moreover, it is altogether unclear whether the Latin and Greek patristic
traditions are identical on the topic of marriage and procreation.
46.
See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Theology and the Condition of
Postmodernity: A Report on Knowledge (of God), in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO POSTMODERN THEOLOGY 11 (Kevin J. Vanhoozer ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2003) (discussing postmodernism in truth and
history).
47.
See Austen Ivereigh et al., In Conversation–Scapegoats and
Saviours, THE TABLET, Oct. 16, 2004 at 8 (summarizing Girard‘s thinking). ―We
learn from one another what it is we desire, he [Girard] argues, and then desire
it, imitating one another. This ―mimetic desire then encourages us to channel our
violence towards vulnerable people (the scapegoats) at times of crisis, as if this
resolves the problem.‖ Id. See also René Girard, Mimesis and Violence, in THE
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Very important economic and social benefits flow from this
sexual action. Does the sexual profile of marriage (whether
procreative intercourse and marital friendship, procreation alone,
or discouragement of promiscuity and concupiscence) sufficiently
justify a disregard of the sexual action (if there are sexual
relations), commitment, and friendship of other intimate
associations in modern society?
The sexual profile of this elite institution48 does not justify this
disregard and does not adequately sustain its claim to selfappropriation of substantially all economic aspects of intimate
bonds, as is the case in many Western systems. Nor is the affective
profile of a person (her emotions, her psyche, and her spirit)
delimited by the nuptial profile of the human body, as it appears to
be in a certain ecclesial tradition.49 Indeed, the assertion that
―[marriage] is an instrinsic good, with two constitutive and
mutually supportive aspects, friendship and procreation‖50 does not
provide a full and rational account for the objectives of legal rules
and institutions that are disinterested (or only marginally
interested) in marital friendship and procreation,51 such as
GIRARD READER 9-19 (James G. Williams ed., 1996) (summarizing his mimetic
model).
48.
See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, For Love & Money: Has Marriage
Become an Elite Institution, COMMONWEALT, Dec. 2, 2005, at 6 (discussing
today‘s marriage as a privilege reserved to the well-educated and wealthy).
49. See Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Pastores Dabo Vobis to the
Bishops, Clergy and Faithful on the Formation of Priests in the Circumstances of
the Present Day, March 25, 1992, para. 44. The Exhortation tells us that
―affective maturity presupposes an awareness that love has a central role in
human life.‖ Id. Moreover, ―[m]an cannot live without love. He remains a being
that is incomprehensible for himself; his life is meaningless if love is not
revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and
make it his own, if he does not participate intimately.‖ Id. The text then states: ―.
. . we are speaking of a love that involves the entire person, in all his or her
aspects–physical, psychic and spiritual–and which is expressed in the ―nuptial
meaning‖ of the human body, thanks to which a person gives oneself to another
and takes the other to oneself.‖ Id. Affective maturity brings to celibate priests
―serene friendship and deep brotherliness.‖ Id.
50.
Finnis, supra note 40, at 43.
51. Apart from the rational disjunction, in very many cases, between
procreation and governmental rules and policies regulating the economic
consequences of intimate associations, is it not a reasonable proposition that
global population growth and, for example, the chronic poverty, disease, and
burgeoning populations of sub-Saharan Africa, militate against institutional
policies favoring procreation? These policies would appear irresponsible, even in
the West. For a readable overview discussing population growth over the next 50
years, see Joel E. Cohen, Human Population grows up, SCI. AM., Sept. 2005 at
48-55 (outlining problems relating to population growth) and Jeffrey D. Sachs,
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retirement pensions, spousal survivorship benefits, and access to
public housing. Should two intimates‘ entitlement to homestead
protection conform to the sexual strictures of St. Paul?
Investigations into the functional underpinning of rules and
institutions, especially of public authorities, should not be reserved
to the scrutiny of the sexual and affective profiles of same-sex
couples. Indeed, the notion of an intimate association extends to a
great number of people who are unmarried, divorced, widows or
widowers. Stories of these intimates are not stories, in the sense of
fables, but stories, in the sense of real experiences.52
Now, what is the content of juridical personality and how does
it relate to the right of intimacy?
III. ATTRIBUTES OF JURIDICAL PERSONALITY
Juridical personality53 is also known as legal personality, and
sometimes as legal personhood. In the civil law tradition—a
Can Extreme Poverty be eliminated?, id. at 56-65 (discussing poverty and
proposing solutions).
52.
Roderick Macdonald, first President of the Law Commission of
Canada, tells the story of the fiftieth wedding anniversary of his wife‘s parents.
The anniversary celebration included only a small number of actually married
couples. See RODERICK ALEXANDER MACDONALD, LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW
59–63 (McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2002). Macdonald relates:
There were an elderly brother and sister (a widower and widow)
who had been sharing an apartment for five years. There were two
sisters who had never married and who had lived in the same
house for over 40 years. There were two air force friends of my
father-in-law (one widowed, one divorced) who also were sharing
an apartment. There were three unmarried couples in their forties
and fifties who had each been living together for more than a
decade after their respective divorces. There were single fathers
and single mothers trying to re-establish a relationship with a new
partner. There were never-married guests currently living alone
who had in the past been involved in a longterm relationship. And
there was one same-sex couple. The obvious diversity of these
domestic situations caused me to realize just how few longmarried, never-divorced couples such as my wife‘s parents there
really were, and just how many other forms of a stable domestic
relationship now exist.
Id. at 60.
53.
Juridical personality is known under many names. In the structured
environment of civil codes of the civil law tradition, the term ―juridical
personality‖ (personalité juridique) is used in the Civil Code of Québec (see,
e.g., C.C.Q. art. 1) for both human beings, ―natural persons‖ (personnes
physiques), and ―legal persons‖ (personnes morales) (corporations and other
entities constituted by law) (see e.g. C.C.Q., art. 3083). The Civil Code of Chile
employs ―juridical personality‖ (personalidad jurídica) (see e.g. art. 54) but
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tradition noted for its scientific approach to these matters—the
personality or civil personality of human beings is often contrasted
with the juridical personality, legal personality, or the moral
personality of entities. In that legal tradition, human persons are
natural persons or physical persons, and entities are juridical
persons, legal persons, or moral persons. In the common law
tradition–a tradition that is said to know little and to care less for
the construct of personality—there are sightings of artificial
personality, artificial persons, and juristic persons.54 Generally
reserves its use to entities. The Louisiana Civil Code uses ―natural personality‖
for human beings (see e.g. C.C. art. 25). The term ―civil personality‖
(―personalidade civil‖) is used in the new Brazilian Civil Code of 2002 (see e.g.
C.C. art. 2) and in the Spanish Civil Code (see e.g. C.C. art. 32) for human
beings. ―Juridical personality‖ makes a civil law appearance in the English
language version of the draft Québec Civil Code (1977) (see e.g. art. 1) although
the English language version of the 1976 committee report for this draft Code
uses the word ―legal personality.‖ Human beings are known as natural persons
(Quebec, Chile, Louisiana, Brazil, and Spain) and entities are called either
juridical persons (Chile, Louisiana, Brazil, and Spain) or legal persons (in the
English version of the Civil Code of Québec). In Louisiana, an in vitro fertilized
human ovum is a ―juridical person‖ (see e.g. R.S. 9:124). French doctrinal
writing uses ―juridical personality‖ for both persons and entities, but often
―personalité juridique” appears as a term reserved for entities. In the French
Civil Code, the terms ―moral personality‖ (personalité morale) and ―moral
person‖ (personne morale) make a showing (see e.g. C.C. art. 1842, 1844-1845).
The Civil Code of Argentina distinguishes between personas de existencia
visible and personas de existencia ideal also called personas jurídicas (see e.g.
art. 32). For an extensive list of persons with their attributes, see the entries
under ―Persona‖ in MANUEL OSSORIO, DICCIONARIO DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS,
POLÍTICAS Y SOCIALES (31st ed., Heliasta, Buenos Aires, 2005). Finally, it
should be noted that the English language commonly uses one word, ―legal‖, as
a descriptive for matters of ius and lex. Moreover, when civil law terms are
expressed in English, there are obvious challenges of translation.
In the common law, the term ―legal personality‖ is much preferred, but is
most often limited to ―legal persons‖, ―artificial persons‖, or ―juristic persons‖,
such as corporations and associations. The term ―legal personality‖ is not used to
describe an overarching concept of the person, embracing natural and juristic
persons. But see W. M. Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 L.Q. REV. 90, 95 (1911).
There are sightings of ―artificial personality‖ especially for public bodies,
religious bodies, foreign states and international organizations.
In American legal writing, the use of ―juridical personality‖ as applicable to
the rights of individuals is rare. But see, e.g., Gary A. Ahrens, Privacy and
Property: Can They Remain After Juridical Personality is Lost?, 11 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 1077, 1079, 1132, 1134, 1136 (1977-1978). In the social sciences, there
are references to both the juridical and the legal personality of human persons.
54.
On the topic of persons and personality in English law, see generally
William Swadling, Property: General Principles, in 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE L. 141155 (Peter Birks ed., Oxford University Press, 2000). The English courts are said
to have no use for ―personality.‖
Questions of this sort do not often strike the English courts as
having a practical bearing on the cases which they must decide,
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speaking, in the common law, human persons are persons, tout
court.
In this paper, ―juridical personality‖ expresses the right-owning
and duty-owing status of human persons.
Every natural person has juridical personality, and every entity
has juridical personality to the extent allowed by law.55 The
juridical personality of the natural person does not depend on the
sovereign; that of the entity largely does.
The personality of a natural person vests at birth56 although it
may, in certain cases, exist at the moment of conception or at some
intermediate time between conception and birth, whether or not a
viable birth. The boundary posts separating the fertilized ovum or
the fetus, as a potential human being (but, in law, often still
considered a thing or entity), from the right-owning-duty-owing
human person, frequently shift in the minds of lawmakers, judges,
and scholars. Yet, identification of viable human existence is
crucial to the exercise of important rights.
Simply put, juridical personality is the enjoyment of rights and
the capacity to exercise these rights. It is also expressed as the
capacity for jural relations (or legal relations).57 It is real law,
especially in most of the civil law tradition, because it has a
legislative expression. Moreover, in the civil law, where scholarly
and even when they declare themselves to be ‗concerned with
abstract jurisprudential concepts [so far as these] assist towards
clarity of thought‘, they generally recoil from discussing them in
any detail.
Id. at 144.
55.
Dias summarizes Kelsen as arguing that the ―biological character of
human beings is outside the [law]‘s province‖ and that, moreover, there is no
distinction in law between ―natural‖ and ―legal‖ persons. See R. W. M. DIAS,
JURISPRUDENCE 267 (5th ed., Butterworths, London, 1985). The importance of
juridical personality, as a legal construct, is disputed. For example, there has
been considerable debate on the necessity of this construct for legal entities and,
even if necessary, its nature and scope. Dias outlines the theories. Id. at 265-269.
56.
For some, a ―human being‖ may arguably exist on or about the time
of conception, and a human being might become a ―human person‖ sometime
thereafter. An ecclesiological conception of personality might be based on yet
another event, for example baptism. In the Roman Catholic Church, it is at
baptism that a person is the subject of rights and duties and, therefore, is
conferred with canonical legal personality. See 1983 Code c. 96. Spiritual
personality is another concept. See 1983 Code c. 204, § 1.
57.
Smith cites Salmond as defining a ―legal‖ person as ―any being to
whom the law attributes a capacity of interests and, therefore, of rights, of acts
and, therefore, of duties.‖ See Salmond, Jurisprudence 273 (5th ed., 1916) cited
in Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L. J. 283, 284 (1927-1928). This
definition conflates the two concepts of enjoyment of rights and exercise of
rights.
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writing is considered a source of the law, albeit a secondary
source, juridical personality has an important doctrinal expression.
In the West, juridical personality is also abstract law. To study it,
as a conception, is a way of understanding the nature of rules
governing the general conduct of a person and his relations to other
persons and to things.58 Its finality is to correctly structure capacity
for jural relations. It does so from two very real and practical
perspectives. First, the exercise of rights and duties may be limited,
such as in cases of minority or incompetence, as but two examples.
Second, although the enjoyment of civil rights and fundamental
freedoms may never be renounced, the exercise of some of these
rights may be waived under certain circumstances.
Jural relations are relations between people and between people
and things that have consequences in the law. Not all intimate
relations between persons are jural relations because the law does
not have a rule (or does not care to have a rule) to regulate all
possible intimacies. By like token, not all aspects of intimate
associations and not all their commonplace events interest the law.
However, to the extent that the law is sufficiently interested or
intrigued by the daily routine and experience of intimates,59 it
provides rules for the coordination of jural relations.
These rules or ―sorts of law‖ are described by Honoré: rules of
existence, categorizing rules, rules of scope, position-specifying
rules, and directly normative rules.60 Various aspects of juridical
58.
A lawyer‘s collection of books can indicate the contours of his
juridical personality. His law books may act as guides and pointers to the sorts
and qualities of his relationships with family, friends, colleagues, and other legal
actors or subjects. In this regard, see Angela Fernandez, Albert Mayrand‟s
Private Law Library: An Investigation of the Person, the Law of Persons, and
„Legal Personality‟ in a Collection of Law Books, 53 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 37
(2003).
59.
The topic of ―everyday‖ law is examined by Macdonald. See
generally Macdonald, supra note 52 at 1–12. Macdonald states that experience,
wisdom, and good judgment provide the authority for everyday law and that this
everyday law makes official law possible. Id. at 6-7.
60. See generally A. M. Honoré, Real Laws, in LAW, MORALITY AND
SOCIETY–ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H. L. A. HART 99 (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1977).
1. Existence laws create, destroy, or provide for the existence or
non-existence of entities . . . 3. Categorizing rules explain how to
translate actions, events, and other facts into the appropriate
categories. 4. Rules of scope fix the scope of other rules. 5.
Position-specifying rules set out the legal position of persons or
things in terms of rights, liabilities, status, and the like. 6. Directly
normative rules . . . guide the conduct of the citizen as such.
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personality can be assigned to one or another of these classes of
rules; however, juridical personality is really about status and the
capacity to enjoy and exercise rights related to that status;
accordingly, the rules are, in large part, position-specifying.
Civil rights and fundamental freedoms are extrapatrimonial
rights. The law provides recourses for undue interference with
them. When there has been actionable interference with these
rights, they are patrimonialized because damage claims have a
monetary value.
How many rights and freedoms are there? They certainly
include the right to sue in court, the right to acquire, own, and
dispose of property, the right to life, the right to personal and
physical integrity, the right to the safeguard of one‘s reputation,
and the right of privacy. Examples of rights of privacy might
include a right to prevent unlawful interception of private
correspondence and a right to prevent the disclosure of personal
information. Codes and statutes specify seemingly innumerable
rights: the right to refuse specimen taking or tissue removal, the
right to alienate a body part, the right of a child to the protection,
security and attention of his parents, and the list goes on. Civil
codes in the civil law list these rights but the list of any particular
civil code is a function of the time and place of its writing and
whether the lawmaker at the time considered it expedient to
formally express these rights. Today, the rights to make healthcare
decisions and to protect private personal and financial information
are topical; tomorrow, intimacy of association may be the order of
the day.
The Civil Code of Québec61 provides an example of a recent
approach to the architecture and enumeration of rights. After a
preliminary title on the enjoyment and exercise of civil rights in its
book on persons, the code has a second title on personality rights.
The first chapter of the second title announces the integrity of the
person (―Every person is inviolable and is entitled to the integrity
of his person . . . ‖) in a single article.62 That chapter then proceeds
to its first section on the care of the person63 and its second section
Id. at 112. His second class, ―rules of inference,‖ relates to proof and
evidence.
61.
See CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC (18th ed., Jean-Maurice Brisson &
Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2010-2011) (hereinafter C.C.Q.).
62.
Id. at art.10.
63.
Id. at art. 11-25.
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on confinement in an institution and psychiatric assessment.64 Its
second chapter provides for children‘s rights.65 Its third chapter
deals with the respect of a person‘s reputation and privacy. 66 Its
final chapter provides for the respect of the body after death.67
Much of the rest of the book is devoted to particulars of status
(name, change of name, change of designation of sex, records of
civil status, etc.)68 and capacity (majority, minority, emancipation,
and various form of protective supervision for incapables).69 The
draft Civil Code of Puerto Rico has a more extensive list of rights,
including the right of intimacy and physical and moral integrity, in
its principal article (article 8) on the enjoyment of derechos
esenciales (fundamental rights), but fewer specific details than the
Quebec code, save in connection with the integrity and care of the
person.70
Rights pre-exist their restatement in formal constitutions and
statutes, but the understanding of rights occurs in the legal and
social environment where their pre-existing nature is first (or
again) debated. In this regard, it might be stated—and
unequivocally so—that the sovereign authority, through its
legislative bodies and courts, merely recognizes rights that arise
from the particular actions and conduct of people at particular
times. How could it be otherwise? Does it seem credible to assert
that rights, including rights of intimacy, spring as spontaneously in
formal law (because the formal law purports to have created them)
as sprung Venus from Neptune‘s life-giving froth? Formal law and
public law do not create rights; they specify them.71
Indeed, the thrust of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is that the human rights noted in the Universal Declaration
are innate and that their pre-existence is simply made textually
explicit in that declaration; accordingly, formal expression of all
rights, including the general right of intimacy, occurs in contexts of
place and time. Formal law hopes (but can do no more than hope)
that it has expressed the rights according to the best contemporary
(and informed) understanding of their inherent nature. As often
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at art. 26-31.
Id. at art. 32-34.
Id. at art. 35-41.
Id. at art. 42-49.
Id. at art. 50-152.
Id. at art. 153-297.
See supra note 27.
See supra note 13 for the position in English public law.
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happens, rights are made juridic—juridified as it were-in a single,
static form. In these cases, the challenge lies in re-establishing the
connection with the human person.
The right of intimate association as a real (and not supposed)
civil right and fundamental freedom in cosmopolitan private law is,
indeed, contextual because it is a good to and for persons and
because it is experienced by persons living, as they do, at a
particular time and in a particular place in the West.72 In other
words, its content is historically conditioned and, on account of
this historical mediation, intimate association can be objectively
assessed. Its intrinsic goodness can be concretely and specifically
understood.
In sum, the legal content of intimacy is not the private
transcendent experience of any one individual (or lawmaker).73
The intimacy and dignity of ―inclusive moral citizenship‖74 is
adverse to platitudes of family and sexual morality that do not take
account of the social and economic life of every individual in the
community. Intimacy is readily plastic. It is predicated on the good
experience of the living. Since this is so, intimacy cannot be
delimited; it cannot be restricted to a particular set of human
experiences, especially those sourced in invented traditions.
Recognition of intimate associations will not entice people away
from marriage. Indeed, even if all heterosexual and homosexual
intimate associations, other than marriage, are adjudged morally

72.
Beyond the formal law and constitutional framework of any
particular system, there are supranational and global communitarian aspects to
human rights. See generally Carl F. Stychin, Same-Sex Sexualities and the
Globalization of Human Rights Discourse, 49 MCGILL L. J. 951 (2004)
(discussing the use of universal human rights by local gay rights activists and
arguing that rights struggles will be successful when based on international
human rights standards and global, communitarian political debate).
73.
The law can be understood in a manner not dissimilar to the
theological phenomenon of revelation. Roger Haight says that revelation is
experiential and that, as religious experience, it is historically mediated. See
ROGER HAIGHT, DYNAMICS OF THEOLOGY 51-67 (2001) (discussing the structure
of revelation). Haight discusses (and argues against) transcendental analysis. Id.
at 6-7. For the theologian Haight and for the legal scholar Sinha, man belongs to
his history. See Sinha, note 5 at 3.
74.
For the use of the phrase ―inclusive moral citizenship,‖ see Fourie
and Bonthuys v. Minister of Home Affairs, case no 232/2003 (Supreme Court of
Appeal of South Africa, 2004) at 10. This South African case recognized samesex marriage as valid.
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destructive to the institution of marriage, surely these associations
cannot be any more destructive than divorce and remarriage.75
The narrative of intimacy (together with its happy post-modern
disorder!76) is next discussed.
IV. SOURCES OF INTIMACY
Pure reason–the practical reason of natural law philosophers–is
neither a satisfactory nor a truly rational method of examining
intimacy. It presupposes that there is but a single, correct reason
for human conduct. It ignores the here-and-now factual situations
that meaningfully contextualize reason. Pure reason disregards the
plurality of rational and sentient ways of defining intimate
associations, in the East and the West. It takes no stock of different
logics and reasonings that are predicated on different community
realities and values. In this light, it would seem that the proponents
of natural law approaches reckon social anthropology as a useless
science vacant of any forward-looking telos. Only theological
anthropology would seem deserving.77 Nonetheless, even unkind

78. See Charles E. Curran, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights in
American Religious Discourse: A Roman Catholic Perspective, in SEXUAL
ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 85, 97-98
(Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., Oxford University Press, 1998).
―Thus one could maintain that the provision of domestic partnership laws does
less harm to marriage and the family than do the existing laws about divorced
and remarried people.‖ Id. at 98. Importantly, domestic partnership laws respond
to human economic and social needs. See also Margaret A. Farley, Response to
James Hanigan and Charles Curran, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE, supra at 101, 108 (stating that
domestic partnerships respond to needs for psychic security, economic security,
and sometimes physical safely). Farley understands domestic partnerships in the
sense of legal unions reserved to gays and lesbians. Id. at 106-108.
76.
Disorder and post-modernism are neatly (and nicely) associated in
Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and
Legal Pluralism, 15 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 69, 71 (1998). ―If, as a
conception of social organization, modernism was primarily about rationalism,
universalism, certainty and order, post-modernism seems to be about
empiricism, particularism, indeterminacy and disorder.‖ Id. at 71.
77.
On account of fallen human nature, the need for redemption and the
doctrines of original sin, judgment and atonement, legal theory may not be split
from theological doctrine. See John J. Couglin, Canon Law and the Human
Person, 19 J. OF L. & REL. 1, 56 (2003-2004). Coughlin discusses the secular
and theological doctrines of human will and freedom. Id. at 53. Mainstream
legal theory has a negative concept of freedom, i.e. an absence of constraint and
an over-emphasis of autonomy and subjective preferences. This negative theory
leads to an inability to act for human good and an inability to understand that
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critics of natural law agree that its suppositions and theories must
be carefully considered. Natural law, therefore, remains a vital
trampoline for discussion and debate.
A diversity of intimate associations necessitates a method for
the determination of their legal parameters. How do we know what
we know about personal associations? Is there a strict
methodological path, or is there a multiplicity of paths? Does a
hierarchical disorder of relevant sources lead to approaches that are
too relaxed for any practical and useful understanding of the topic?
Legal methodology may be defined as the study of legal knowhow. It is the study of those legal methods and techniques that
allow the law to be known and understood (fundamental
methodology) as well as implemented (applied methodology). The
topic of sources is essential to legal methodology. This topic is
interested in answering the questions: ―Where do I find the law?‖
and ―Where is the essence, cause or origin of the law?‖ In this
way, the discovery of sources tries to offer a tentative answer to
the general question: ―What is it to have knowledge of the law.‖78
The word sources is used in two different senses. Sometimes
sources of law means material sources, that is to say, ―where
lawyers look in order to find out what the law is.‖79 Sometimes
sources of law means the sources of legal justifications or formal
reasons, that is to say, the grouping of ―. . . legally authoritative
reasons on which judges and others are empowered or required to
base a decision or action . . .‖80 There are numberless sources that
might constitute sufficient authority for legal decisions relating to
intimacy and intimate associations. The identification of these
sources is not difficult. It is the classification and ranking of these
sources as, say, primary or secondary, or authoritative or
persuasive, and the determination whether they are, for example,
obligatory, prudential, hortatory, or illustrative, that is highly
problematic.

transcendence of self-interest is necessary for genuine human fulfillment. Id. at
53-57.
78.
GEOFFREY SAMUEL, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHOD IN LAW 6 (2003)
(asking: what is it to have knowledge of the law?).
79.
See John Bell, Sources of Law, in 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW 3 (Peter
Birks ed., Oxford University Press, 2000).
80.
See P.S. ATIYAH AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 2 (Oxford, 1987).
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In these matters, Western courts have latched onto different
approaches.
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,81 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reformulated the definition
of marriage to include same-sex couples. The Court cited case-law
and statute law, with very occasional references to law books.82
The Court‘s psychological and sociological observations were
unsupported.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada made use of a
catholic selection of materials in M. v. H.83 In that case, two
women, M. and H., lived together in a same-sex relationship. They
had a home and started a business. After ten years, M. left the
common home and sought an order for partition and sale of the
house and, importantly, claimed support. The Supreme Court of
Canada reviewed the relevant Ontario statutory provisions and
extended to same-sex couples in Ontario the right to claim support
upon termination of an intimate relationship.84

81.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (Mass.
2003).
82.
See e.g. id. at 952, 967.
83.
M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 (1999) (Supreme Court of Canada).
84.
In M. v. H. intimacy is associated with economic dependence. The
Supreme Court delineated the notion of ―intimacy‖ as follows:
Section 29 [of the Family Law Act, 1986] refers to individuals
who have ―cohabited‖. Section 1(1) . . . defines ―cohabit‖ as ―to
live together in a conjugal relationship, whether within or outside
marriage‖. The accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship,
as outlined by Cory J. at para. 59, go to the core of what we would
generally refer to as ―intimacy.‖
Id. at para. 99.
Cory, J. states:
Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist.
Ct.), sets out the generally accepted characteristics of a conjugal
relationship. They include shared shelter, sexual and personal
behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and
children, as well as the societal perception of the couple.
However, it was recognized that these elements may be present in
varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be
found to be conjugal. While it is true that there may not be any
consensus as to the societal perception of same-sex couples, there
is agreement that same-sex couples share many other ―conjugal‖
characteristics. In order to come within the definition, neither
opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are required to fit
precisely the traditional marital model to demonstrate that the
relationship is ―conjugal.‖
Id. at para. 59.
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The Court‘s written reasons indicate that sources as diverse as
statistical surveys, behavioral and psychological studies, and law
reform commission reports, were treated as persuasive materials
and listed under the rubric ―Authors Cited,‖ together with
hornbooks, law review articles and sundry doctrinal materials.
Statutes and case-law, that is to say, primary sources in the
common law tradition of Ontario, were separately identified. Some
of these authors-cited sources—helpful but informal, from a
traditional legal viewpoint, yet formal and authoritative in their
respective social science disciplines–must have influenced the
court. By way of example, the court expressly referred to (and
appeared to have critically examined) several studies on the nature
of lesbian relationships.85 Reference to these sources tells us that
some courts are prepared to position social science materials
directly—and not cleansed or filtered through law review articles
and comments—somewhere (and somewhere important) in the
hierarchy of sources. These materials provide some of the best
elements of legal discussions and proceedings relating to intimate

85.
See, e.g., the remarks of Cory and Iacobucci, JJ:
Although there is evidence to suggest that same-sex relationships
are not typically characterized by the same economic and other
inequalities which affect opposite-sex relationships (see, e.g., M.
S. Schneider, "The Relationships of Cohabiting Lesbian and
Heterosexual Couples: A Comparison", Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 10 (1986), at p. 237, and J. M. Lynch and M. E. Reilly,
―Role Relationships: Lesbian Perspectives‖, Journal of
Homosexuality, 12(2) (Winter 1985/86), at pp. 53-54, 66), this
does not, in my mind, explain why the right to apply for support is
limited to heterosexuals.
Id. at para. 110.
See also this statement:
Studies presented to this Court demonstrate that when men are in
such a position, they expect less from their partner in housework:
P. Blumstein and P. Schwartz, American Couples (1983), at p.
151. In other words, the dynamic of dependence also exists for
men in opposite-sex relationships, as a type of "division of labour"
is created, where the man will often assume additional duties at
home while his partner is at work: M. S. Schneider, "The
Relationships of Cohabiting Lesbian and Heterosexual Couples: A
Comparison", Psychology of Women Quarterly, 10 (1986), at p.
234. Other evidence submitted to this Court demonstrate other
forms of dependency that are similarly unique to individuals in
opposite-sex relationships: J. M. Lynch and M. E. Reilly, "Role
Relationships: Lesbian Perspectives", Journal of Homosexuality,
12(2) (Winter 1985/86), at p. 53.
Id. at para. 239.
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relationships.86 Moreover, firsthand accounts,87 interviews,88
personal sentiment,89 polemics,90 and literature91 also usefully
86.
Is the ―law‖ blind to its historical and social contexts? Do legal
actors adequately understand the various factors that influence and fashion their
decisions. Nelken discusses these issues. See generally, David Nelken, Blinding
Insights?–The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law, 25 J. OF L. AND SOCIETY
407 (1998).
87.
See generally KEVIN BOURASSA AND JOE VARNELL, JUST MARRIED–
GAY MARRIAGE AND THE EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). Bourassa‘s and
Varnell‘s chatty personal account of the circumstances surrounding their 2001
marriage in Ontario was published prior to the decision of Halpern v. Attorney
General of Canada, (2003) 65 O.R. (3d) 161; (2003) 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529
(Court of Appeal for Ontario). That decision reformulated the common law
definition of marriage to read: ―the voluntary union for life of two persons to the
exclusion of all others.‖ Id. at para. 156. It also ordered the Province to register
Bourassa‘s and Varnell‘s, together with other parties‘, marriages. Id.
88.
See Cece Cox, To Have and To Hold-Or Not: The Influence of the
Christian Right on Gay Marriage Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, and the
United States, 14 L. & SEX. 1 (2005) at note 39, where Cox refers the reader to
an interview by Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell with Kees Waaldijk of Leiden
University. Bourassa and Varnell published the interview on their website:
www.samesexmarriage.ca/advocacy/turin/KeesWaaldijk2002.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2011).
89.
See Halpern, supra note 87 at para. 9-12. For example, the Court
reported the following:
Two couples, Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell and Elaine and
Anne Vautour, decided to be married in a religious ceremony at
MCCT. In an affidavit, Elaine and Anne Vautour explained their
decision:
We love one another and are happy to be married. We highly
value the love and commitment to our relationship that marriage
implies. Our parents were married for over 40 and 50 years
respectively, and we value the tradition of marriage as seriously as
did our parents.
Id. at para. 12.
90.
For an example of polemical legal writing in France written for
general public, the scholarship of Daniel Borrillo (of the University of Paris X–
Nanterre) is representative. Borrillo argues for (and on behalf of) the gay
community on personal, social and economic issues throughout the European
community. For typical Borrillo thinking, see McAuley, supra note 7 at notes
33-34. The scholarship of Michael Mello of the University of Vermont is a
recent example of American polemical writing reviewing Vermont‘s civil union
legislation and arguing for gay marriage. See generally MICHAEL MELLO,
LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE (2004). Mello‘s book has impressive endnotes
drawing on traditional legal materials—law review articles and similar kinds of
scholarship—as well newspaper articles and letters to the editor. Id. at 197–256.
His source materials have been called ―heterodox.‖ See Times Literary
Supplement, May 20, 2005, at 7 (book review).
91.
See generally THE M WORD–WRITERS ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
(KATHY PORIES, ED., 2004). The front flap of this collection of stories and essays
states:
As it heads through the courts, dividing the nation and shaping the
political landscape, the issue of same-sex marriage is becoming
one of the major civil rights battles of our generation. Now, some
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inform courts, again directly or indirectly. They have a place in the
hierarchy of persuasive authority, however horizontal that
hierarchy may appear to be. In fact, the history of privacy and
intimacy is most convincingly illustrated by lively narratives and
spirited monographs on discrete aspects of intimate relationships.92
Once again,93 stories are the stuff of intimate bonds. If marriage is
the institutionalization of the ways that people drink, eat and sleep
together—Boire, manger, coucher ensemble, est mariage, ce me
semble—then narratives of intimacy demonstrate the striking
similarity of many relationships.94
These informal narratives are subsequently formalized. For
example, law reform commissions are usually attentive to
canvassing the citizenry and collecting evidence of popular
opinion, whether at public hearings or on the web.

of the country‘s finest writers, gay and straight, explore the
nuances of one of the most complicated issues of our time.
THE
MCGILL
SHAKESPEARE
MOOT
PROJECT
(www.mcgill.ca/shakespearemoot/) (last visited Feb. 21, 2011), a remarkable
interdisciplinary project, in which the body of legal knowledge consists solely of
the complete works of Shakespeare, has debated same-sex marriage. In the case
of Attorney General of Canada v. Peter Pears, Ben Britten and Others, 2 C. of
Sh. 1 (2004), some of the Court of Shakespeare‘s judgments have been
published. See generally Desmond Manderson and Paul Yachnin, Love on Trial:
Nature, Law, and Same-Sex Marriage in the Court of Shakespeare, 49 MCGILL
L. J. 475 (2004).
92.
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES–FAMILIES,
INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW (2004). Friedman has an admirable blend of
scholarly sources: case-law, law review articles, psychiatry, sociology, statutes,
general books on family law topics, etc., all of which are marshalled, in no
specific hierarchical order, to support his account of modern American family
law issues. Using another approach, the Law Commission of Canada listed the
source materials for its report on adult relationships under headings, e.g.
discussion documents, background research papers, reports, books, journals, and
research studies. The Commission also consulted the reports of other reform
bodies, such as the Australian Law Reform Commission and the law
commissions and institutes of a number of Canadian provinces. See LAW
COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY-RECOGNIZING AND
SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 147-172 (2001).
93.
See supra note 52.
94.
This is Antoine Loisel‘s adage. Loisel was a Paris lawyer whose
Institutes coutumières were published in 1607. See Alain-François Bisson, Sur
un adage trompeur : «En mariage, il trompe qui peut», in LE FAUX EN DROIT
PRIVE 155, 158 (Nicholas Kasirer ed., Les Éditions Thémis, 2000). The adage in
full reads: Boire, manger, coucher ensemble, est mariage, ce me semble: mais il
faut que l‟église y passe. The full text, therefore, speaks to the requirement of a
public ceremony in facie Ecclesiae. Id. at 159. The necessity of a church
ceremony has (totally?) disappeared in the West although, of course, a church
marriage, in some Western systems, may suffice for civil purposes.
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V. INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS
There are formal incidents and effects arising from the
emotionality and conviviality of couples‘ lives and consequent
upon their sleeping-place. These incidents and effects have been
surveyed for European countries,95 and the findings compared in
five ―dimensions,‖ that is to say, ―the dimensions of marriage,
registered partnership and cohabitation, between different-sex and
same-sex partners, between different areas of private and public
law, between different countries, and between now and previous
years or decades.‖96
This survey clearly illustrates (as do other similar surveys97)
that the number and variety of intimate associations are almost
95.
See generally Kees Waaldijk and others, More or less together:
Levels of legal consequences of marriage, cohabitation and registered
partnership for different-sex and same-sex partners: A comparative study of
nine European countries (Document de travail 125) (Institut National d‘Études
Démographiques, Paris, 2005) (available at http://www.ined.fr) (last visited Feb.
21, 2011). A survey of the incidents and effects of same-sex intimate
relationships in Europe, together with essays and comments on these
relationships, was published in 2004 and used by Waaldijk and his team to
prepare their 2005 findings. See generally Same–sex couples, same-sex
partnerships & homosexual marriages: A focus on cross-national differences
(Document de travail 124) (Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy eds., Institut National
d‘Études Démographiques, Paris, 2004) (available at http://www.ined.fr) (last
visited Feb. 21, 2011).
96.
Waaldijk, supra 95 at 3. Waaldijk and his team‘s survey compared
―levels of legal consequences‖ in private and public law. Comparative analyses
were made for parenting consequences (id. at 12), ―material‖ consequences
(such as allocation and redistribution of property and debts on dissolution of the
relationship, and payment of alimony) (id. at 16), ―positive material‖
consequences in public law (such as lower property and income tax rates, access
to public health insurance, and exemption from inheritance tax) (id. at 20),
―negative material‖ consequences in public law (such as higher property or
income tax rates) (id. at 24), and other consequences (such as residency and
citizenship, testimony in criminal proceedings, and use of surnames) (id. at 28).
The reporters for each of the countries compared the consequences for same and
opposite-sex marriage, registered partnerships, and informal cohabitation on
other discrete topics, e.g. insurance, medically-assisted insemination, workmen‘s
compensation survivorship benefits, organ donations, and the legal duty to have
sexual relations (id. at 58, 60). The templates were structured to compare
marriage, partnership, and informal cohabitation even though Belgium has a
distinct legal regime of rights and benefits for each of de iure and de facto
cohabitation.
97.
See e.g. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A WHITE PAPER: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW REGARDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2004). The report reviews legal developments on the
topics of sexual orientation, gender identity, same-sex marriage, statutory
protections for same-sex couples, and other related issues. The disparate rights
and duties in each state that are attached to same-sex relationships are outlined.
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beyond reckoning. Surveys illustrate that there are numerous and
divergent manners of arrangement of the economic and social
consequences of living-together and vie commune.
Different types of marriage,98 registered or domestic
partnerships or pacts, civil unions, civil partnerships, and countless
modes of de iure and de facto cohabitation exist in the West.99
These associations can occur (or not occur) cumulatively, coextensively, or co-equally.100 Moreover, one-way travel between
co-equal associations, say, from civil union to marriage, is possible
in at least one jurisdiction.101
Id. at 22-29. A casual reader might think that different social and cultural
realities are described whereas the nature of same-sex intimacy is grosso modo
similar from state to state in the United States. The report does not outline every
right and duty. Its authors state: ―Four states provide between sixteen and
several hundred statutory protections and rights to same-sex couples. Ten states
provide benefits to some state employees in same-sex relationships. Several
other states provide between one and a few hundred rights or protections for
same-sex couples, and those rights and protections vary from state to state.‖ Id.
at 22. Courts have taken judicial notice of the benefits of marriage and prepared
lists of statutory benefits. See Goodridge, 798 N. E. 2d at 955-956.
98.
In a single Western system, there can be several kinds of marriage
differentiated by the formalities of solemnization, by the scope of spousal duties
and rights, and by the nature of incidents and effects. See generally 6
HALSBURY‘S LAWS OF INDIA 50.009-50.020 (Butterworths India, New Delhi,
1999). In India, family laws, including marriage and maintenance, are referred
to as personal laws and are sourced in religious laws. See id. at 50.009. Is India
in the West? Its methodology—how it knows and expresses the law—is
manifestly Western.
99.
The divergent relationship models present particular challenges for
private international law. See generally SWISS INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, ASPECTS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ DES PARTENARIATS
ENREGISTRÉS EN EUROPE–ACTES DE LA XVIE JOURNÉE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ DU 5 MARS 2004 À LAUSANNE (Schulthess, 2004)
(discussing marriage, cohabitation, and partnerships for Germany, Great Britain,
Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Spain, France, Belgium, and Switzerland).
100. The intimate relationships might be cumulative, e.g., a person might
be statutorily recognized as a cohabitant, for Canadian federal purposes, and
recognized as united (the civil union of Quebec) or partnered (the domestic
partnership of Nova Scotia) for provincial rights and benefits. Co-extensively, a
person might be both civilly united (in Quebec) and civilly registered (in the
United Kingdom). Finally, a number of recognized relationships are co-equal,
e.g., the institutions of civil union and marriage both in Quebec and in Vermont.
Yet, this co-equality is not identical in Quebec and Vermont since the
constitutional prerogatives of the province and of the state and their relations
with their respective federal authorities are different.
101. Quebec allows civil union spouses to convert their civil union into
marriage. However, Quebec can only provide for one-way travel. The province
is arguably not constitutionally competent to provide for the conversion of
marriage into a civil union. The conversion will not confer any additional rights
in Quebec private law although it may be advantageous, in a limited number of
cases, for federal entitlements. See An Act to amend the Civil Code as regards

54

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

Intimate associations can exist or co-exist at differing
intensities of social and economic intimacy in a single jurisdiction.
This graduated intimacy, that is to say intimacy measured by
degrees of social and economic functionality, is troubling; yet, it is
no more troubling than the distinct social and economic
consequences of marriage that are now prevalent in the West, e.g.
ownership and management of marital property.
Specific rights and duties attach to all of these relationships.
Some were (and still are) initially available for either homosexuals
or heterosexuals and some are now available for homosexuals and
heterosexuals. Although legal recognition of heterosexual
cohabitation started first and later embraced homosexual
cohabitation, civil unions and domestic partnerships were
conceived in the first instance for gay and lesbian couples.
Sometimes, their conception has been an honest attempt to
introduce a new edifice to house the rights and duties of intimates
between themselves and in their relations with the sovereign.
However, in the United States, civil unions and domestic
partnerships do not seem to have been conceived on the basis of
their intrinsic merits nor imagined as refreshed secular institutions
to complement (or replace) erstwhile civil marriage, now in a high
state of desecularization and resacrementalization. Nor can it be
said that they were conceived for economically symmetrical
relationships, in contrast to the continued asymmetry of
marriage.102 Rather, these unions and partnerships were intended as
legislative comforters for public anxiety, real or imagined, over
gay marriage.
All these institutions compete for the attention of the lawmaker
and vie with the paradigmatic institution of marriage. Yet,
marriage is a confused paradigm. In most of the West, marriage
has been defined as a sui generis secular contract, divorced from
marriage, S.Q. c. 23 (2004) (Quebec). The Explanatory Notes state that this will
allow couples ―to continue their life together as a married couple‖ and that
marriage dissolves the civil union but that the effects of the civil union continue
into the marriage. Is this an upgrade (or a downgrade)? Opinions differ.
102. The life-profile theory of marriage suggests that long-term support
promises protect specific investment by the economically vulnerable spouse. See
generally ANTHONY W. DNES, THE LIFE-PROFILE THEORY OF MARRIAGE,
COHABITATION, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (MAY 2004) (American Law &
Economics Association 14th Annual Meeting: Working Paper 65). ―Marriage
enables a man and woman to plan their lives and to avoid turning a sexual
asymmetry into the basis for exploitation of the weaker party.‖ Id. at 10-11.
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its former religious and sacramental past.103 It is, therefore, a civil
and purely temporal institution. In this regard, citizens are told that
this is why civil marriage is called civil.104 Despite all this clarity,
its secular nature remains unfathomable to some religious bodies.
Regardless of the secular rhetoric of the civil law, the institution of
marriage has been unable to detach itself from its sacramental
tattoo.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where did we start? Where have we gone? What is law? What
is intimacy? In the good law of today for the people of now, there
is a place for intimacy. There is room for every person‘s sociallytempered autonomy in the choice of an intimate partner. The life of
the citizen is a life of legal travel, with all of its ―mishaps and
disappointments‖ not a life of legal tourism ―cushioned against
misadventure.‖105 Her implication in the law requires that she and
her mate cooperate with the community in which they live and
love, full of both eros and agape,106 and in which they enjoy and
103. Daniel Borrillo briefly addresses the institution of marriage in
France, a country that prizes its secular tradition. See generally, Daniel Borrillo,
Le mariage homosexuel: hommage de l‟hérésie à l‟orthodoxie?, in LA
SEXUALITE A-T-ELLE UN AVENIR? 39-54 (Presses universitaires de France, 1999).
Borrillo points out that the 1791 French constitution clearly states: ―La loi ne
considère le mariage que comme un contrat civil.‖ Id. at 47. For the continued
French interest in its secular tradition, see generally CONSEIL D‘ETAT, RAPPORT
PUBLIC 2004: JURISPRUDENCE ET AVIS DE 2003. UN SIECLE DE LAÏCITE (La
Documentation française, Paris, 2004). For an official affirmation of secular
marriage, see id. at 250, 354-356. In France, clerics are expressly prohibited
under the Code pénal (Criminal Code) from conducting a religious marriage
before a civil marriage has taken place. Id. at 354-355. Yet, notwithstanding its
secular tradition, French courts considered the Roman Catholic moral position
relating to homosexuality as a valid ground for the dismissal of an assistant
sacristan. See D. 30 mars 1990 (Cour d‘appel de Paris) at 596-597 (stating that
the Roman Catholic Church has always strongly condemned homosexuality as
being radically contrary to divine law as this law is embodied in human nature.).
104. The Canadian government took great pains to stress the civil nature
of marriage in its legislation on the topic. See An Act respecting certain aspects
of legal capacity for marriage for civil purposes (Civil Marriage Act) (Bill C-38),
S.C. 2005, chapter 33. See section 2: ―Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful
union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.‖
105. See Lawrence Durrell, Reflections on Travel, in SPIRIT OF PLACE:
LETTERS AND ESSAYS ON TRAVEL 423, 426 (Alan G. Thomas, ed., Marlowe&
Company, New York, 1969).
106. For a current statement (restatement?) of the Roman Catholic
position on love (eros, philia, and agape) and its many meanings, see the
Encyclical Letter of Benedict XVI Deus Caritas Est (2005) at para.2-8. The
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exercise their rights as individuals and as intimates. They are rightowners and duty-owers. In recognition of their economic and
social contributions, the community respectfully greets them. The
community is mindful that each of them and all other citizens have
juridical personality, not third-person personality but first-person
self-aware personality. Simone Weil might say that their juridical
personality is their metaxu, that is to say ―those . . . blessings
(home, country, traditions, culture, etc.) which warm and nourish
the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human life is not
possible.‖107 These metaxu—these blessings—are steppingstones
from the temporal to the spiritual and fullness of being.108
Juridical personality is a way of understanding the private law.
In the civil law tradition, it is the starting-point for all law-talk. By
logical necessity, all legal operations are predicated on knowledge
of the nature and scope of the individual rights and duties at play.
An examination of the content of these rights and duties is
unavoidable when determining the effectiveness of any particular
act or fact.
In the common law tradition, an understanding of juridical
personality is also indispensable for correctly establishing the
boundaries of the private law and for identifying the number and
quality of civil rights. Civil rights are rights that, in and of
themselves, justify private-law operations. They do not seek nor do
they need the endorsement of the public law. They are inherent in
the person and suffice for all juridical acts and facts. These rights
and duties are not constant. Each legal operation individually and
the aggregate of all operations add texture to the assembled
attributes of personality.
In the West, and especially in the common-law West, the
construct of juridical personality is vital for any intelligent
discussion of rights and freedoms.109 It contains the public law to
Letter
is
available
at:
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedictxvi/encyclicals/documents/hfbenxvienc20051225deus-caritas-esten.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). All kinds of
love represent ―a single reality, but with different dimensions; at different times,
one or other dimension may emerge more clearly.‖ Id. at para. 8.
107. See Simone Weil, Metaxu, in THE SIMONE WEIL READER 363, 365
(George A. Panichas ed., Moyer Bell, 7th prtg. 1999).
108. See generally id. at 363-365.
109. Juridical personality has always been vital in the civil–law West.
This is tellingly noted by the title of H. Patrick Glenn‘s personal survey of the
world‘s legal traditions. See GLENN, supra note 23. Glenn entitles his chapter on
the civil law: ―A Civil Law Tradition: The Centrality of the Person.‖ Id. at 125-

2011]

JURIDICAL PERSONALITY AND INTIMACY

57

its proper sphere of operation, and it provides a proper foundation
for the exercise of rights other than a constitutional foundation. In
the Anglo-American tradition, rights and freedoms are almost
always examined in the context of public law norms formally and
officially issued by the political State. They operate or fail to
operate on grounds related to the interpretation of charters or bills
of rights and other like documents. The merits and demerits of
intimate associations and, in particular, same-sex marriage, have
been debated on constitutional grounds in Canada and the United
States. As a result, the public is cajoled to believe that any
exposition of dignity, autonomy, diversity, intimacy, or privacy is
a top-down development. In fact, rights and duties inevitably take
form bottom-up, from the person to the sovereign. Indeed, they
move from the non-law to the law, and from folkways, to morals
(mores), to law.110
The absence of the conception of juridical personality in the
common law tradition has encouraged an inappropriate expansion
of the public law, fully to the detriment of the private law, and
heightened the positivistic profile of the general law. It has
increased the girth of legislation as lawmakers endeavor to frame
all rights and duties as emanations of sovereign authority and as
special concessions of the state. All of this flies in the face of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In the public or private law realms of intimate associations, it
seems likely that current ideological quarrels will bear as much
169. He addresses the issue of centrality by referring, on the one hand, to the
Enlightenment thinking with respect to property, with its focus on individual
ownership, and with respect to contract, as the meeting of autonomous wills, and
by referring, on the other hand, to the notions of subjective law and social
equality. Id. at 140-143.
So all the great concepts of western civilization come together
in a kind of package, and at the base is the centrality of the
person, now a rather abstract concept even if seen originally as
a divine representative of the jewish and christian God. And
then, once the theoretical package is in place, you have to look
around and see if it is being applied properly, or whether the
tradition is neglecting someone or something.
Id. at 142-143.
110. On the topic of the relation between non-law (non-droit) and law
(law), see generally JEAN CARBONNIER, FLEXIBLE DROIT: POUR UNE SOCIOLOGIE
DU DROIT SANS RIGUEUR (7th ed., Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence,
Paris, 1992) at 23-48. Carbonnier discusses their hierarchy and chronology.
Does non-law precede law? Which of the two takes first place? Id. at 36-44.
Carbonnier seems inclined to the view that non-law results when law withdraws
and abandons its interest in certain human relations. Id. at 25, 37.
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fruit as ecumenical dialogue, that is to say, none. If this is so, then
more questions should be asked about the role of the law, about
personality, and about a citizen‘s autonomy in her social,
economic, and sexual interactions with and within the community.
Here are some of these questions.
Does the private law need a new civil institution, one that is
truly secular and one that does not interfere with sacramental
conceptions of marriage? Such an institution would not be a civil
union that is more or less co-equal with marriage, but an institution
that would act as an umbrella for all intimate associations and that
would function as the only vessel for the patrimonial relations of
the couple. Why should all intimate relationships be configured on
the marriage model of procreation, paternal authority, monogamy,
indissolubility, and legitimate succession? Should the law not
provide citizens with a new type of close relationship that
recognizes the diversity of economic and sexual profiles?
There are many notions of marriage that make no reference to
procreation. Marriage shares these notions with other intimate
associations. There is friendship. There is the amicitia of intimates,
and this amicitia ―induces people to love one another greatly.‖111
Thus, love and friendship, emotionality, living-together, stability,
mutuality, continuity, reciprocal dependence, reliance, loyalty, and
companionship—all the constituents of fides—are some of the
denominators.
These common characteristics might constitute the skeleton of
a secular consortium—a new institution for intimates and a new
well for their juridical personality.

111. See LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, PART. IV, TIT. XXVII (Samuel Parsons Scott
trans., Robert I. Burns ed., University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). This
remarkable Title (Concerning the Mutual Obligation Existing Between Men, by
Reason of Friendship) defines and describes amicitia (friendship) in feudal
Spain. The nature of the male amicitia of this Title might well describe the
relationship between Gilgamesh and Enkidu. See supra note †.
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I. ABSTRACT
Modernization relies on law as the means of transformation.
Democratization and development strategies of the last 20 years,
such as the Washington consensus and its successor: good
governance and institution building, have embraced the
instrumentalization of law in order to create democratic societies
and market economies. In these great processes of transformation,
from regime changes in Eastern Europe to state building across
Central Asia, the process of lawmaking rests upon premises that
have a tendency to perpetuate transition without transforming the
relationship of the individual to power. This alienizing feature of
transition is reflected in lawmaking practices. In this paper, I argue
that a wider participation in the lawmaking process enhances the
legitimacy of the democratic regime, and it helps to fill the gap
between the law in the book and the law in action. I rest my thesis
on the premise that the reformation of laws, and therefore the
system, is characterized by a dichotomy between the legality and
the legitimacy of the lawmaking process. I analyze and expose two
different and contradictory patterns that are inherent in lawmaking
processes in countries in transition. On the one hand, a rule of law
society presupposes clear, transparent and predictable rules, a
certain formalism associated with modern states and societies. On
the other hand, the flexible nature of transition demands solutions
outside the legal framework. I use dichotomies such as legality and
legitimacy, expertise and wider participation to analyze the
contents of lawmaking practices as well as the role of international
actors and elites in the democratization and development process.
Juxtaposing transformation with participation, this paper elucidates
the practices of modern lawmaking in societies in transition.
I should have sought a country, in which the right of
legislation was vested in all the citizens; for who can
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judge better than they of the conditions under which they
had best dwell together in the same society?
Jean Jacques Rousseau,
Discourse on the Origin
of Inequality
II. INTRODUCTION
The process of transition from one political regime to another,
in the last twenty years, has required structural political and
economic reforms. These reforms in turn have relied on the role of
law as an instrument of social change.1 Thus for instance, the
political and economic changes of the 1990s in Eastern Europe
were followed by the establishment of a new legal order, which
was necessary to foster democratization, and create the market
economies.2 On the economic front, the transformation of Eastern
Europe in the early 1990s followed the model of shock therapies
prescribed in the Washington consensus as quick liberalization,
privatization and stabilization.3 During these great processes of
transformation, the social dimension of the state was either

1.
In twenty years of transition in Albania, between 1990 and 2010,
approximately 3000 new laws and thousands of by-laws were adopted. Data
gathered
from
the
database
of
the
Albanian
Parliament,
http://www.parliament.al. (last visited April 21, 2011). See generally European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Law in Transition Series,
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/newsletters/archive/archive.sh
tml. (last visited April 21, 2011), for a description on the launch of legal reform
projects. By Eastern Europe I am referring to all the former socialist countries
east of Germany, not including the Soviet Union.
2.
In contrast to the democratization in Eastern Europe, a post third
wave of democratization in Central Asia seems to rely more upon conventional
norms of democratization through Constitution making and power sharing
agreements. In Nepal, for instance, the process of transition from monarchy
towards a republican form of government is relying almost exclusively on the
adoption of a Constitution, which is one of the conditions of the peace process
between the Maoist guerrillas and the former royal army. See Reports of the
Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in
Support
of
its
Peace
Process,
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/SecretaryGeneralReportsNP.aspx
(last visited April 21, 2011).
3.
See generally, Alexander N. Domrin et al., Ten Years of Legal
Reform in the Former Soviet Union: A "Progress" Report, 93 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
235 (Mar. 24-27, 1999).
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abandoned or relegated to the exigencies of the market.4 At this
moment, we come across the first paradox of transition. On the one
hand, legal reform aims at democratizing the societies and creating
the necessary legal framework that would legitimize the new
regime. The assumption is that legal reform would either be
forward or backward looking, leading or following social
developments, attempting to formalize or regulate them. 5 It does
so, however, by following one of the two dogmas of development,
i.e. the neoliberal model or the good governance and institution
building. In both paradigms, the emphasis is on economic reforms
and institutions rather than on maintaining the social dimension of
the state.6
On the other hand, the abandonment of the social role by the
state undermines the legitimacy of the new democratic regime.
This becomes particularly acute when considering that the
totalitarian regime based its legitimacy on performance, that is to
say on the role of the state as a social regulator. Since most of the
new governments face an uphill battle regarding performance, the
social dimension of the state is reduced while the performance is
simply not there. In a situation where constituents perceive the
legitimacy of regimes connected closely with performance, the
withdrawal of the social elements threatens the legitimacy of the
new democracies. Further, the method of reformation exacerbates
the distrust towards governments, and in turn the legitimacy of the
law. The reforms are typically adopted on the basis of a top-down
approach that tends to reinforce the belief that transition is
permanent. The process of establishing a new legal order is
conditioned by the relationship between domestic and international
actors. The latter have influenced the understanding of law and
also stimulated the need for legal reform projects. This immense
legal reform took place in all former socialist countries, in what

4.
While the state was obliged to abandon the regulation on social
services, that did not mean that society was left unregulated. The emergence of
informal law filled the vacuum left in place by the withdrawal of the state.
5.
See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992)
(when discussing the presumption that law and society are inseparable and that
law governs all men).
6.
It should be said the in recent years the two paradigms are not
mutually exclusive.
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Gianmaria Ajani calls an international traffic of legal ideas.7 It is
worth emphasizing that the existence of a legal base does not
automatically translate into optimal operation of laws in everyday
life. The large number of laws adopted, or what I call “the inflation
of legislation,” is devoid of any significant impact on how the
society functions.
There are two features inherent in the transition process. The
first is characterized by the problematic nature of reforms
themselves; the second refers to the process through which these
reforms are adopted.8 In this paper, I use a dichotomy between the
legality and legitimacy of legal reform projects to analyze the
practices of actors involved in lawmaking. Against this
background, I argue for a more participatory process of reforms as
a step for adding legitimacy to the new regime, and also
subsequently to the transformation process itself. In turn, this
increased participation contributes towards enhancing the
legitimacy of laws. A wider participation of the public is necessary
to ameliorate the alienation in the relationship of the individual to
governance and government.9 The problem identified in
democratization processes is that there is transition without
transformation of the relationship of the individual to power. While
participation could add legitimacy to laws and address the
democratic deficit, it does not necessarily follow that the process
itself is the only missing piece of the puzzle.10 The very nature of
7.
Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 93, 95 (1995).
8.
On the lack of a theory on large scale institutional transformation
see Matjaz Nahtigal, Remarks, in Alexander N. Domrin et al., Ten Years of
Legal Reform in the Former Soviet Union: A "Progress" Report, 93
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 239 (1999) (Matjaz states that “Central and Eastern
Europe had no broad theoretical knowledge on how reform is to be coordinated
among several branches of government, or between the government and the
private sector, the government and civil society or the government and pressure
groups. We had no experience on how to run things without the government. So
the immediate withdrawal of government from every level of society caused an
institutional vacuum, which did not allow for development to arise from the
bottom up, but, rather, generated an intermediate struggle for private
ownership.”).
9.
I adopt a wide definition of the public as essentially including
anyone with a representative function, and, of course, elites.
10.
For an account of the need for local actors to understand legal
norms see Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1,
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the paradigms of change, such as the neoliberal prescriptions as
well as the good governance and institution building, on which
democratization and development are premised, ought to be
addressed as well. However, for the purpose of this paper, I focus
on the dynamics of the process. A wider participation is one of the
components of a successful transformation process, along with the
nature of the development paradigms, institutional capacities, and
the political will of the elites.11
The goal of this paper therefore is to examine the nature of the
transition process as it is reflected in the operation of legal reform
programs and lawmaking practices. This analysis and approach are
in the function of exposing two different and contradictory patterns
that accompany the lawmaking process in transitional countries.
On the one hand, the contemporary understanding of a rule of law

163 (2003), and Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 97 (2002). Berkowitz writes that
for law to be effective it has to be meaningful in the context in which it is
applied, while Pistor makes a reference to the need for embedding laws in a
local culture. But see Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms
and Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 1, 21 (2001), and Thomas W Waelde &
James L. Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western
Transplants: A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy, 43 THE INT‟L AND COMP.
L. Q. 2, 347, 361 (1994) (for an account on the need for institutions in
transition). Davis and Trebilcock argue that the current wave of legal reforms
must be situated in a broader agenda of public sector reform if these are not to
suffer the same fate as the reforms inspired by the original law and development
movement. Waelde and Gunderson write, “any effort at mere legislative reform
will fail if it does not cover as well, or more so, the challenges of helping to
build up the organisations required and the institutional environment within
which a legal culture can emerge and flourish. Substantive legal reform and
institution building must therefore be implemented together so that each
reinforces the other . . . The effectiveness of law in the economic and social
reality of a nation is usually intimately linked to the institutional set-up of
government and economic organisations and the shape and focus of social and
economic forces and their interaction.” While this is true that one needs a
bureaucracy to enforce laws, I argue that one cannot rely only on the existence
of a bureaucracy in transitional societies, where by definition state structures are
weak. Hence, there is a need for participation to alleviate legitimacy and
implementation.
11.
For the purpose of this paper, I define “elites” as political actors,
including members of parliament, senior government officials, and also legal
professionals, the latter essentially constituting a lawmaking group. Regarding
the role of lawyers as an elite group, see William Ewald, The Logic of Legal
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 489, 499 (1995) (Ewald writes that lawyers
constitute an elite lawmaking group).
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society calls for clear, transparent, and predictable rules, a certain
formalism in the societal interrelations. On the other hand, the fluid
nature of transition demands solutions outside the legal framework.
In this context, it is necessary to note that there is more to the
effectiveness and legitimacy of a normative order than technical
considerations dictated by experts. The legitimacy of law, where
legitimacy means acceptance as the basis of social coordination,
requires a social and political foundation.12 This raises the need to
ensure a democratic and participatory process of lawmaking,
which is able to give legitimacy to adopted laws, and prevent
lawmaking within closed door chambers.
In this paper, I draw from the experiences that I had while I
was working on legislative policies at the Albanian Ministry of
Justice. I also draw upon a more modest experience in Nepal where
I was drafting a key piece of the legal framework on microfinance.
What makes studying the Albanian legislative process interesting
and relevant to the contemporary processes of state building,
democratization and development is the degree and complexity of
experiments done and still being done today in reforming the
political landscape, economy, society and the legal system. In that
milieu are embedded all versions of Frankenberg‟s comparative
lawyer, as well as successive mutations of comparative law in

12.
See Scott Newton, Transplantation And Transition: Legality And
Legitimacy In The Kazakhstani Legislative Process, in LAW AND INFORMAL
PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 151 (Denis J. Galligan &
Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003). Newton argues that foundation can be based on
interaction and reciprocity. For other accounts of legitimacy in legal reforms see
generally Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Reflecting on the Rule of Law: Its Reciprocal
Relation with Rights, Legitimacy, and Other Concepts and Institutions, 603
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
LAW, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 37, at 44
(2006). Donnelly writes that changes or developments in law or legal institutions
can enhance the legitimacy power of the courts or society or they can produce
legitimacy costs. Legitimacy power can accumulate slowly during a sequence of
law reform or over the history of an institution. Thomas Franck writes,
“legitimacy is the quality of a rule, or a system of rules, or a process for making
or interpreting rules that pulls both the rule makers and those addressed by the
rules toward voluntary compliance. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (1992). Duncan Kennedy
also provides a series of contexts in which emerges the concept of “legitimacy
power.” Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication, A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
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action.13 Those in turn, are associated with differing political wills
and legacies of the multitude of domestic and international actors.
The first Chapter looks at the practices and requirements of the
lawmaking process, thus illustrating the dynamic of the early years
of transition, which are common to all transitioning countries. It
provides a narrative of the political transformation process and
discusses the rise of the informal sector. I also map key actors of
legal reforms. Taking into consideration the horizontalization of
lawmaking, the role of various institutions and exogenous actors
that participate in reforming the system is analyzed against the
dichotomy of informal and formal norms inherent in a transition
process.
The second Chapter probes the relationship between the
legality and the legitimacy of the lawmaking process. In discussing
the lawmaking methodologies, I analyze this relationship vis-à-vis
the legitimacy derived from a democratic law making process. The
methodologies of reforming the legislation reflect the background
and assumptions of the actors involved.14 In this context, as Ajani
puts it, one could speak in terms of an offer and demand of
legislation.15 This approach highlights the effect of the diversity of
origins of laws introduced to the legal system.
The lawmaking practices raise more questions than answers
vis-à-vis the compatibility, adaptability and functioning of
legislation originated from different legal systems, the enforcement
of standards and norms in local communities, and the compliance
with requirements of public participation. They also open the
Pandora box regarding the implications of adopting international
standards, and the role of international organizations as providers
13.
Günter Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise: identity and Politics
in Comparative Law, 2 UTAH L. REV. 259 (1997) (Frankenberg discusses
interchangeably the identities of comparative lawyers when advising a foreign
government. The case in question is based from a business trip to the Albanian
Ministry of Justice).
14.
For instance, international organizations and foreign donors‟
projects were aimed at incorporating international standards as well as relying
heavily upon harmonizing laws with existing standards by mostly transplanting
legislation of developed countries, but not only. When OSCE was advising
Albania to revise its Election Code, legal sources as far dispersed as those from
the former Zaire to Azerbaijan were presented as examples. I had just started
working at that time, in the summer of 2000, and the materials were on my own
desk.
15.
Ajani, supra note 7, at 97.

2011]

TRANSITION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION

67

of expertise and norms. One of the problems associated with legal
reforms projects is the emphasis on the technical rather than
political or social nature of expertise.16 While this approach allows
legal work to be carried out even in those areas considered
inherently political with the justification that it could increase the
legitimacy of the outcome through prestige, more often then not
the result is the contrary. The recipients of laws often stay outside
the political and lawmaking process, which in turn is conditioned
by the central influences of domestic elites and international
factors.
The methodology of preparing laws, within the technical
assistance framework provided by international actors has changed
twice in the last 20 years. In the early 1990s until 2002, weak state
structures exacerbated the lack of coordination among various
actors involved in the reformation of laws. The preferred approach
of preparing laws consisted of the establishment of closed working
groups, no more than three to four experts each, working on a
particular law. As mentioned earlier, during this time, a legion of
legal reform projects in similar areas, sometimes even working on
the same legislative measure, but from different perspectives
created a plethora of results. No one has dared, or dares, to embark
on a study of evaluating the effects and results of those laws.17 The
myriad of legal reform projects combined with the diversity of
experts, bringing their own backgrounds in drafting law, resulted
in conflicts in the codification efforts of the late 1990s.18
16.
David Kennedy makes a general case on the need to bring politics in
expertise and comparative law. See generally David Kennedy, Challenging
Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY J. OF INT‟L L. 5
(2005), and The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in THE COMMON
CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 131 (Mauro
Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., Kluwer Law International 2003).
17.
There are no studies indicating the implementation or the extent of
harmonization of particular pieces of legislation with international standards
broadly defined. However, there are reports on the progress of Southeast
European countries toward membership or association with the European Union,
which contain passages on the status of different sectors related to the internal
market, as well as project implementation reports from the World Bank and
country reports in the WTO.
18.
For instance, the Albanian civil code was drafted within the
framework of a Council of Europe (CoE) and was adopted relatively quickly by
the Parliament in 1994, partly because the elements of the market economy
needed some legal basis. At the same time, two other projects from the German
Technical Assistance (GTZ), were working on the commercial legislation and
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The modern era of legal reform is mostly devoted to the
approximation of legislation with the European Union (EU)
acquis.19 The challenge here, since the EU legislation formally
does not have direct effect on candidate or associated countries, is
to transpose the standards laid down by the EU Treaties,
regulations and directives into domestic laws.20 The methodology
adopted by the Executive branch is to create working groups with
experts from interested line ministries that often fall back in the
default mode of transposition of their predecessors of the early
1990s.
The proliferation of law, or as I call it “the inflation of
legislation,” aimed at filling the gaps between the law in the book
and the law in action is in fact only exacerbating the contradictions
in the legal system, and simultaneously highlighting the defective
nature of the lawmaking process. The implementation of
legislation has encountered two barriers that derive their nature
from the legislative process. First, there is little understanding in
the administration about the EU standards and how to transpose
them into the domestic system. This is followed by a poor
performance in enforcing laws. The desire for a closer integration
with the international, or for greater Europeanization, has provided
a powerful incentive to adopt more laws than it is possible to
absorb and enforce. Any piece of legislation with a European
Union label is fast tracked to the Parliament.21 The problem with

competition, with German experts. The result was that after completing the
legislation and after the Parliament adopted it, the experts from both projects
saw that with respect to consumer protection and commercial registry, these two
pieces of legislation had conflicting provisions and solutions.
19.
The body of European Union regulations and standards of primary
and secondary legislation, as well as European Court of Justice jurisprudence,
case law. By modern era, I mean the results of approximation that started in
2000.
20.
The choice of the legal median is left to the enforcing country, and
it can either be a law, almost always initiated by the executive branch and voted
by the parliament in the so called fast track procedure, or executive orders-by
laws. Within ten years, or sooner, any country associated with the EU, and
aspiring for membership, has to incorporate approximately 100,000 pages of
acquis, the number keeps growing each year.
21.
The fast track procedure is widely used in Central and Eastern
European parliaments, and as a matter of fact, it is adopted solely for the
purpose of adopting laws required under the relationship with the EU.
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this is not the existence of just weak administrative capacities, but
with the approach taken to the harmonization of legislation.
Second, as the institution responsible for enforcing such
contradictory and incoherent laws, the judiciary is the ultimate
bearer of inadequacies of the legislative process. Among many
complaints from judges is their relative ignorance of the laws, and
the inability to understand, interpret and enforce legislation. This
trend is a result of their absolute absence from the lawmaking
process.
The third Chapter puts forward some proposals to ameliorate
the lawmaking process by introducing several ways of assessing
and evaluating legislation. Almost every report from the
international community on Albania emphasizes the failure to
enforce laws. This problem is often attributed to inadequate
capacities or political will. Instead, it should serve as a cause for
inquiring about the coherence of the legal reform programs. The
fact that despite 20 years of transition Albania is still in transition
facing the same type of problems indicates that questioning the
human and institutional capital does not fully address the issue. It
is feasible to assume that in 20 years people would have had the
time to train and learn, even by a trial and error method.
Concluding, this paper elucidates the complexity of lawmaking
in a transitioning process and exposes conflicting aspects of the
legal reform, which tend to favor legality over legitimacy. The
implication, ultimately, is the perpetuation of transition and the
withering away of the legitimacy of democratic regimes.
III. CHAPTER ONE: TWENTY YEARS OF TRANSITION:
POLITICS AND ACTORS
In this Chapter, I lay the context to my argument that attempts
to reform legislation during periods of transition are inherently
unable to reflect the complex and ever shifting social forces that
regulate relationships in a society. This inherent inability in turn
emphasizes the tension in the relationship between the legality of
normative measures and the legitimacy of solutions, which
undermines the credibility of law as an instrument of change. I
provide a narrative of the transition process in Albania during the
1990s, focusing on two aspects, first, highlighting the chaotic
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nature of the process and the erosion of the state associated with
the rise of informality, and second, the actors that largely drive the
transformation process. The choice of Albania is not simply based
on knowledge of the country, but rather one based on the merits of
the case. The experience of the legal reform in Albania is in itself a
study in complexity. It includes phenomena common to most of
the other former socialist countries, and in some aspects it outpaces
them in its extremity and severity. It is illustrative of a country that
experienced a period of modernization through industrialization
and urbanization between 1924-1989. In turn, from 1991 until
present day, it is systematically and structurally deindustrialized,
with one fourth of the population leaving to go overseas.
Furthermore, it is illustrative of a country where democratization
after Huntingtonian‟s third wave model is being reinjected.22
A. Politics of Transition and Transformation
It becomes therefore necessary to say a few words about the
forces and phenomena that shape the context in which we find the
seeds of legal reform programs as instruments of change. The
transition from a communist country towards a liberal democracy
in the early 1990s relied heavily on law. Hart has argued that the
need for certainty about rules points to the need for a legal
system.23 This central and formal understanding of law was
22.
In this latter context, the country experienced a brief period of
democratization in mid 1920s until 1939. After 1947, with the consolidation of
the Communist Party‟s grasp of power, the totalitarian ideology permeated
every particle of the society, economy and politics, thus treating these three
components as one. The transition process taking place since 1991 is structurally
transforming the society, economy and politics, treating each one of these
components individually. However, I use the term “reinjected” not only to
denote the above-mentioned cycle, but also to the fluctuations between
democracy and quasi-authoritorianism that characterized the political landscape
between 1991-2010. Respectively, 1991-1995 and 2001-1007 were the most
democratic periods, whereas 1995-2001 and 2007-2010 were periods where
quasi-authoritarianism was on the rise.
23.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed., Oxford University
Press 1994). On the extent of the role of law in social change, see generally a
summary of legal reform projects published by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Law in Transition: Ten Years of Legal
Transition
(Autumn,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/secured/lit022.pdf (last visited April 21,
2011).
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considered as the necessary vehicle to achieve society‟s goals and
inspirations. The centrality and omnipresence of law takes a
totalitarian dimension when considering the attempts to refer to
law and to formalize almost every aspect of life, or as David
Kennedy says “there is law at every turn.”24 Even the political
rhetoric embraced concepts such as “respect for law,” and “rule of
law, often ascribing to it a legitimizing function.”25 However, few
actually understand the meaning of rule of law or agree on its
implications. Indeed, the formalization of law, or for better words,
the drive towards formalism, is pervasive and utterly imported.
Within each society law is embedded differently in the social
texture, varying in its form, substance, social functions, regulative
impact and in its legislative procedures.26 While the content and
consequences of a law could be judged separately from the process
by which it is made, I argue that the process itself has an influence
on the attitudes and on the acceptance of law. Needless to say, an
open law-making process enables the law to positively deal with
major social issues, inform the interested communities about the
envisioned goals, objectives and procedures, and adjust the role of
the implementing institutions.
In a totalitarian state, law has a subservient position to the party
guidelines.27 It thus takes an instrumental role in the Party‟s
interests. For instance, in Albania the functioning of the secret
police was not regulated by a legal framework, and its absence did
not prevent the secret police from enforcing laws, or the “party‟s
line.” On the other hand, there was an extreme attempt at
legalizing, or formalizing, other aspects of life. As the communist
system matured, so it formalized the relationship of the individual
to the state, extending to the utmost details of life in the gulags.
The more the socialist state matured, the more laws it adopted. The
24.
David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global
Governance 27 SYDNEY J. OF INT‟LL L. 5, 1 (2005).
25.
It is worth mentioning that there is no translation of the “rule of
law” into the Albanian language. The substituted version, which supposedly
means rule of law in the local context is indeed “shtet ligjor,” “Rechtsstaat,” “a
legal state.”
26.
Marina Kurkchiyan, The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet
Societies, in LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST
EXPERIENCE 25, 31 (Denis J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).
27.
The slogan was, “What the people say the party does, and what the
party say, people do.”
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establishment of “the rule of law society,” or Rechsstaat, is
portrayed to correspond with the victory of rules against
informalism. However, the exact definition of the rule of law in
countries in transition is ambiguous. It constantly shifts according
to the exclusive function of what an organization needs to do to
justify legal reforms projects. In assessing the rule of law programs
sponsored by the World Bank, Alvaro Santos tracks the variations
of the concept of rule of law in legal reform programs according to
institutional and substantive, instrumental and intrinsic criteria of
classification.28
The abrupt decentralization of governmental powers, along
with the reduction in competencies and size of the central and local
governments, resulting from neoliberal prescriptions on the role of
government as a watchdog, contributed to a gap between law in the
books and law in action. What followed after the collapse of the
ancien régime was a move from a highly centralized state towards
a mutation of the government‟s role in the society following the
laissez faire doctrine.”29 Law became the epicenter and the rule of
law rhetoric became the slogan of the day. Regardless of the size
of government, and in the early 1990s the size of the public sector
decreased steadily, the number of laws increased on a daily basis.
This process transformed law into a product. Today, for instance,
the number of laws produced by any Ministry is the measure of
effectiveness for that institution, a measure of productivity and
efficacy, a symbol of its success. It determines the fate of one‟s
career and furthermore, it determines the understanding of law and
its relation to the society. Experts and institutions are seen as
factors of production; law is therefore commodified.
The economic component of transition is outliving its
contemporaries elsewhere. It has achieved the goal of
fundamentally restructuring
the
economy
by
utterly
deindustrializing it. This form of restructuring has allowed only for
28.
Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law"
Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (Cambridge University Press 2006).
29.
The approach of shock therapies can be conceptualized as a
fluctuation between “seizing the window of opportunity” and therefore relying
on discretion and standards to achieve the ends of a liberal democratic society
with a functioning market economy, and the return to institutions, understood as
rules of the games, as a precondition for the functioning of the market.
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the emergence of trafficking of human beings and drugs, as well as
the remittance of migrant workers. It has systematically
encouraged immigration by effectively turning it into the single
biggest input of the GDP, and it has eroded any trust in the
legitimacy of the system.
The lack of trust in the legal system results in a surge towards
the informal, which being more efficient, contributes to the decline
of the trust in the system.30 In the context of customary law, or
informal normative aspects of the society and formal rules,
Sigismund Diamond writes that “[c]ustom is the modality of
primitive society; law is the instrument of civilization, of political
society sanctioned by organized force, presumably above society at
large, and buttressing a new set of social interests,” or as Sir Henry
Maine has famously conceptualized the development of law and
society as moving from status to contract.31
“Social norms are relevant to legal failure,” writes Galligan, in
the first place they tend to undermine the function of law as a
distinct means of social regulations.32 They do so by undermining
or diminishing the special qualities law needs in order to be
effective.33 If law is not seen as important in serving social needs,
the conditions for its being able to develop in order to do so are
likely to be missing. Another way social norms are relevant to
legal failure is when their content conflicts with the law. In the
case of Albania, social norms associated with the ancien régime
quickly became taboo, and instead the society turned towards the
formal and informal law for guidance. What took place can be
described as a competition of forces in the vacuum resulting from a
30.
A perfect example of the informalism in the economy and the
silence of the legal system is the phenomenon regarding the financial “pyramid”
schemes of 1995-‟97. Promoted by every single international organization with
a presence in the country as a success story among Central and Eastern
European countries, “a poster child,” the Albanian government encouraged the
system of informal money lending. The epilogue of this two year-old process
consisted of the presence of a stabilization police mission of the European
Community in Albania in order to restore public order after the collapse of the
“pyramids.”
31.
Sigismund Diamond, The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom,
38 SOC. RES. 42 (1971); SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
32.
Denis J. Galligan, Legal Failure in Post-Communist Europe, in
LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 1, 4 (Denis
J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).
33.
Id.
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lack of social norms to operate in a free society on the one hand,
and the lack of the enforcement of laws on the other.
During the last twenty years, there is a parallel development of
social norms and legal formalism. The former is a product of
peripheries: people cut off from the chores of running a state. The
latter is a newborn, a transplant, a product of the center, the
nation‟s capital, where the domestic cooperates successfully with
the international. The surge of formalism as the way of
understanding law came from the center, from adopting policies
related to the necessities of the market, that is to say the demand
for clear, precise, and systemic laws that are supposed to guarantee
the functioning of the market and to attract foreign investments.
The change in the understanding of development results in the
change of rhetoric on the meaning of rule of law. Whereas
Washington consensus policies ascribed an instrumental function
to the law in eradicating the past and providing for the future,
relying both on formal and informal norms, the new development
strategy of the mid to late 1990s based on good governance,
foregrounds the law.34 This latter approach treats law not only as
an instrument of change, but as the goal of transformation, heavily
vested with formal characteristics.
A similarity between these two strategies is in the technical
nature of the legal reform. The first focuses on questions of
efficiency, whereas the second on questions of good governance,
rather than on questions of distribution or government. The
elimination of the political and therefore of the role of ideology in
the functioning of the market and good governance, is done in the
name of expertise and technicality that sees win-win situations.
However, it is a hard sell to maintain that law is merely technical
in nature, and there is no reason to assume that they will be
effective on their own.35 Reforming legislation is ultimately a
34.
See David Kennedy, The New Law and Economic Development, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., Cambridge University Press 2006).
35.
In an article on the role of law in political transformation, Ruti
Teitel argues that the previous politicized nature of law and adjudication
partially justifies non-adherence during the transition. This understanding of the
rule of law as anti-politics is a common theme. Ruti Teitel, Transitional
Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L. J. 7,
2009, 2030 (1997).
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political objective that needs a political coalition in place to
support it, and public acceptance to enforce it.
The two paradigms of development transcend political
divisions. In three consequent periods 1992-1997, 1998-2005, and
2005-2009, governments from both ends of the political spectrum
have adopted the above-mentioned strategies. During the first
period informality went to the extreme.36 Informal economy, and
informal relations in the public administration. The late
governments of 1997-2009, under the new paradigm of governance
as development have taken steps at formalizing the economy and
public administration. However, it does not mean those efforts
have made any impact on the relationship of the individual as a
political animal to the government and power. While in the
socialist regimes it was accepted that the will of the individual was
subsumed to the will of the collective, the new democratic regime
has yet to provide the emancipation of the individual for which the
socialist regime was changed.37 In the new system, the individual
has become unhinged and there is a total sense of alienation from
the society and a strong move towards familial amoralism.
This narrative on the complexities of transition from a
communist legal regime towards a liberal democratic legal order
highlights the dilemmas and challenges that a government faces
when at the same time it attempts to behave both pragmatically and
visionary, legally and politically, in order to control the chaos and
direct the transformation.
The fluidity of the relationship between law and politics, or
legality and legitimacy, is well illustrated by the phenomenon of
political round tables. Whenever there is a political crisis,
regardless of the nature and motives, usually the party in power
would posit itself as the defender of the legality of some normative
act, or institution, such as preferably the Constitution or the courts.
The challenger, in its attempts to shake the legitimacy of the
system, would demand a solution outside the regular institutional
36.
The 1997 financial crisis was attributed to the collapse of the
“pyramid schemes.”
37.
On the political transformation and the role of values see generally
Teitel, supra note 35, at 2026 (Teitel holds that no one rule of law value is
essential in the movement toward construction of a more liberal political
system).
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channels. In a situation like this, the role of the international
community is virtually or realistically emphasized by both parties.
Never allowing a good crisis to be wasted, the international actors
would strive to find followers in need of patronage. This latter
game is carefully played out, without giving direct messages, but
rather subtly hinting and confounding the local actors with
ambiguous messages. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, has become the default player,
accumulating legitimacy for itself and also giving legitimacy to its
solutions. On the one hand, international actors are involved head
over heels in promoting an institutional and formal legal culture,
the rule of law society, and on the other hand, the adventurism and
quest for solutions outside the institutional framework is rewarded
as an adequate response to the difficult nature of transition.
The relevant point here is not about the fact that the Albanian
parties disregard the requirements of the rule of law, after all the
political rhetoric emphasizes that they are not fully matured
democratic actors. Instead, it is the blessing of the international
community for orchestrating solutions outside the box.38 In these
situations, the line between political solutions and respect for the
rule of law is extremely thin, reflecting an ever present dichotomy
of “engagement with local leaders, in other words the informal,
and the promotion of respect for the rule of law.39
The axiom that law should be recognized as having an
important part in social organization is questioned by the primary
actors who adopt it. Savigny‟s writes that “[l]aw is only law where
it maintains a close relationship with the common consciousness of
the people,” the key element in the creation of public confidence in
the legal system is the belief that rules agreed to in a democratic
manner are followed by the entire society and by state structures.40
The rise in the authority of international factors, throughout
twenty years of transition, as the ultimate arbiter and source of
legitimacy in determining constitutional solutions outside the
38.
There are several explanations for the failure of law, ranging from
weak democratic principles to old mentality from the socialist past.
39.
This latter point is illustrated by the engagement of international
actors with locals in the political crisis of 1997.
40.
FRIEDERICH VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW
(Madras: J. Higginbotham 1867).
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institutional framework, as well as in the top-down approach to
disregarding legal formulas, has created the belief of politics über
alles. It is not clear how this situation fits with the description and
final analyses of legal reform projects and workshops that train
politicians to think in legal terms. It is not altogether uncommon
for the same actors to be encouraged to find solutions outside the
system, and the next day to participate in training on the absolute
authority of institutions and the rule of law. This latter concept is
seriously pursued in transforming the local culture by sowing the
concept of law as incubated from the everyday, able to function
within the limits that insulate judges and decision makers from
outside influences.
The discussion of political culture extends more specifically
into the question of access to the legislative process. Whenever
people are not effectively consulted in the development of law, and
have little reason to view institutions as legitimate, they do not
own the law. Consequently, they perceive little obligation to obey
it, their decisions on compliance resting on an assessment of the
coercive power of the state.41 In this case the only way to succeed
in making laws work is to enforce them with impunity.42
The characteristics of the modern state emphasize the
rationality of law and the need for adopting legislative procedures–
in particular to contend with inflationary tendencies in legislative
production—so as to guarantee the quality of legislation and
implement its results. The application of law sometimes takes
tyrannical features, reflecting a Weberian sense of the drive
towards bureaucratizing any aspect of life in an organized
society.43 The indispensability of acting according to the legal
41.

Neil MacFarlane, Politics and the Rule of Law in the CIS, in LAW
61, 74 (Denis J.
Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).
42.
This leads to an interesting comparison of the intensity of
enforcement of laws and deeply rooted social norms. The Northern part of
Albania functioned under the norms of the Kanun of Leka, a 500 year-old
formalized customary law, that even existed during the Ottoman occupation, and
regulated most aspects of family, civil and penal law. The communist
government enforced with an unprecedented impunity its laws, and especially in
the Northern part, and with great success. However, as soon as communism fell,
the norms of the Kanun resurfaced almost immediately.
43.
MAX WEBER'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Charles Camic et al. eds.,
Stanford University Press 2005).
AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE
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process is attributed to the strengthening of the rule of law vis-à-vis
ordinary people, and disregarding its relation to the political class.
In this context, law can demand absolute fanaticism to the
formality of say issuance of birth certificates, where it can be
scrupulously implemented. From the perspective of a political
party, a formal approach to law can threaten the fragile democratic
nature of the state, and thus any attempts at reinforcing legality are
swiftly denounced as authoritarian actions by the state.
In authoritarian regimes the legislative process by definition is
hermetic. Whereas, the systemic changes of the 1990s attempted to
constitute a clean break regarding the substance of legislation, we
cannot say the same for the lawmaking process.44 This is not to say
that I am overlooking the significance of the content of new rules
creating new rights and obligations. After all Hart said that “. . .
some of the distinctive features of a legal system lie in the
provisions it makes . . . ,” however my interests in the procedure
are closely connected to the outcome. In this context there is a
relationship between the domestic and international factors that
dominate the process.
B. Actors of the Lawmaking Process
In this section, I narrate briefly a panorama of the main actors
and their activities involved in legal reform in Albania. I map some
the most influential actors, without necessarily attempting to
comprehensively and exhaustively covering who‟s who or who‟s
doing what. In this context, I provide a typology of some of the
most influential actors involved in lawmaking.45 There are two
broad categories that could be used to characterize the actors
involved in lawmaking. That is to say I group them according to
their origin. In this sense, there are international and domestic
actors. Each has its own sub-division between state and non-state
actors.
The international actors involved in legal reform programs in
Albania can be divided in two groups. The first consists of
international organizations, most notably, the European Union
44.
Hart, supra note 23.
45.
Influence in this context is related to the perceived power that is
exercised by the said actors.
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(EU), Council of Europe (CoE), and World Bank (WB). The
second group consists of donor countries acting through their own
governmental and non-governmental organizations, most notably
the German Technical Assistance (GTZ), United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), and Central and Eastern
European Legal Initiative (CEELI). All of these groups work with
the local government and non-state actors in conceptualizing and
implementing legal reform programs.
The European Community established contractual relations
with Albania in 1992 with a Trade and Co-operation Agreement
that promoted trade on the basis of non-discrimination and
reciprocity. This agreement did contain a provision on the
approximation of legislation in the areas of the internal market, but
it lacked an institutional approach for large-scale legal reform.
However, the “great leap forward” in the EU-Albania relations
took place with the launch of the Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans in 1999.46 It was aimed at
assisting the Southeast European countries to undergo a political
and economic transition that prepared them for a new form of
contractual relationship with the EU known as stabilization and
association agreements. The Stabilization and Association
Agreements (SAA) combine political and economic conditions,
such as respect for democratic principles, reform of the judiciary,
and strengthening links of the countries of the region with the EC
single market. They foresee the establishment of a free trade area
with the EC and set out rights and obligations in areas such as
competition and state aid rules, intellectual property and
establishment, which are supposed to allow the economies of the
region to integrate with that of the EU.47 The Stabilization and
Association Agreements contain provisions for the approximation
of domestic legislation with the EU acquis in two stages during a
10 year period.

46.
As a framework, SAP combined various instruments, an assistance
program (CARDS), technical advice, trade preferences, co-operation in fields
such as justice and home affairs, and political dialogue.
47.
See The Stabilization and Association Process, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_d
oes_a_country_join_the_eu/index_en.htm (last visited April 21, 2011).
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Each year, a national plan for the approximation with the
acquis specifies the legal areas and measures that are to be
harmonized with the EU standards.48 It is the largest and most
influential package of reformatory instruments adopted each year
as part of the EU conditionality for candidate for membership
countries. The first areas that are targeted include competition law,
intellectual property law, standards and certification law, public
procurement law and data protection law. Legal approximation in
other sectors of the internal market is an obligation to be met at the
end of the transition period. During the second stage of the
transitional period the approximation of laws will extend to the
elements of the acquis that are not covered in the first stage.49
During the negotiation period, a Consultative Task Force
(CTF) of the European Commission and Albanian government
examines the progress of legislation. Every six weeks the
Executive is obliged to submit a progress report to the Commission
on the status of legislative and institutional measures identified
during the CTF, negotiations and in the European Partnership
document. In addition to this, the launch of the TAIEX assistance
for the approximation of legislation, monitors changes in
legislation on a monthly basis.50
The Council of Europe is an example of an intergovernmental
organization where the Member States, at least conceptually, have
greater influence in determining the influence of CoE in their own
domestic legal reform projects. However, this is not the case with
the former socialist countries. Legal reform programs have been on
48.
Otherwise referred to as simply NPAA, containing annual
legislative and institutional measures to be adopted with a year in order to
implement Community legislation and raising administrative capacities to
enforce them.
49.
Excerpts from the draft European Community and Member States
Stabilization and Association Agreement with Albania (unpublished material)
(2004).
50.
TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
Instrument of the Institution Building unit of Directorate-General Enlargement
of the European Commission. Its aim is to provide to the New Member States,
acceding countries, candidate countries, and the administrations of the Western
Balkans, short-term technical assistance, in line with the overall policy
objectives of the European Commission, and in the field of approximation,
application and enforcement of EU legislation. Assistance is also provided to
those countries included in the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, as well as
Russia.
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the agenda of the Council of Europe since the beginning of the
„90s.51 Its assistance has focused on drafting legislation in civil and
criminal areas, consistent with CoE conventions and treaties. In
particular, legal instruments such as the civil code, the
Constitution, an anti-corruption package, and special legislation in
the criminal area have all been prepared with CoE expertise.52 It
has been a working practice and understanding between Albania
and CoE, that the Ministry of Justice, or the Constitutional Court
would submit major draft laws53 to CoE‟s Legal Affairs
Department for opinion and expertise, or ask for opinio juris. In
this context, there was a silent agreement between CoE and the
Executive branch that in their relations with the Parliament, or the
public, a draft law would be considered prepared with CoE
expertise as long as it was submitted to it, without CoE necessarily
issuing an opinion. Labeling a particular law with CoE brand
strengthens the legitimacy of actors and silences political conflicts.
The World Bank has been involved in four different ways in
legal reform programs. It has traditionally characterized
governance as neutral and technical in character, thus paving the
way for reforming the legal systems of host countries.54 The Bank
has contributed to the development of legislation in the areas of
51.
The CoE has focused on the process of lawmaking as well. One of
its projects was to support member states‟ administrations in their efforts to
improve the quality of law making. The project‟s activities aimed at promoting
application of a uniform law-drafting technique and style and identify and
disseminate best practice concerning the management of the preparation,
discussion, adoption and publication of legislation. Its major themes included
transparency of the legislative process where the project‟s activities promote
more active consultation of external interested organizations and civil society
representatives on draft laws and regulations. Broad consultation was also one of
the principal tools to enable evaluation of the impact of legislation, which is
another important activity of the project aiming at improving the stability of
legislation. The project dealt with issues concerning better access to legislation,
including the functioning of the official gazettes and design of electronic legal
databases.
52.
Data from the
Council of Europe, available at:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=3&MA=999&
PO=ALB&SI=2&CL=ENG (last visited April 21, 2011).
53.
Usually these are draft laws dealing explicitly with political ends.
This practice is of importance to the executive but also to other political forces
because it can rubber stamp approval or disagreement to their initiatives thus
eliminating most of the contested domestic debate.
54.
WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK‟S EXPERIENCE
(1994).
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public procurement, property registration and property law,
bankruptcy, collateral laws and laws on the structure of the
judiciary. Its Legal and Judicial Reform Project of 2000 reflected a
new development paradigm that treats good governance and rule of
law as a development strategy. Despite millions of dollars spent
mostly on foreign expertise, the results of World Bank‟s
engagement in legal reform have been disappointing. One of the
components, the improvement of the legal education at the Law
School of the University of Tirana has not given any particular
results.55 The legal education in the country is by all domestic and
international comparisons anemic, to say the least. A project to
rehabilitate the school actually left the school in shambles. In an
act of triumph of hope versus the experience, the Bank spent
considerable funds in futile attempts to build an arbitration center
in Tirana, a country where it is fairly easy to bribe any judge,
despite numerous ethical and criminal provisions prohibiting it. To
this day, after at least six years of existence, the center has still to
be used.56 The transition process fuels distrust in government and
authorities. In this case, how the World Bank tried to bridge the
distance remains a puzzle. In this context, what is there to prevent
anyone from corrupting any arbitrator, when there are no
regulations against the conflict of interests or subjecting arbitrators
to the jurisdiction of the penal code? Fast tracking the adoption of
ethical codes for arbitrators won‟t solve the deeply entrenched lack
of trust towards any institutions. Furthermore, a stakeholder
approach adopted by the World Bank to encourage local
authorities to participate in formulating and implementing its
recommendations did not make any difference in the process of

55.
This particular component aimed at funding twinning arrangements
to train faculty staff abroad and technical assistance; strengthening the
institutional capacity of the Law School and funding textbook preparation and
teaching materials, financing investments, and rehabilitating and expanding the
premises of the law faculty building.
56.
World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform in Europe and Central Asia
(202),
available
at
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=301446&pagePK=14
1143&piPK=399272&theSitePK=301412 (last visited April 21, 2011).
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adopting national strategies.57 The process is as hermetic as it ever
was.58
The second group that has contributed considerably to legal
reform programs consists mainly of government sponsored
organizations, such as the GTZ,59 USAID,60 and CEELI.61 The
context for their involvement is the international aid allocated by
donor countries, and channeled through them either in the form of
direct grants, but mainly in the form of technical assistance.
Benefiting from their own expertise and financial resources at
hand, they become influential sources of power and legitimation
for the host government and local actors. As it will be discussed
later in the paper, reliance on dogmatic premises, such as the
USAID‟s paradigm of creating legal systems that better support
democratic practices, or twin competition and rivalries among
57.
See
World
Bank
Projects
and
Programs,
http://www.worldbank.org.al (last visited April 21, 2011). The Strategy went by
the name of National Strategy for Economic and Social Development.
58.
I was in charge of conceptualizing legislative policies at the
Ministry of Justice and despite my position, neither my colleagues nor I was
ever involved in the World Bank legal reform projects.
59.
GTZ in Albania, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasuszentralasien/648.htm (last visited April 21, 2011). The bilateral cooperation
between GTZ and Albania began in 1988, even before the Communist era had
ended, and it focused mainly on the economic sector. In this framework the legal
expertise of the GTZ has been influential to the development of the Albanian
commercial legislation and registry of companies, civil procedure, insolvency
law, and recently of the competition and consumer protection laws.
60.
USAID in Albania, Rule of Law, http://albania.usaid.gov (last
visited April 21, 2011). Its programs aimed at improving the professional and
ethical performance of the judiciary and judicial institutions, promoting anticorruption and avoidance of conflicts of interests, land titles, mobilizing citizens
to demand accountability and transparency from the government, promoting
public awareness and education, domestic violence and the new family code.
61.
CEELI
activities
in
Albania,
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/europe_and_eurasia/albania.html (last visited
April 21, 2011). The Central and Eastern European Legal Initiative (CEELI)
was active in Albania right after the collapse of the regime in 1992. It supported
Eastern European countries and not it is focusing on Central Asia. Since
commencing its program CEELI's major projects have included: substantial
assistance in support of the drafting of a new, democratic constitution, adopted
through a popular referendum in 1998; promotion of judicial independence by
supporting the creation of the Albanian Magistrates School and facilitating the
establishment of the National Judicial Conference; and substantial support of
legal profession reform and legal education by providing expertise and
assistance to the National Chamber of Advocates. From 1998 to 2001, CEELI
conducted a Criminal Law Reform Program, and from 2002 it worked in the
anti-corruption campaign.

84

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

organizations can serve as illuminating lessons for modern day
lawmaking and democratization.62
The domestic actors can be divided in governmental actors, in
particular the Parliament and Ministries, and a potpourri of sub
national non-state actors. The latter are often created and
maintained through family ties to the government, or through
alliances. Based on that connection, a rotation of fortunes for these
organizations takes place whenever the right or the left come to
power. Formally, Article 81§1 of the Constitution gives the right to
initiate laws to the Council of Ministers, members of parliament,
and 20,000 voters.63 An interesting shift in legislative powers can
be traced to the rise of the Executive branch as the predominant
actor in lawmaking. Approximately 99% of all legislation
approved by the Parliament is initiated by the Council of
Ministers.64 Article 26 of the law “On the Organization and
Functioning of the Council of Ministers” recognizes the right of
legislative initiatives only for ministries and their dependent
agencies. Every ministry proposes legal acts in accordance with the
area of competencies and with the activities of the dependent
agencies and central institutions. Among the ministries, the most
influential is the Ministry of Justice, which not only has the right to
initiate laws, but most importantly is the gatekeeper for the
compatibility of laws.
The Ministry of Justice, reestablished in 1990 after three
decades of inexistence in the socialist regime, where the
presumption was that the state and the party were always right
hence there was no need for public defenders, practicing lawyers
and a Ministry of Justice, is the principal state institution
responsible for the implementation of general government policy
62.
As it will be discussed later in the paper, the rivalry was between
two German organizations, GTZ and IRZ. Since 2000, the GTZ and IRZ, two
leading German organizations shifted their focus toward providing the impetus
for domestic reform and regional cooperation for a closer rapprochement with
the European Union. The common areas of work and competence lead to a
serious rivalry among these two organizations for funds which both of them
received from the funds allocated by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
Albania.
63.
The Albanian Constitution is one of the latest constitutions of
Eastern Europe, adopted by a referendum on 28 November 1998.
64.
This is an estimated number from my own experience at the General
Department of Codification in the Ministry of Justice.
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in the field of justice and is generally responsible for justice and
legislative reform.65 Through its Directorate of Codification it has
a central role in the preparation of government‟s legislative
policies and legislation, and most importantly in checking the
compatibility of draft laws and other normative acts.66
The problem with the legislative actors is twofold. As part of
the regulatory scheme, the Constitution empowers the MPs with
the right to initiate legislation. However, as the statistics show, this
right is used in very rare occasions.67 It looks like the
transformation of the society through law is a task serious enough
not to be trusted exclusively to the parliamentarians. Downgrading
the role of Parliament from the legislator into the approver, or
rubber stamp, directly and gravely influences the parliamentarian
basis of the state.68 On the other hand, there is a modus operandi
among the international organizations, governmental sponsored
organizations and the local government and organizations that
foster a culture of self-perpetuation and legitimization for the
conceptualization and implementation of legal reform projects.
These legislative practices effectively restrict access to lawmaking,
and there are no incentives on the part of the main actors to change
the status quo.
The relationship between democratic decision-making and rule
of law principles is a two way street. Just as democracy rests in
considerable measure on the rule of law, the latter rests in turn on
democratic institutions and processes. Hence a balanced
relationship between the rule of law and a democratic legislative
process is needed to ease the transformation of the regimes. The
legislative process in Albania during 20 years of transition displays
chaotic characteristics, giving few opportunities to the public to get
it involved in the lawmaking process.69 In this context the notion of
65.
Law No. 8678, dated 14/05/2001 “On the organization and
Functioning of the Ministry of Justice.”
66.
Id.
67.
Approximately 99% of the laws are initiated outside the parliament,
with the latter always voting in favor of tabled laws. Data from the Albanian
Parliament, www.parlament.al (last visited April 21, 2011).
68.
Albania is a Parliamentary Republic, according to Art. 1 of the
Constitution.
69.
According to the OSCE Legal Sector Report: Albania (2004), public
confidence in the Albanian legal sector is low.
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law as an instrument of reform reflects a top-down approach.
Despite some merits to this approach, the need for bottom-up
considerations takes a more accentuated role in democratic
societies and is a legitimate one in the prism of participatory
democracy.70 Direct participation could increase access to the
political system and greater voters‟ involvement in the legislative
process, thus giving more legitimacy to the system.
IV. CHAPTER TWO: THE TRAFFIC OF LEGAL NORMS
Legal reform does not take place in a vacuum. The need to fill
gaps in a short time, combined with international pressure to
stimulate the need creates an environment that is forced to receive
norms and institutions. This process resembles a sophisticated
system of offer and demand for legal norms.71 Expertise and
financial rewards are key mechanisms to the functioning of the
system. The feasibility of projects relies mostly on the origin of the
organization(s) involved. The more Western an organization is, the
higher the chances for funding and trading in influence. Prestige
carries a lot of weight.
In this chapter, I attempt to elucidate the dark sides of legal
engineering. In particular, I draw attention to the practices of legal
experts and the form of expertise involved in lawmaking in
Albania and Nepal, where I have had the opportunity to witness
first hand how laws are made. I also draw upon some theoretical
frameworks of comparative law to help me navigate and streamline
the information that I gathered while working on legal reform
programs. A particular discussion is dedicated to the workings of
the legislative process, which is contrasted with the Constitution
making process. While I make the argument for more inclusive
participatory politics in lawmaking, I also caution against the

70.
It is obvious that the adoption of Napoleon‟s Civil Code was of
benefit not only for the French society but also it had a strong resonance in other
European countries as well, which as a result of the spill over effect incorporated
that code into their domestic legal systems. On the other hand, the paradoxes
that associated the communist legal reform regarding collectivization and the
crimes against state are an example of seeing the law as a mere instrument of
government.
71.
Ajani, supra note 7, at 97.
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formality of the process as substituting the political will of the
parties.
If law is made to be a means to an end rather than vice versa,
then it follows that it should take into account the moral and social
norms of a particular society.72 According to Merryman, legal
reform either tinkers with the legal system, follows or leads the
social change.73 Two immediate problems are associated with legal
reform projects. The first is the evident mismatch of the supply and
demand of legal norms. The premise of this problem is the
assumption that formalism demands the production of laws. In this
context, pragmatic or dogmatic perspectives on the nature of
transformation stimulate the demand for laws. The second problem
refers to the nature of transplants.74 The multitude of actors and
methodologies for transplanting laws has created a situation where
it is impossible to trace the origin of laws. In this case, transplants
take on a life of their own, losing their original meaning and
intent.75 Frankenberg calls this process of supply and demand of
expertise and laws as “[j]uridic midwives of capitalism . . .
monitored by representatives of supra-or international
organizations they dismantle and overhaul the old normative

72.
But see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 97, 109 (1993) (“It follows from the four reflections to this
point that usually legal rules are not peculiarly devised for the particular society
in which they now operate and also that this is not a matter for great concern.”
“. . . The fact is, I believe, that even in theory there is no simple correlation
between a society and its law.”).
73.
John Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the
Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25
AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 457, 462 (1977).
74.
Jonathan Miller provides a typology of transplants classifying them
as cost-saving transplants, externally dictated transplants, legitimacy generating
transplants, and entrepreneurial transplants. All these types are found
interchangeably in legal reform projects. Usually the entrepreneurial and
legitimacy generating transplants are the most used, although the cost-saving is
often used when there are no administrative capacities able to provide an
analysis of a particular transplant, save the case of a legitimacy generating
transplant. Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant
Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 839 (2003).
75.
See Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of
Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.: HISTORIES OF LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS
(2009),
available
at:
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss2/art14 (last visited April 21, 2011).
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superstructure, importing, adapting, and transplanting legal
codes.”76
A. The Supply and Demand of Transplants: Diversity of Origins–
Diversity of Results
In one of my early days at the Ministry of Justice in Albania, I
found a folder containing the traveaux préparatoire of the Election
Code. Curiosity took the better of me and I started going through
it. The working group was established under the auspices of the
OSCE, which was very active in 2000 in establishing the rule of
law in the country. Several of its experts were involved in drafting
the Code, which was supposed to cure once and for all whatever
was wrong with Albanian elections. I could not believe the surprise
and sheer amazement I felt when I found in the folder the Election
Code of former Zaire. One needs to be especially skilled in legal
engineering to extract and adapt Mobutu‟s Zaire electoral rules in
order to democratize Albania of 2001. However strange this may
be, it was a part of a larger pattern. The reformatory process in
Albania was characterized by a diversity of approaches and
methods in drafting laws. The result consisted of an amalgam of
laws, broadly taken by the common law tradition and GermanicRoman law.77 Of course, the first draft of the Election code in 2000
had the exotic nuances of Zaire.
A diametrically different experience was in the case of Nepal.
At the Center of Micro-Finance where I was helping with drafting
the legal framework on microfinance, a more inclusive,
participatory process was in place. Most of the relevant
stakeholders were part of a process in which they learnt of our
efforts and at the same time they contributed valuable comments
and suggestions. The draft law was drawn from the experience of
Nepal and from other neighboring countries. This is not to say that
76.
Frankenberg, supra note 13.
77.
For instance, the Civil Code was drafted after the French Code Civil
in the framework of a Council of Europe project, while simultaneously, GTZ
experts drafted the first part of the commercial legislation with the registry of
companies modeled after the French and German legislation. The registration of
private property recently was developed under the auspices of the USAID,
whereas the criminal and criminal procedure code were aligned with the Italian
legislation.
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the final draft was a combination of transplants, at contrary, the
law was entirely home grown on the premise that it benefited from
lessons learned either in Nepal, or in neighboring countries.
Having in mind the reformatory aspect of the law, the legal
framework also reflected international standards of accountability
and good governance. In this way, it was more productive to
engage with a local product that aimed at achieving higher
standards for governance.
There are two direct consequences resulting from the diversity
of the methodologies and projects of the legal reform. First, there
is a sense of confusion or alienation that is derived from the
chaotic nature of the legal system and its incoherence. Second, a
sense that the lack of action on the part of government or private
actors is attributed to the vacuum in legislation. This implies an
urge to adopt more laws in order to bring the country up to date
with modern standards. As it was mentioned in the first Chapter,
generating laws is the measurement of success and efficacy of
public institutions. It is an imposed solution in a closed
administration and civic society catering to the needs of project
awarders. This creates a vicious circle, which perpetuates a need to
adopt new laws every day. In turn, they are practically never
absorbed by the administration itself, by the elite, or by the public.
As an example, shortly after I started working in Albania, during
one of the negotiations in the framework of accession to NATO,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no data regarding the UN
conventions ratified by Albania. The large number of adopted laws
and by laws also makes the lawmaking process difficult to
manage.78 It is obvious to say that the process needs management
in order to ensure effectiveness in adoption and in implementation.
Pressure from the interaction with international organizations
and donor countries is being brought to bear on the Executive
branch as well as the Parliament.79 The membership in
78.
A direct result, which is connected with the large number of
normative acts adopted by the Government is the lack of disseminating
information in the communities of lawyers and judges. A shared complaint by
the members of the judiciary is the frequent amendment to laws, and the lack of
codification.
79.
See Robert C. Bergeron, Globalization of the Dialogue on the
Legislative Process, 23 STATUTE L. REV. 85 (2002). Examples include the need
to incorporate structural changes and “rule of law” reforms into domestic law as

90

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

international organizations, such as the WTO for instance, requires
constant assessment of the existing legislation against the
international norms. An element worth mentioning here is that
while there is a vigorous debate in EU circles about the
relationship of WTO norms not only on states individually, but
also on the EU and its institutions. In Albania, the relationship of
domestic law to international law takes a very formalistic, and
dogmatic perspective.80 There is little room for discussion among
judges and other practitioners on whether international law
supercedes national law in whatever form, period. The WTO and
the related treaties, such as WIPO, were ratified in a single session
in Parliament. The prospective membership in the EU brings with
it a requirement for a comprehensive rehaul of legislation in order
to bring it up to EU standards. It also requires the examination of
the entire legislative process to ensure that future laws meet the
required standards. In this latter context, beginner‟s luck was to
accompany me during the first year at the Ministry of Justice. In
one of the office visits by legal experts, I was abruptly introduced
to the world of legal reform projects. Under the goal of
modernizing the legislation, an expert introduced me to the
inefficiencies of the Albanian insolvencies law which was drafted
by his organization some years ago (GTZ). He eloquently argued
that I should inform the Minister about the immediate need to
amend the legislation in order to align it with the acquis. His
organization was only too happy to assist us.
Newton says: “[t]he very term „transplantation,‟ biased
towards the technical, masks the political realities, for „legal
transplantation‟ is always necessarily a species of the genus
legislation. To speak, as comparativists typically do, of
transplantation as „reception‟ is to obscure the political calculations
and complex play of interests behind any modern instance of
importing statutes (or concepts or provisions).”81 Watson on the

a condition for obtaining loans from the World Bank, and the orchestrated
revision of the monetary, banking and fiscal legislation under the conditionality
of the IMF.
80.
See generally ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION (2002).
81.
Newton, supra note 12, at 152.
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other hand makes the case that transplantation has occurred all the
time and the modern legal systems are the fruits of massive
transplantations.82 Limited in the technicality of the term, the
reform in changing and aligning legislation with the international
standards and with the EU acquis becomes easier to be
conceptualized and adopted. This approach however misses the
point of how are the transplants incorporated and how are
implemented.
The multitude of national strategies and action plans addressing
particular recommendations can be evaluated twofold.83 Firstly,
there is a lack of coherence among the goals and objectives of legal
reform programs proposed by the interested actors, which results
not only in sporadic implementation, but resonates problems in
codification, and creates the need for repetitious revisions in all
areas of legislation. Secondly, there is a lack of cohesiveness
within a single legal reform project, manifested in terms of
maintaining uniformity and cohesion in conceptualizing goals and
objectives and drafting legislation.
The process of adoption of the NPAA and APIEP was typical
of the Albanian administration. It merits a few words of
explanation to illustrate the process and methodology.84 The
drafting process of the APIEP started in early May 2004 with the
aim of finalizing it by early June. The methodology adopted to
draft the Plan was the result of a “compromise” of two different
EU technical assistance experts assigned to the Ministry of
82.
WATSON, supra note 72.
83.
NPAA, APIEP are instruments regarding the European Union,
whereas the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development was
adopted as a requirement from the World Bank.
84.
See generally European Partnerships for Western Balkans,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/index.htm
(last
visited April 21, 2011). The approximation of legislation is conceptualized in
the National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), as well as in the
Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnerships (APIEP).
These plans contain annual as well as medium term legislative and institutional
building measures. The launch of European Partnerships in 2004, in addition to
the annual preparation of National Plan for the Adoption of Acquis (NPAA), has
put the focus on identifying short and mid-term priorities regarding the
preparations for further integration with the European Union identified in the
Commission‟s 2004 Annual Reports and serves as a checklist against which to
measure progress. The NPAA and the APIEP are developed independently by
national authorities, subject to revisions and monitoring by the technical joint
committees associated country-European Commission.
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European Integration, which had conflicting perspectives and
proposed
different
methodologies.85
The
conflicting
methodological viewpoint, poor training on the part of ministries‟
experts as well as the hermetic process of consultations and
drafting prevented the working group from coming up with a final
draft, even four months after the formal start of the project.86 The
question is not simply that if there were only one set of experts
then the confusion would have been avoided. The problem goes
deeper into the incoherency of strategic objectives.
It is significantly easier to adopt legislation that comes from a
well-established source. The authority of the legislation provides
not only for a broader acceptance in the Parliament but serves as a
legitimacy claim by the Executive versus opposition, and towards
the population at large. The foreign technical expertise, alignment
with the international standards, and the process of
Europeanization of the legislation contain sufficient dosages of
authority to facilitate the adoption of laws. It should be said that
the alignment of the domestic legislation with international
standards is not objectionable in itself. On the contrary, the drive
of formerly oppressed societies towards universalistic virtues
brings much vitality and needed energy. A flaw of this process is
the strong emphasis on product over process that dominates the
reform.87 In this context, the gap, or the contradiction, between the
objectives and results makes the case of a careful review of the
lawmaking process.
The focus over the product is closely connected to the
underlying motives that propel actors to become involved in legal
reform projects. Furthermore, the legal reform projects overlap not
only with regard to their substance, but also with regard to the
actors. Legal reform projects have become a source of income for
85.
One of the projects was intended to support Albania with the
approximation of legislation before the negotiations for the Stabilization and
Association Agreement were opened, preparing the country for them. Thanks to
the Brussels bureaucracy it started some three years later, after the negotiations
started. The second one was of course associated with the development of the
SAA negotiations as technical support to the administration.
86.
The methodologies used for drafting the Plan were revised on a biweekly basis, acting on differing proposals from the two projects‟ expertise.
Needless to say it threw the whole administrative network tasked with preparing
the document into a state of constant chaos and incertitude.
87.
Newton, supra note 12, at 153.

2011]

TRANSITION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION

93

many NGOs, founded by former or current ministers, or their
wives. The quest for funds bypasses gap analyses on the need for a
particular piece of legislation. The hierarchic and economic
liaisons of the workplace enable many government experts to offer
their expertise in the framework of the projects. In a different spin,
the mobility and rotation in power of existing and former high
level government civil servants influences the conception and
implementation of assistance programs and the division of
projects.
The following example illustrates the dynamic of actors‟
rivalry. In 2000-2001, two leading German organizations, German
Technical Assistance (GTZ) and the German Foundation for
International Legal Cooperation entered the market of
approximation of Albanian legislation with the EU acquis. Both of
them were funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
were competing for the same assistance for the Department of
Approximation of Legislation in the Ministry of Justice. The
competitive situation derogated to the point that the intervention of
the German Embassy was necessary to basically remove IRZ from
the approximation of legislation and encourage it to participate in
other activities in the country. The result of the competition among
the legal reform providers is not limited to projects working in the
same area.
The predominant methodology of drafting laws in Albania
consisted largely of transplanting laws or provisions from different
experiences. For instance, the working group on drafting the
copyright law tried to transplant part of the Italian, Romanian and
Greek copyright laws.88 This approach stands in contrast to the
process of approximation of legislation with the acquis. The
requirements of the EU alignment consist of the transposition of
Treaty provisions, regulations and standards of directives into
domestic laws.89 This form of transposition demands a new
88.
The initial version comprising these different parts of the law, was
rejected as being artificial and not aligned with the international standards in
copyright regime and with incorporating EU acquis. The working group in 2004
finalized the drafting of a law, which largely transposed the EC directives in this
field.
89.
The White Paper of the European Council (1994). The EU White
Paper is focused on the need to adopt legislation, which is essential for the
functioning of the internal market. It presents this legislation in a way which
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strategy of drafting laws that differs from a classical transplant
based approach. Instead of eyeing similar legislation in different
Member States, some working groups, for example in the area of
competition and consumer protection, based their work on
standards set by relevant directives and regulations. According to
this approach, the legislation of Member States has a
complimentary role in providing a comparative bases for
evaluating different models and in challenging, or affirming the
assumptions of a particular law, rather than an in promptu
translation and incorporation into the domestic system.
Regardless of sporadic episodes of bringing laws closer to the
social context, the political will and the reformatory goals, the
trend of legal transplants will continue to influence the lawmaking
process. The benefits of comparative law can easily be
demonstrated as lessons learned from other jurisdictions. However,
it can or should not substitute for drafting laws that reflect the
social context, the political will and the reformatory goals. The
accession into the European Union is in itself a great exercise in
reforming the legislation. The approximation of legislation with
100,000 pages of acquis is a process that requires first of all, and at
least, a well-coordinated mechanism in order to prevent frequent
amendments of legislation and to ensure wide acceptance for the
necessary reforms.90 Wider participation of the concerned actors
and public can influence the zeal with which the proponents of EU
advocate swifter lawmaking.
The tendency to adopt and incorporate as many international
agreements as possible and EU acquis comes mainly from the lack

shows the key measures in each sector and those measures which should be
tackled first, but it does not attempt to establish priorities as between sectors. It
also describes in some detail the administrative and organizational structures,
which are required in each sector if the legislation is to be effectively
implemented and enforced.
90.
I do not mean here to imply that the problem with harmonization of
the acquis is exclusively one of coordination, as in that case the remedy would
not be difficult to find. While I address in other works some of the problems
associated with the nature of acquis, as a system, or a body of law that can be
put under a critique of its own regarding its existence as a system, and therefore
its internal coherence, in this paper as I state in the beginning, I take a process
oriented perspective on the implementation of legal reform projects, rather than
a substantive approach to their conceptualization.
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of deliberations in the legislative process. In the situation when it is
fairly easy to initiate a draft law under the label “European
Integration” even the formal requirements of the lawmaking
process become a mere formality. One can pass almost anything as
long as it is properly labeled. The heavier (read powerful) the
authority submitting a draft law, the faster the lawmaking process
works. They are in direct proportion. In this way, they reflect the
contradiction between the need to adopt legislation using the fasttracking parliamentary procedures, in order to speed the pace of
integration, and the need for a greater public deliberation, in order
to ensure the “stakeholders as process owners” perspective.
B. A Comparative Perspective of the Legislative and Constitution
Making Process
In this section, I explore the nuances of the lawmaking process
in two different contexts. The first is a typical procedure that is
used for adopting laws, and it includes both the drafting, and the
passing of the laws by the Parliament. A caveat to that is the
process of adopting EU acquis, which I explain immediately
below. The second context is provided by the process, in which the
Constitution was drafted in 1998. As described earlier in the
Chapter, the large amount of legislation enacted every year,
overlooking the process, contributes to the lack of implementation.
A hypothesis could be raised whether normative acts would have a
better chance of being implemented if a participatory lawmaking
process was in place. In the interest of promoting much discussed
democratic standards of transparency and accountability, such an
approach could vest the system with more legitimacy.
The tension between a participatory lawmaking process and the
product of legal reform projects becomes palpable in the case of
adoption of the EU acquis. The usual legislative procedure is more
preoccupied with ensuring the legality of the process, rather than
establishing the mechanisms for ensuring legitimacy. Prior to the
start of the negotiations for the SAA the approach to legal reform
varied from one actor to the other. As noted earlier, the different
approaches produced a myriad of results. The EU acquis were
almost never taken into consideration by any working groups or
legal reform projects. The laws were drafted to resemble particular
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legislation of different countries, regardless of whether they were
EU Member States or not.
In order to convey the commitment to the European
integration, the Parliament has introduced a de-facto fast-track
parliamentary procedure to pass legislation that aims at
approximating domestic laws with the EU acquis or demands.
Under this procedure, the Parliament has a limited time to review a
particular draft law introduced by the Council of Ministers. The
latter has the sole authority to carry out negotiations and maintain
relations with the EU. According to the annual legislative plans, a
majority of laws come from the EU conditionality for membership.
For fairness sake, the EU is not the only international organization
that wields power. The OSCE, World Bank, IMF, UN, WTO, and
any other donor country have the prerogative to dictate conditions,
and a de facto fast-track procedure is established for adopting laws
coming from these organizations.
The typical law drafting in Albania starts with the preparation
and adoption every January by the Council of Ministers of an
annual legislative plan. It is coordinated through the Department of
Coordination at the Prime Minister‟s Office with the legal
departments of the line ministries and the central institutions.
According to the law “On the Organization and Functioning of the
Council of Ministers,” each ministry sets up working groups to
come up with planned legislative measures. Representatives from
the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of European Integration
are invited to participate in the working groups charged with
drafting normative acts.
After the working group completes the draft, it goes for
revision to the interested line ministries and to the Department of
Coordination, in order to settle disputes and approve the final
version before introducing the draft law for approval in the Council
of Ministers. Although formalized, this procedure is not exclusive
and there have been numerous occasions when draft laws are
introduced outside of this procedure. A sine qua non of the
legislative process is the opinion of the Ministry of Justice for all
normative acts and of the Ministry of European Integration for
those normative acts that affect one of the areas of the acquis.
Pending review and approval by the Council of Ministers, a
draft law is submitted to the relevant Parliamentary commissions
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with jurisdiction on the subject area of the draft law and always to
the Legal Affairs Commissions. Although members of Parliament
have the legislative initiative, very few laws are adopted by the
MP‟s initiative. It could be stated that the Parliament in a
Parliamentary Republic has relinquished its legislative role by
giving the Executive branch a quasi monopoly on legislation.
Formally, meetings of parliamentary commissions are open and
MPs reserve the right to invite experts to discuss proposed laws.
The process is intended to be deliberative. Actually, proceedings
before parliamentary commissions are routine matters, where there
is almost no deliberation. Rarely does anyone read the texts of a
proposed legislative acts. Unless a proposed law is of a political
nature, all others are adopted, almost always unanimously. After
adoption by the relevant commissions, a report is prepared
regarding the status of the draft law. In case members of the
commissions have reservations regarding the draft law, they are
included in the report.
Regarding the incorporation of international agreements into
the domestic law, the situation is even simpler. Few would dare to
run counter the “will” of integration and the internationalization of
the legal system. A draft law incorporating the agreement is sent
for opinion to the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of foreign
Affairs. The process of reviewing the international agreements is
practically non-existent. The pressure to modernize the laws, and
to have friendly relations with all international organizations and
donor countries, influences the depth of reviewing the contents of
international agreements. The proceedings before the
Parliamentary commissions also in this case are quite fast and
without much debate.
In this respect, the membership in the WTO was a perfect
example of the hermetic nature of the legislative process. Most of
the interested communities, the local producers, did not have a
chance to participate in the negotiations and the preparatory work
for concluding the membership agreement. Six yeas after the
accession to the WTO, most of the business community frequently
demands the renegotiation of the membership agreement, and the
renegotiation of all free trade agreements with various countries.
The seriousness of the matter was taken into consideration by

98

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

political parties in their election campaigns of July 2005,
promising to renegotiate all the concerned agreements.
From a purely formalist position, it should be noted that there
is no law guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to become part of
the process of drafting laws, and this affects all ministries. As there
is no legal provision that would require the Ministry of Justice to
regulate public participation in drafting laws, the Ministry of
Justice sees itself under no legal obligation to do so.
Access to law is an essential element of any state governed by
the rule of law, and a problematic area that I tried to raise in this
paper. However, despite the obvious benefits of an open minded
approach to public participation, a right to public participation is
not a recipe for success, and it‟s worth looking at some of its dark
sides and blind spots. Apart from the traditional means of
publicizing the law such as “official gazettes,” information
technology is now extensively used to enable wide-ranging
possibilities for electronic access to legal texts. Public participation
should not be taken to mean voting, as for example electing a
constitutional convention or ratifying a constitutional text by a
referendum. At its best, participatory constitutionalism works and
counteracts the arguments in support of elite negotiation as the sole
effective model.
The Constitution making process reflects the greater
participation that attempted to lend legitimacy to the product.
Although, by contrast to the traditional process of lawmaking, the
Constitution making process was much more participatory and
deliberative, the political boycotting by the opposition party
contributed to the anemic nature of the final product.91 With this
caution in mind, it is worth contrasting these two lawmaking
processes to highlight the nature of participation and deliberation.
It is also necessary to emphasize the important role of mechanisms
that are needed to ensure the right to participate and deliberate.
During the process of drafting the Albanian Constitution,
Frankenberg wrote about the rules that would guide the legislative
process: (1) institutions must be simple; (2) functions must be
91.
It should be said that while the Constitution suffers from a lack of
enforcement, due to its problematic substantive elements, and the initial political
taint, the process of making it represents an interesting practice worth studying
and illustrating.
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clearly divided among the institutions; (3) the legislative process
must be transparent; (4) the legislative process must be efficient (as
guaranteed by public scrutiny); and (5) popular participation must
be permitted.92
Despite the practice of a participatory lawmaking process that
characterized the Constitution making process, the supreme law of
the country does not contain a single provision for the public
access in the lawmaking process. The process of drafting the
Constitution took into account the need for a wide participatory
approach in order to best exploit the resources of local and
international NGOs, and reflect the perspectives of the local
experts and of the public in a more general tone.
The Administrative Center for the Coordination of Assistance
and Public Participation (ACCAPP), a joint initiative of
ABA/CEELI, GTZ, and OSCE, served as a liaison between and
among Albanian and international participants in the constitutional
drafting process.93 Its function was to ensure that all interested
parties had the opportunity to participate fully and to avoid
duplicative and conflicting initiatives.94 As such it was working to
create a program of public participation. It solicited assistance
from Albanian NGOs and international donors to provide
materials, training, and financial assistance to develop strategies
for organizing assistance and promoting public participation in the
constitutional drafting process.95
The program that they managed to put together consisted of
two phases, collecting input into the drafting of the Constitution,
and submitting draft provisions to the public for comment.96
92.
Günter Frankenberg, notes from THE THREE POWERS SYMPOSIUM
ON THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ALBANIA (May 13-15, 1998).
93.
Scott Carlson & Molly Inman, Forging a Democratic Constitution:
Transparency and Participation in the 1998 Albanian Constitutional Process. In
the Fall of 2003, the US Institute of Peace in cooperation with the UNDP
organized a series of workshops with experts on constitution making practices. I
was invited to participate as a country expert in the workshop of the Constitution
making in Albania. In the workshop we discussed the findings of Scot Carlson‟s
paper, as well as debated the legitimacy questions of public participation and the
politicization of the Constitution making process.
94.
SCOTT CARLSON & MOLLY INMAN, FORGING A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE 1998 ALBANIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
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Throughout the duration of the program, its officers traveled all
over Albania to generate public awareness and participation in the
constitution making process. The results of these fora provided
Commission members and its technical staff with a basic outline of
the issues that the public considered important.97 In a second
phase, the review of the constitution was largely done by
individuals and organizations either in Albania or abroad.98 This
public review was in addition to the drafting consultations
provided by foreign experts.99 This approach by the ACCAPP
provided at least a mechanism to ensure wider participation in the
lawmaking process.
Although the Constitution drafting project involved input
gathering on a national scale, it did not provide answers to the
methodologies adopted to filter the information gathered from the
public participation into the drafting. The problem was threefold.
The first was the relation of the political class to the final outcome.
The Democratic Party, the major opposition force in the country
was opposed to a Constitution being drafted by the Socialist,
whom they considered to have come to power through a Bolshevik
like revolution after the collapse of the financial sector in early
1997. They did not consider the government to be legitimate, and
they did not support the process as they perceived it to being
controlled and manipulated by the Socialists and their allies, even
among the international actors. Hence, the final product, the
Constitution, which was adopted formally by a referendum on 28
November 2008, purposely coinciding with the National
Independence Day, did not have the full backing of the political
elite. The second was the perceived role of the international
community in legitimizing the process and product. The public
perception at that time was that while making a constitution is
generally viewed with optimism, the process and product were
perceived to be too much controlled by the government and the
international actors. In other words, the public perception was that
yes, it is good that a constitution is being drafted, but we do not
have any influence in it whatsoever. The third was the relation of
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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selected expertise and opinions generated in town hall meetings
and the final product. Despite the fact that this exercise formally
introduced the concept of the public as a participant in the
lawmaking process, and as such constituted a break from the
established mentality of closed doors working groups, without
adequate methodological framework and proper safeguards it did
not guarantee that the public input would find its way in the final
draft.100
The legal framework establishes virtually no formal
opportunities for public participation in governmental and
parliamentary decision-making.101 The relationship between the
government, NGOs, and the public is a complicated one. Because
of the lack of procedures for incorporating public input, relations
between the government and the public and NGO community
depend heavily on the discretion of governmental officials. The
predominant attitude among government and parliamentary
officials is that public participation hinders the lawmaking process
instead of improving it. Moreover, public administration tends to
show interest in public participation in the lawmaking and policy
preparations process only when it expects that the public will
approve of their intended decisions.
The law on the Council of Ministers, and the regulations on
Parliamentary commissions do not prohibit the participation of
other experts in the drafting process, but in the absence of an
explicit provision and mechanism to ensure it, the right to invite
outside experts is left to the discretion of MPs. There is a
contradiction in the proceedings of the working groups. When a
particular law is part of a legal reform project, the project experts
100. For instance, Frankenberg‟s article Stranger than Paradise,
provides an example of a typical working group. Two to three local experts and
a foreign consultant, tasked with drafting a major law, such as the
Administrative Procedure Code. This practice until early 2000 was well
trenched in the set up and proceedings of the working groups.
101. Law no. 9000, dated 30/01/2003 “On the Organization and
Functioning of the Council of Ministers”. Article 24 of the law provides:
1. The initiators send the draft acts along with an explanatory
memo on the goal, objectives and the substance of the draft act for
opinion to the interested ministries and other institutions.
2. In any case, the draft acts, with the exception of those with an
individual character, are sent for opinion to the Ministry of Justice,
on the legality of their form and substance.
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have a rather strong voice in the proceedings and in the final
outcome of the law. However, if an interested NGO or a concerned
community were to ask to participate in some of the meetings of
the working groups, the decision to invite or not would be the
chairperson‟s alone. Taking into consideration the past practices of
lawmaking, the need for public consultations should be explicitly
provided in the law rather than left to the discretion of the
administration. The only direct participation by the public in
governance and government consists on electing representatives to
the Parliament.
V. CHAPTER THREE: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
LAWMAKING PROCESS
How legislation is made, and of course what it says, are equally
important and complementary. Process has become equally as
important as the content of the final document for the legitimacy of
legislation.102 The previous Chapters analyzed the contradiction
among rules, and the deficits of the legislative process. In this
Chapter, I discuss some perspectives on filling the gap between the
law in the book and the law in action through greater participation
in lawmaking and evaluation of legislation. From a political
science perspective, Archon Fung juxtaposes the representative
democracy with the participatory democracy. Fung highlights the
democratic deficit of the policy making process where preferences
are not matched by outcomes and where deliberation or
participation is absent from the lawmaking process. Underlying the
potential disruption of representative institutions, Fung nonetheless
proposes that “for countries where patron-client exchanges are
highly stable, entrenched and reinforcing dynamics of a policy-

102. Writers such as Daniel Berkowitz and Katharina Pistor have
respectively focused on the legality and effectiveness aspects of the legal
reform, and the need for legal professionals to embrace the laws in order to
ensure effectiveness. This is another occasion to emphasize that my focus in this
paper has been on the need to ensure broader participation by the public in order
to enhance the legitimacy of the process and products of legal reform projects,
rather than their legality. Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM.
J. COMP. L. 1, 163 (2003); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its
Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 97 (2002).
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making process, participatory reform may be an effective
corrective.”103
In the context of an emerging right for public participation in
democratic governance, Thomas Franck wrote that the legitimacy
of governments will be measured by international law and
process.104 The right to public participation in democratic
governance exists today in international law. This right packs a
moral punch but it lacks legal teeth and effective enforcement.
Does this right extend from everyday governance to the process of
constitution making? The United Nations Committee on Human
Rights has recognized a specific right to participate in constitution
making. The Aarhus Convention, even though a regional
instrument, fortified the concept of public participation.105

103. Archon Fung, Democratizing the Policy Process, in PUBLIC POLICY
669 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). On an extreme use of anti-representative
institutions, Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller discuss the role of populist politics
as opposed to progressive politics and representative democracy in undermining
the legislature ability to set the policy agenda, frame policy options, balance
competing interests, and protect minority rights. Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P.
Miller, Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative
Government, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 33 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
104. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (1992).
105. A ruling in 1991 of the UNCHR, acting in its judicial capacity to
hear individual complaints under Optional Protocol I to the ICCPR, in the case
of Marshall v. Canada (Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986, 3
December 1991). This was a case brought in 1986 and decided five years later,
first authorized a specific right to participate in constitution making as an
undoubted part of public affairs. The right to participate in constitution making
might logically be derived from the general meaning of “democratic
participation” in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 21) and
especially Article 25 of the ICCPR (a covenant agreed in 1966 and entered into
force in 1976). Article 25 establishes a right to participate in public affairs, to
vote, and to have access to public service: “Every citizen shall have the right and
the opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to
vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
the will of the electors; (c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.” The right of public to participate was also recognized by
the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on 25
June 1998.
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It is of interest to study how international law deals with the
access to legal norms and what we can learn from the EU response.
The right of public participation to legal norms and legislative
process has been recognized in international law. Such an
instrument is the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters. It was adopted on 25 June 1998, in the
Danish city of Aarhus at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in the
“Environment for Europe” process. The Convention, although it
relates to the environmental issues, represents the most advanced
instrument that regulates the right to public participation. Since
signing the Convention in 1998, the EU has taken important steps
to update existing legal provisions in order to meet the
requirements of the Aarhus Convention by adopting directives for
the Member States, but also for its own institutions. In particular,
two directives106 concerning access to environmental information
and public participation in environmental decision-making (“first”
and “second pillar” of the Aarhus Convention) were adopted by the
European Parliament and the Council in 2003. They have to be
implemented in national law respectively by 14 February and 25
June 2005.
The Convention adopts a rights-based approach and establishes
minimum standards to be achieved, but does not prevent any Party
from adopting measures which go further in the direction of
providing access to information, public participation or access to
justice.107 Article 6 of the Convention establishes certain public
participation requirements for decision-making on whether to
license or permit certain types of activity listed in Annex I to the
Convention. The “public concerned” is defined as „the public
affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the
106. Council & Parliament Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003 On
Public Access to Environmental Information and Repealing Council Directive
90/313/EEC, (OJ L 41 of 14.02.2003, p. 26), Directive 2003/35/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003.
107. The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (1998).
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environmental decision-making,‟ and explicitly includes NGOs
promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements
under national law.108
The public participation requirements include: timely and
effective notification of the public concerned; reasonable
timeframes for participation, including provision for participation
at an early stage; the right for the public concerned to inspect
information which is relevant to the decision-making process free
of charge; an obligation of the decision-making body to take due
account of the outcome of the public participation; and prompt
public notification of the decision, with the text of the decision and
the reasons and considerations on which it is based being made
publicly accessible.109 What is important in this picture for us is to
take into consideration the spirit and scope of its provisions.
The aim of all legislative work is to produce relatively good
laws, because to produce absolutely good laws means to attain
justice and justice is an ideal.110 The mechanic process of adopting
laws in Albania has contributed to a large number of adopted laws
over a relatively short period of time. As the previous Chapters
illustrated, this tendency has provoked a lack of transparency, and
this also is reflected in the quality of legislation. Part of the blame
can be attributed to the handicaps of the lawmaking process: i.e.
the deficiencies in the functioning of the supply and demand
scheme for legal norms, which contribute to what I call the
inflation of legislation. The problems are also reflected in the
inadequate time for reflection and reviews, as well as in a greater
isolation between the Executive and other branches of the
government.
According to the Council of Europe, evaluation of the effects
of laws is a relatively recent development in Europe. Its growing
importance is related to changes in the form of legislation. Modern
legislation has taken the form of programs, which are targeted to
achieve certain goals; therefore, the traditional verification of the
legality of legislation should be gradually accompanied or
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EVALUATION OF LEGISLATION, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE‟S LEGAL CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE
ACTIVITIES (2000-2001) (2001).
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combined with the evaluation of the effects of legislation.111 The
most frequently mentioned evaluation criteria are the effectiveness,
efficacy and efficiency. The focus is on the content of the law
rather than on the procedures of collecting the input of the target
populations into the given legislation.
The approach taken by the Council of Europe with respect to
evaluation of legislation restricts itself to the effect and the
implementation of the legislation. Little is said about the need to
evaluate the legislative process itself. This approach focuses on the
technicality of the lawmaking process, leaving outside political,
economical, and social factors that are the driving forces of
legislation.112
In this context, legislative evaluation is seen as an
indispensable aspect of the democratic debate. In order to fully
play its part in ensuring legal certainty, evaluation cannot be
restricted to purely financial concerns or consistency of the legal
order, but must also monitor how efficacious, efficient and
effective a given norm is, as well as any other expected or
unexpected effects. There should be provisions for evaluation at
the time of travaux préparatoires, so as to foresee the effects (ex
ante evaluation), and during the implementation, so as to be able to
draw conclusions about the legislation‟s content and the
implementation methods (ex post evaluation).113
In this framework, evaluation of legislation is thought to be an
element of the sociology of legislation as well as an essential part
of legislative methodology. Unlike legislative drafting, it concerns
the material and substantial aspects of legislation rather than its
formal aspects. It is particularly concerned with the relation
between normative contents and their consequences in the social
111. Id.
112. Id. Legislative evaluation is a necessary discipline, but it has still to
be widely developed in all European countries. Every Council of Europe
member state or candidate for membership should independently look into the
question and set itself the goal, when drafting legislation, of establishing
machinery that makes it possible to have a better understanding of the
legislation‟s impact. As part of its ADACS legal co-operation program, the
Council of Europe might encourage and support these efforts by organizing both
bilateral activities and discussion among all the countries in the program, and by
developing, in partnership with national and NGO bodies concerned, networks
for monitoring and exchange of information and experience . . . ”
113. Supra note 110.
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reality, in the “real world.”114 Therefore, it is imperative to
emphasize the nexus between the substance and procedure of
lawmaking.
The analytical or theoretical model underlying the methodical
approach to be used for preparing legislation considers the
legislative process as a reiterative learning process.115 It is a
process in which the evaluation of the effects of legislation is one
of the fundamental prerequisites and tools for learning. A process,
in which the responsiveness of the legislator to social reality and
the social adequacy of legislative action should be guaranteed.
Taking into consideration that the Europeanization of
legislation is the single biggest legal reform, much attention is
needed to provide a scrupulous process of reviewing legislation
initiated by the executive in the framework of the Europeanization
of legislation.116 The establishment of the necessary domestic
participatory and evaluation mechanism becomes relevant when
considering that the EU does its homework quite well. Through the
introduction of TAIEX programs in Albania, EU evaluates the
Albanian legislation on an automatic basis.117 Every month, line
ministries and the Ministry of European Integration are obliged to
update a list of all normative acts adopted by the Council of
Ministers and the Parliament in a database monitored by the
European Commission TAIEX office. This process evaluates how
many laws are adopted in a particular area and their level of
compatibility with the acquis. During the implementation of the
Stabilization and Association Process joint working groups and
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. In addition to international instruments on evaluating legislation,
renown law and development scholars, Bob and Ann Seidman, have done
remarkable work in preparing manuals for lawyers on drafting and evaluating
legislation. ROBERT SEIDMAN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC
SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (Kluwer Law International 2001);
and ASSESSING LEGISLATION: A MANUAL FOR LEGISLATORS (Boston University
School of Law 2003).
117. TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
instrument managed by the Directorate-General Enlargement of the European
Commission. TAIEX supports partner countries with regard to the
approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is largely
demand driven and facilitates the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise
to address issues at short notice. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/what-istaiex/index_en.htm (last visited April 21, 2011).
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committees evaluate the implementation of the agreement and ex
officio as well as the enforcement of legislation. The concern here
is not about preserving nationalist, or culturalist sensitivities. It is
more about providing alternatives and achieving a higher standard
of comparison and evaluation rather than the basic level of
alignment with the acquis.
There are few aspects that merit attention when talking about
the effectiveness of evaluation. What I find missing and consider
worth noticing is the important question of the subjects of the
evaluation. Answers to these questions raise identity prerogatives
for the executive and parliament. In this context, taking into
account the shift in power from the legislature to the executive
branch, regulatory agencies and the courts, it is about time to give
something back to the lawmakers.
B. Reflections on Public Participation
The typology of critique against public participation is usually
made in the context of lawmaking initiatives in America. Whereas
my argument does not involve direct democracy, but calls for
greater participation in the lawmaking process using the existing
institutions of the representative democracy, nonetheless it is
worthwhile to bring up the critique and discuss how it is refuted.
The critique against forms of direct democracy in lawmaking
highlights the role of special interests in formulating policies, the
inexperience and incompetence of voters in conceptualizing policy
proposals and formulating laws, and the risk for infringing
minority rights.118 In an empirical study, Elisabeth Gerner refutes
the critique by showing that the evidence fails to support the
claims that there are more special interests involved in lawmaking
initiatives, and that the voters are uninformed.119 Whereas, there
118. Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Logic of Reform: Assessing Initiative
Reform Strategies, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 143 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
119. Id. Furthermore, in the context of greater participation in the
lawmaking process, an experiment was conducted in British Columbia where a
Citizens‟ Assembly was created by the Government of British Columbia with
the unanimous support of the B.C. Legislature. It was an independent, nonpartisan assembly of citizens who examined the province‟s electoral system. The
Citizens‟ Assembly had 160 members, one man and one woman from each of
B.C‟s 79 provincial electoral districts (constituencies) plus two Aboriginal
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could be a potential to harm minority interests, Gerner uses a
Madisonian argument to conclude that risks could be mitigated by
controlling the effects rather than the causes of antiminority
tendencies.120
According to Fuller, non-publication of law, contradictory
rules, and a gap between law and implementation are among the
elements that contribute to failing to make law.121 In the context of
implementation, well-designed institutions are not the only answer,
since the best institutions will fail in making law effective unless
both officials and citizens display general attitudes of respect and
compliance, unless, that is, they have a view of legal rules as
binding.
Every single report on Albania evidences the relatively sound
legal base, and the drastic lack of implementation. There are
several factors that contribute to the failure of law, starting from
socio-anthropological arguments on the attitude of Mediterranean
populations towards formalized rules, lack of clarity in adopted
legislation, lack of administrative capacities and resources,
incoherence of proposed laws and of the system they intend to
build, as well as a lack of political will to implement the reforms
and recommendations of the international community. In a report
about the state of the judiciary in Albania, the lack of
professionalism and discipline, lack of implementation, conflicting
and arbitrary legal interpretations, the lack of coherence and
consistency in the law itself and its application form a set of

members. They were representative of the province as a whole, and worked for
all British Columbians. Members were picked by random draw from a pool that
reflected the gender, age and geographical make-up of British Columbia. They
spent 11 months in 2004 studying electoral systems in use around the world,
holding public hearings, accepting public submissions, and finally reached a
decision on a new electoral system, which was put to voters in a referendum.
The process was divided into three phases where they learnt about the electoral
systems, held public hearings, and deliberated on the new system. This
experiment emphasized the relevance of greater participation in the lawmaking
process and the use of alternative mechanisms to the usual institutions of a
representative
democracy.
Information
Data
available
at
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/inaction (last visited April 21, 2011).
120. Id.
121. L.L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (New Haven: Yale University
Press 1964).
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challenges for the law enforcement authorities.122 The list is long,
and one can attribute the failure to almost anything. Distinguishing
chaff from grain is the persuasiveness and cohesiveness of
arguments. The “production” of laws, as commodities, has
certainly negatively influenced their coherence and quality vis-àvis clarity and precision. Legislative problems are universal
problems; they should be dealt with in a multidisciplinary way, as
they have a theoretical as well as a practical dimension.
The legislative loophole in the Albanian legislation regarding
the participation in the lawmaking process has contributed to
minimal initiatives to get the public to participate in the legislative
drafting process throughout the years. Adding to the confusion, it
has also led to inadequate publicizing of draft laws and poorly
developed media contacts that would allow the process to be open
to the public, not mentioning the failure to publish adopted law and
by laws. With the exception of some isolated cases, the public
generally has not played an active part in the process of legislative
drafting.123 This pattern fuels the hypotheses that enacted laws lack
sufficient transparency and are predestined not to be implemented.
In order to open this process and ensure that the public has a
voice in the process of drafting legislation the executive should and
in some sporadic cases has started working to provide proper
conditions to achieve participation, especially through the open
invitations via such simple mass media as internet. The lack of a
clear obligation or the lack of capacities cannot constitute excuses
for not allowing interested groups to play an active role in
lawmaking. Developing the necessary legal standards for
determining when public participation is required and educating
the public about the importance of public participation in
legislative drafting are of primary importance, and would directly
122. Roland Miklau, The Albanian Judicial System and Access to Legal
Information, in LAW IN TRANSITION (EBRD Autumn, 2009),
www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit092.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011).
123. OSCE Legal Sector Report: Albania (2004). For example, public
participation in discussions related to legislation package on NFO-s, draft laws
on environmental issues (which reflects the obligation required by the
“Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,” signed in Aarhus, Denmark on
25 June 1998 and entered into force on 30 October 2001, ratified by Albania on
27 June 2001).
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contribute to the quality and legitimacy of the laws. In the words of
Vivien Hart “[t]he context of a traditional constitution, presumed
to stand above and to structure democratic politics, the extension
of democratic process to include free, open, and responsive
discussion of the constitutional settlement itself represents a radical
departure, but one that attempts to overcome the problems of entry
of new participants and of an equal voice for all concerned
regardless of their expertise.”124 It would also encourage citizens to
participate in the various associations that would be involved in the
process of commenting on legislation, thereby instilling important
civic virtues.125
Innovative ways to bring about great participation are usually
commendable, but when in shortage, valuable tools can be used
from other practices. Comparisons with the U.S. notice and
comment practices can thus be a starting point.126 In order to make
these methods work efficiently in practice, there must be proper
methodological mechanisms guaranteeing sufficient and real
participation. The most important ones are the dissemination of
information (public notice of and access to the latest drafts, either
through the production and publication of information leaflets or
through media and internet coverage), the creation of concrete
possibility of organizations and interested parties to comment on
existing draft laws at various stages, and ensuring that hearings are
held at a time and in a manner that it is truly possible for comments
to be evaluated and the final decisions to be influenced.127
It should be stressed that these are not simply matters of
ensuring citizen rights, though they do enhance democratic
principles. By allowing sufficient participation in the drafting
process, the public administration can avoid considerable amounts
124. See Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making: Special Report,
United States Institute of Peace 107 (2003).
125. OSCE LEGAL SECTOR REPORT: ALBANIA (2004).
126. For an account of the need to adopt notice and comment procedure
in European law see Francesca Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European
Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment Comitology, 40
HARVARD INT‟L L. J. 451 (1999) (Bignami identifies an inadequacy in the
rulemaking procedures in the European Union that fuels the democratic deficit
and argues for the adoption of a revised notice and comment procedure in order
to allow for greater participation but for a reduced role of courts and interest
groups in light of cross-cultural differences in beliefs and interest organizations).
127. OSCE, supra note 125.
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of criticism after laws have been passed. Participation also ensures
the anticipation of a wider range of potential problems with the
draft laws, thus lessening the need to amend legislation at a later
stage. Despite the criticism of participatory-like arrangements and
their shortcomings in lawmaking procedures, the situations that I
analyzed earlier in the paper indicate an urgent need to reform the
reform. Extracting the legislative process from the incubator to a
more open and mature environment cannot help but bring healthier
products and legitimacy to them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The co-existence of parallel processes in the modernization
project, transformation and deliberation, formalism and
informalism, legality and legitimacy, is nothing new, but what is
experienced daily in most of the transitioning societies. The
relationship of local values with prescriptions from the center is
subject to a legitimacy test. In other words, there has to be a
process where the local permeates the universal, and where the
universal at the same time gradually influences the local.128
Therefore, how law is made does matter. It matters whether groups
and the population at large are able to contribute to the process.129
A claim of necessity for participation is based on the assumption
that the outcomes will have the legitimacy as coming from the
right way of channeling the political power that resides in
individuals. Thus participation has the potential, although not
exclusively, to become a criterion of a legitimacy process.
Lawmaking can no longer be confined exclusively to the domain
of “high politics” and negotiations among elites. What needs to be
avoided is exactly the tendency to favor legality over legitimacy.

128. See GLYN MORGAN, THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE: PUBLIC
JUSTIFICATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2005). Morgan discusses the
Europeanization process as one in which the periphery transform itself following
the conditions of the center, while simultaneously the center is transformed by
the periphery.
129. See Galligan, supra note 32, at 23.
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This paper discusses the solutions adopted by Italian law (on
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recoverability of non-monetary damages suffered by one spouse for
the intentional tortious conduct of the other. These suits are usually
raised within the divorce proceeding and are grounded in the Italian
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provisions ruling this issue, and therefore the application of the
general provisions on tort law not being barred, there was in the
past a sort of immunity of family from the operation of tort law
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rules, resulting from the almost total absence of lawsuits in this
field.
The unfavourable Italian approach towards admitting marital
torts had its background in custom, and could be easily explained
through the proverb ―you shouldn‘t wash your dirty linen in
public.‖
The immunity rule was not only typical to the Italian legal
tradition, but was present also in American law. Unlike Italian law,
in U.S. the immunity rule was rooted in common law (in
accordance with the English legal tradition).
The transformation of the traditional family model occurred in
the western world, characterized by a shift from the primacy of the
family unit upon the single member to the primary relevance of the
individuals within the family, together with a wider recoverability
of non-pecuniary losses, paved the way for the acknowledgement
of interspousal torts in both the legal systems.
The modern approach to the issue adopted in the Italian legal
system will be illustrated mainly through judgments, while in U.S.
the overcoming in most states of the traditional immunity rule
(occurred through judicial rulings or by legislation) will be
explained mainly through references to scholarship.
This survey, rather than suggesting new approaches to
interspousal tort liability aims at assessing differences and
similarities on the ground of operational rules used in a field—that
of family law—which in the past comparative law enquiries did not
delve into because of its alleged ‗exceptionalism.‘
I. INTRODUCTION
Family law for long time has been placed at the margin by
comparative lawyers interested in the processes of unification and
harmonization of legal rules aimed at ensuring the functioning of
market. It was ‗commonly thought that family law was too much
the product of each nation‘s distinctive culture and history to be a
promising subject for comparison.‘1 Since family was conceived
1.
M.A. GLENDON, Introduction: Family Law in a Time of Turbulence,
in 4 Int. Enc. Comp. Law, Tubingen-Leiden-Boston, 2006, at pp. 6-7. On the
possibility of comparison of family law regimes, see also H.D. KRAUSE,
Comparative Family Law. Past Traditions Battle Future Trends–and vice versa,
in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 1099, 1101 (M. REIMANN & R.
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outside the area of ‗patrimonial law‘ grounded on law of the
market, family law was considered as ‗exceptional,‘ and not
harmonizable. The rise in western legal systems of the ideologies
about gender equality and individual rights in family law matters
made possible a gradual convergence of family law regimes, and
the overcoming of the idea of family as ‗exceptional.‘2
The operation of tort law in the realm of family may be
considered as a significant example of the emergence of the
individual within this ambit. Tort law rules may arise within family
in different ways: a) the harmful act can be committed within
family, but the effects can be suffered at the hands of a third person
not belonging to family; b) the act can be committed by a third and
fall on a person belonging to the family (in this case, two different
specific damages may occur, one suffered by the victim and one by
his/her family); c) or it can be committed by a family member
against another family member.
In this last group of cases we find: 1) torts committed by
parents towards children; 2) torts committed by children towards
parents; 3) interspousal torts. In this third case an issue arises as to
if and when a spouse should be held liable in tort for conduct that
simultaneously constitutes both an infringement of spousal duties3
(with the consequent operation of specific family law remedies)4
ZIMMERMANN eds., Oxford, 2006).
2.
F.G. NICOLA, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58
Am. J. Comp. L. 777 (2010).
3.
In this regard it is worth mentioning sec.143, subsec. 2, of the Italian
Civil Code (hereinafter, c.c.) which states the spousal duties of fidelity, of moral
support and financial aid, cooperation in the interest of family, cohabitation: ―dal
matrimonio deriva l‘obbligo reciproco alla fedeltà, all‘assistenza morale e
materiale, alla collaborazione nell‘interesse della famiglia e alla coabitazione.‖
4.
Sec. 151 subs. 2 c.c. allows separation when living together is
unbearable or can cause a prejudice to the bringing up of children (―la
separazione può essere chiesta quando si verificano, anche indipendentemente
dalla volontà di uno o entrambi i coniugi, fatti tali da rendere intollerabile la
prosecuzione della convivenza o da recare grave pregiudizio alla educazione
della prole‖), and empowers the judge to state if separation can be ascribed to
the conduct of one of the spouses (―il giudice, pronunziando la separazione,
dichiara, ove ne ricorrano le circostanze, e ne sia richiesto, a quale dei coniugi
sia addebitabile la separazione, in considerazione del suo comportamento
contrario ai doveri che derivano dal matrimonio‖). In this latter case there are
two consequences: one, the loss of rights of succession; the other, the loss of the
right to maintenance by the spouse to whose fault separation can be ascribed. He
(or she) has the only right to alimony when there are the conditions fixed by sec.
439 c.c. There is no express mention in those provisions to the possibility of tort
claims for the spouse who had suffered damage for the infringement of the
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and a civil wrong. In the Italian legal system, one has to consider
the general clause of sec. 2043 c.c., the most important provision
among those of Civil Code dealing with tort law, which allows
damages when the victim suffers an ―unjust damage‖ from an
―intentional or negligent fact‖ of the wrong-doer.5
The cases under c) can be labelled as ―intra-family torts.‖6 In
contradistinction to other torts, in which the wrongdoer and the
victim have no relationship (prior to damage committal), in the
―intra-family torts‖ damage is strictly tied to family relationship
and occurs because there is this kind of relationship.7
Also if the topic of marital torts has been tackled in the past,8
nowadays it assumes a greater relevance in Italian law for many
reasons. Firstly, the area of relevance of non-monetary damages
(connected to the subject matter under consideration) has
significantly grown;9 secondly, statutory hypotheses of tort law

spousal duties by the other.
5.
Sec. 2043 c.c. provides that ―qualunque fatto doloso o colposo che
cagiona ad altri un danno ingiusto, obbliga colui che ha commesso il fatto a
risarcire il danno‖ (―a fact committed with bad faith or negligence producing to
someone an unjust damage, obliges the damaging person to compensate the
victim for the loss‖). Within this general provision, the most significant element
is definitely that of unjustness of damage, which in fact can be considered the
―architrave‖ of tortious liability: it is not sufficient that a damage occurs, but it
has also to be acknowledged as unjust. This element therefore has the function of
―filter‖ among those damage claims that can be allowed and those that cannot;
the meaning of ―unjust‖is not cleared by the Civil Code, which does not provide
a definition of it. The issue of ‗unjustness‘ is one of the most controversial since
the Italian Civil Code has been enacted. Literature on the topic is immense. A
thorough analysis of the issue is not possible in this paper. I will confine myself
to remind the two main positions as to the meaning of unjustness of the damage
supported by scholars and courts. The first, rooted in the tradition, interprets art.
2043 as a ―secondary‖ provision, in the sense that a damage can be qualified
―unjust‖ only when a provision (other than sec. 2043) acknowledges the right or
interest infringed as relevant for law; the second interprets the provision as a
primary one (or ―general clause‖) in the sense that the same sec. 2043 directly
selects interests and rights relevant at law (a clear and concise explanation of the
differences between these two opinions can be found in C. SCOGNAMIGLIO,
Illecito e responsabilità civile, I, in Tratt. dir. priv., vol. X, Torino, 2005, pp.176.
6.
See S. PATTI, “Intra- family torts,” in Int. Enc. Comp. law, vol. IV,
ch. 9, Tubingen-Leiden-Boston, 3 (1998).
7.
G. FERRANDO, Rapporti familiari e responsabilità civile, in P.
CENDON (ed.), Persona e danno, Milano, 2004, 3 at 2780, 2788.
8.
Ex multis, P. RESCIGNO, Immunità e privilegio, in Riv. dir. civ.,
1961, 1, p. 415, published also in Persona e comunità, Bologna, 1966, p. 414; S.
PATTI, Famiglia e responsabilità civile, Milano, 1984.
9.
I will come back to this topic infra.

2011] INTERSPOUSAL CLAIMS AT THE CROSSROADS

117

have been introduced in the field of family law;10 finally, changes
in family behaviour and new ideas about family life have brought
about an evolutionary process of ―privatization‖ concerning the
interests of the single family member.11
All these factors have played an important role in the upheaval
of the traditional opinion12 which was unfavourable towards
admitting the enforcement of tort liability rules in the realm of
10. A clear example of that is the new provision of sec.709ter of the
Italian Code of Civil Procedure (c.p.c.) in which it is written that in case of
serious breaches or acts causing prejudice to the minor or interfere with the
correct performance of the foster care (―in caso di gravi inadempienze o di atti
che comunque arrechino pregiudizio al minore od ostacolino il corretto
svolgimento delle modalità dell‘affidamento‖), the judge can admit
compensation of damage suffered by children under age and caused by one of
their parents, or from one spouse towards the other. The meaning of this
statutory hypothesis within the tortious liability system is discussed: according to
one opinion, art.709ter can be drawn within the framework of art. 2043 and 2059
of the Italian Civil Code, in the sense that the damage dealt with in the provision
of the Code of Civil Procedure has to be treated in the light of the general
principles of tort law, whereas according to a different opinion it should be
treated as a case in which there is exceptional ground for the relevance of
punitive damages (which are not generally acknowledged in Italian law). The
difference among these two positions is perceivable on the ground of the
conditions for the recoverability of the damage (the first position provides for
damage relevant under art.709ter much stricter bounds of relevance of damage
than those created by the second one). On the issue of the relationship between
of art. 709ter c.p.c. and the general rules of tort liability, see, among many
judgements, Trib. Messina, April 5, 2007 in Fam. dir., 2008, I, 60 with a
comment of E. LA ROSA; App. Firenze, Aug. 29, 2007 Decr., in Danno e resp.,
2008, 7, 799, with a comment of A. FIGONE; Cass. civ., Oct. 21, 2009, n. 22238;
Trib.
Varese,
May
7,
2010,
Ord.,
in
www.personaedanno.it/cms/data/articoli/018114.aspx; further informations on
the issues raised by this provision can be found in A. GRECO, Affido condiviso
(L. n. 54/2006) e ipotesi di responsabilità civile, in Resp. civ. prev., 2006, 6, p.
1178; A. D‘ANGELO, Il risarcimento del danno come sanzione? Alcune
riflessioni sul nuovo art.709-ter c.p.c., in Familia, 2006, I, p. 1031; G.
FERRANDO, Responsabilità civile e rapporti familiari alla luce della l..
n.54/2006, in Fam. pers. succ., 2007, 7, p. 590; M. PALADINI, Responsabilità
civile nella famiglia: verso i danni punitivi, Resp. civ. prev., 2007, 10, p. 2005;
G. CASABURI, Art. 709ter c.p.c.: una prima applicazione giurisprudenziale, in
Giur. merito, 2007, 10, p. 2528; G. FREZZA, Appunti e spunti sull‟art. 709-ter
c.p.c., in Giust. civ., 2009, 1, p. 29; G. SPOTO, Dalla responsabilità civile alle
misure coercitive indirette per adempiere agli obblighi familiari, in Dir. fam.,
2010, 2, p. 910; C. MIGHELA, Il risarcimento del danno derivante dal cd. illecito
endofamiliare, in Resp. civ. prev., 2010, 1, p. 44.
11. In the past a well-established opinion was that family cannot be ruled
from law (according to A.C. JEMOLO, La famiglia e il diritto, in Ann. Fac. Giur.
Catania, 1948, 2, at p. 38, ―family is an island which the ocean of the law barely
touches;‖ in this sense, P. STEIN–J. SHAND, Legal values in Western society
Edinburgh, 1974, p. 23.
12. On this issue I will come back infra.
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family.13
This study is organised as follows: chapter 2 analyses the
traditional approach followed in Italy and England unfavourable to
the protection in tort of the spouse for the wrongful conduct of the
other due to the existence of an ‗immunity‘ rule; chapter 3
examines the progressive relinquishment of this immunity rule
under Italian and U.S. law; chapter 4 focuses on the current
approach to interspousal torts adopted in some recent Italian cases
urged by the application of the doctrine of fundamental rights of
the individual in the realm of family. In chapter 5, some
conclusions will be outlined with reference to the respective ambits
of operation of family law remedies and tort law rules.
Furthermore, on public policy ground, the suitability of tort law as
a general remedy for the protection of individuals within the family
unit will be discussed.
II. TORT LIABILITY RULES AND FAMILY BETWEEN IMMUNITY AND
PRIVILEGE. THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALE IN CASE OF
INFRINGEMENT OF INTERSPOUSAL DUTIES: COMPARISON OF ITALIAN
AND AMERICAN SOLUTIONS
According to the traditional view, the family and liability in tort
cannot be intermingled. The family was to be considered a separate
area characterized by immunity and privilege and dominated by
pater familias, who was the guardian of family unity. The
background to this view is to be found in the traditional conception
of the family. Notwithstanding the absence of special rules or of a
different modus operandi of the rules in tort liability, tort law was
simply not applied because lawsuits were not even started when the
damaging and the damaged persons were part of the same family
unit. This was because there was widespread resistance to the
penetration of tort law general rules within the realm of the family,
whose harmony would have been put at risk by the Courts. The
unity of the family was valued higher than the interests of the
single members of the family and was to be protected from intra13. See P. MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Violazione dei doveri coniugali:
immunità o responsabilità?, in Riv. crit. dir. priv., 1988, at 605, who placed
family ―tra il pubblico ed il privato, tra la sfera della morale e quella del diritto,
tra la spontaneità dei sentimenti e la giuridificazione dei rapporti.‖
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family law suits.14 Therefore the immunity operated de facto, not
being provided for de iure.
Some scholars did not find persuasive this explanation of the
reasons of the immunity of family from tort liability rules rooted on
social culture.15 The operation of an immunity rule in the case of
harmful conduct producing financial harm could be explained with
the fact that the victim was otherwise protected.
The duty of the husband to maintain his wife was, in the past,
wide enough to cover every financial need of the latter and
included all the costs, such as medical expenses, of a damage
caused by his wrongful conduct. Compensation was thereby
unnecessary. Furthermore, it was stressed that holding the
wrongdoer liable for a sum of money would not make sense since
the wrongful conduct did not cause damage only to the person
directly affected, but also to the whole family including the
wrongdoer when the victim of the tort could not work within the
family because of the harmful conduct.16
The ‗hierarchical‘ model lay at the basis of this approach.
For this model (that has been called ‗institutional‘),17 the family
was the basic ―cell‖ of society, based on the status of its

14. D. BARBERO, Sistema del diritto privato italiano, Torino, 1962, at
p.566, supports this position when he states that family law has ―una funzione
ultraindividuale, ultraegoistica ed eminentemente sociale, in cui lo stesso dato
egoistico viene assunto e tutelato non per sé, ma per essere elevato a strumento
di utilità e di benessere per tutti.‖ According to this author, however, Family law
is not ―una branca dello stesso diritto pubblico, ma tutt‘al più, e questo sì, un
sistema di norme preminentemente di ordine pubblico‖ (at 568).
15. See P. RESCIGNO, Immunità e privilegio, supra note 8, at 415:
―l‘esigenza di non turbare la pace familiare non giustifica il rifiuto dell‘azione
proposto dopo il divorzio per un danno subito durante il matrimonio.‖
16. Id. at 416-417.
17. This model lies at the basis of the Italian Civil Code of ‗42. These
provisions are the same of those included in Civil Code of 1865, notwithstanding
the relevant social changes occurred between the two codes. Infact, the
―Relazione sul progetto preliminare‖ admits that ―pur modificati in certa misura i
costumi e mutate le condizioni sociali, non si è ravvisata l‘opportunità di
modificare in alcuna guisa la fondamentale disciplina dei rapporti fra coniugi
[...]. Ogni particolare atteggiamento che sia più confacente ai bisogni ed ai
costumi dei tempi, e soprattutto le conseguenze del fenomeno del lavoro della
donna, è perfettamente compatibile con questa fondamentale disciplina della
famiglia, e senza una precisa necessità non sono da modificare le formule che
hanno ormai il prestigio e la forza di una tradizione‖ (this passage is quoted in A.
SPANGARO, La responsabilità per violazione dei doveri coniugali, in M. SESTA
ed., La responsabilità nelle relazioni familiari, Torino, 2008, p. 81 fn. 17).
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members.18 This latter served as a link between the family and the
legal system, in that it had the function to govern rights and duties
among family members. From this premise many corollaries
follow.19 Family bonds could not be ruled through agreements, the
only cause of marital dissolution could be death and the interests of
single family members were considered as subordinate to the
―public‖ interest of the unity of family.20 The principle of the unity
of the family and the dominance of the pater familias aimed at
satisfying the need of protection of family patrimony.
This immunity rule historically represented an obstacle to the
enforcement of general principles of law, or rather private law,21
while the operation of criminal law rules was admitted,22 and,
consequently, of tort liability rules.
Scholars have looked for some theoretical arguments
appropriate to lending a somewhat legal grounding to the immunity
rule.23 It has been said that family and liability in tort have two
18. M.R. MARELLA, La contrattualizzazione delle relazioni di coppia.
Appunti per una rilettura, in Riv. crit. dir. priv., 2003, 1, p. 57: ―lo status
costituiva una cerniera fondamentale fra famiglia ed ordinamento , assicurando a
quest‘ultimo lo strumento attraverso il quale modellare la struttura della prima.
Nella logica dello status diventava centrale la posizione di un soggetto nei
confronti di altri soggetti considerati non come singoli, ma come appartenenti ad
una collettività organizzata, una posizione che viene intesa non tanto come
somma di poteri che l‘ordinamento riconosce al singolo, ma come presupposto
di tutta una serie di diritti, obblighi e rapporti che possono crearsi fra i
componenti della collettività‖ (at 74, fn. 16).
19. See A. ZOPPINI, L‟autonomia privata nel diritto di famiglia. Sessanta
anni dopo, in Riv. dir. civ., 2002, 2, at p. 215.
20. A. CICU, Principii generali del diritto di famiglia, in Riv. trim. dir.
proc. civ., 1955, p. 1. For a different view on these issues, P. BARCELLONA,
Famiglia (dir. civ.), in Enc. dir., XVI, 1967, at pp. 785-86.
21. A. CICU supra note 20, at 12; P. POLLICE, Il difficile rapporto nel
diritto di famiglia tra istanza individuale e interesse “pubblico”, in Riv. dir.
pubbl. sc. pol., 2000, 2, p. 203; S. PATTI, Famiglia e responsabilità civile, supra
note 8, at 3, observes that the existence of a family bond has been seen as a
hurdle to the enforcement of commonly applied rules and an incentive to the
creation of specific rules: ―tenui dati normativi e, soprattutto, decisioni più o
meno numerose […] inducono […] a pensare che l‘appartenenza dei protagonisti
dell‘illecito ad un gruppo familiare determini un diverso modo di operare delle
regole sulla responsabilità civile, o la disapplicazione delle regole stesse o,
ancora, l‘applicazione di una regola particolare.‖
22. S. PATTI, Famiglia e responsabilità civile, supra note 8, at 32
remembers that criminal law applied to family when ―la gravità del fatto faceva
prevalere l‘interesse pubblicistico alla repressione ed alla punizione del
responsabile rispetto all‘interesse […] alla tutela della sfera privata della
famiglia.‖
23. On this issue, see P. CENDON, Profili generali degli illeciti tra
familiari: famiglia e responsabilità, in R.TORINO (ed.), Illeciti tra familiari,
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distinct languages;24 that family law remedies do not admit the
enforcement of tort liability rules, since the first are alternative to
the second according to the Roman law principle ‗inclusio unius,
exclusio alterius;‘ that spousal duties do not have the nature of
legal obligations; that liability would be an incentive to actual
family breakdown. However, these arguments look like attempts to
find ex post a rationale to immunity rule.
The unfavourable approach towards the operation of tort law in
this field, and in particular within the marital relationship, adopted
in the past times is not an Italian peculiarity. To realise that, it is
sufficient to compare the restrictive solutions adopted in past times
in Italy as to the operation of tort law rules in the field of family
with the very similar ones experienced in legal traditions under
many aspects significantly different, such as the English and the
American one.25
This similarity among legal systems that are deeply different
could find an easy explanation in the fact that they share the same
social model of family. Although it could be true, this apparent
similarity, however, needs to be more carefully considered.
If an immunity rule could be found in common law systems,
the rationale for it in these latter seems to be different from that
lying at the basis of the Italian rule.
It was in fact rooted in law, rather than in social culture.26
There were several legal hurdles to the the operation of tort liability
in the domain of the ‗interspousal‘ relationship, flowing, as it will
be clarified, by the special regime concerning property and legal
capacity of married women.27 In the common-law systems, in fact,
in the past a spouse could not seek reparation for the prejudice
suffered as a result of the illegal acts of the other because of the
violenza domestica e risarcimento del danno, 6-8, Milano, 2006.
24. Id. at 6: ―refrattaria già di suo al tocco spigoloso del diritto, la
famiglia costituirebbe […] una sorta di isola nel mare, poco adatta a sopportare
il contatto con presenze invasive come quella dell‘illecito. Troppo grande la
distanza fra il carattere (lieve, vaporoso) degli intrecci domestici e il taglio
(pragmatico, semplificatorio) della responsabilità civile.‖
25.
References to English law will be limited as to the origins of the
immunity rule.
26. On this point, see S. PATTI, supra note 6.
27. In this regard, for references in Italian literature, see S.PATTI, supra
note 9 at 26-30; S. PATTI , supra note 8; R. TORINO, Responsabilità per illeciti
tra familiari e rimedi contro la violenza domestica in Inghilterra, in Illeciti tra
familiari, cit., 151; CLERK & LINDSELL, On Torts, London, 2000, p. 187.
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doctrine of unity of spouses. According to this doctrine, marriage
produced a merger of the legal identity of spouses, who were
considered at law as one entity, ―and that ‗one‘ was the husband
who acted as ‘guardian‘ for the wife.‖28 Since the doctrine of unity
is of the highest importance for the understanding of the rationale
of the immunity from tortious conducts perpetrated against the
spouse, brief considerations have to be done as to it.29 With
marriage, women lost their legal capacity to act,30 and their
properties in favour of the husband. This means that neither could
wives sell their properties, nor could they sue, or be sued.31
Consequently, women could not claim damages deriving from
any wrongful conduct on the part of their husband. Since a married
woman could not act on her own, in a tort suit the husband would
have been simultaneously plaintiff and defendant (with the
paradoxical consequence that he could have been condemned to
28. J. DE WITT GREGORY-P. N. SWISHER-S.L. SCHEIBLE, Understanding
Family Law, Matthew Bender, 1995, p. 55.
29. This doctrine has been clearly framed in the famous passage by W.
Blackstone, who in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1770, Vol.I,
p.442 (quoted by S.CRETNEY, Family law in the twentieth century. A history,
2005, p. 91, wrote: ―the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing;
and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert, femina viro co-operta; is
said to be covert-baron or under the protection and influence of her husband, her
baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.
Upon this principle, of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost
all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the
marriage.‖).
30.
For a detailed analysis of the issue of womens‘ capacity during
marriage. W. MC CURDY, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43
Harvard L. Rev., 1030, 1031-1035 (1930).
31. According to O. KAHN FREUND, Inconsistencies and injustices in the
law of husband and wife, 15 Mod. L. Rev., 133, 137 (1952).
This rule belonged to the law of procedure, not to the substantive
law. It followed not only from the general doctrine of unity, but also
from the more special doctrine that a married woman could,
exceptions apart, neither sue nor be sued without the husband being
made joint plaintiff or joint defendant.
See also Phillips v. Barnes [1876] 1 Q.B.D. 436, per Lord BLACKBURN:
―the objection to the action [among spouses] is […] founded upon the principle
that husband and wife are one person […] the objection to the action is […]
because husband and wife cannot contract with or convey to each other;‖ in a
later case of 1877, Abbot v. Abbot, the Court followed the solution adopted in
Phillips, but it added that the bar to the recourse to the private law remedies is
justified by the fact that it was possible to enjoy of protection afforded by
criminal law, and that damages suffered during marriage can be compensated
through alimony in a divorce proceeding.
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award damages to himself!). The fact that law considered spouses
as one entity did not make possible any distinction, in the case of
intra-family torts, between the wrongdoer and the victim. It is also
true that these common law disabilities concerning married women
were ameliorated by Courts of Equity, during the eighteenth
century, which allowed specific property to be held in trust (usually
created by the wife‘s father) for the wife‘s ‗sole and separate use.‘
This case of trust was known as the ‗feme sole estate.‘ This
doctrine began to be accepted by American Courts later and gained
considerable popularity in statutory law by the mid-nineteenth
century with the enactment in several states of Married Women‘s
Property Acts.32
Furthermore, the victim could not sue the husband/tortfeasor
not even after dissolution of the spousal bond. The English
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 ruled only that a judicially separated
woman should be considered a feme sole in relation to any property
she bought subsequently to the marriage, and also for the purposes
of contracts, torts, and legal actions against third parties, but it did
not allow the possibility for women to sue the husband in tort. It
seemed that women did not have the possibility to sue even if the
tortfeasor and the victim married after the tort had been
committed.33 The doctrine of unity of spouses was so embedded in
the English system as to resist legal reforms introduced at the end
of nineteenth century34 with the aim of allowing the retention of a
woman‘s property after marriage and the possibility to keep her
own earnings. The Married Women‟s Property Act 1870
32.
See J . DE WITT GREGORY-P. N. SWISHER-S.L.SCHEIBLE, supra note
28, at 56:
Although the Married Women‘s Property Acts varied in detail from
one state to another, in general, they extended further than the feme
sole estate. The Acts not only granted wives the rights to acquire,
own, and transfer all types of real and personal property to the same
extent as unmarried women, but many Acts further allowed married
women to enter into contracts in their own names, to engage in
business or employment and retain their own earnings, to make wills,
to sue and be sued, and to be fully responsible for their own tortuous
and criminal conduct. Typically, the married women‘s Property Acts
shielded the woman‘s assets from the creditors of the husband.
33.
On this issue, see E. HALL WILLIAMS, Wife Suing Husband For AnteNuptial Tort, 12 Mod. L. Rev., 93-95 (1949).
34. See Married Women‟s Property Acts enacted between 1870 and
1893, and modified during the twentieth century from the Bankruptcy Act of
1914, Law of property Act of 1925, and the Law Reform Act of 1935.
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acknowledged to ―married women the legal right to property
earned and to keep sums received on intestacy, small legacies, and
saving deposits,‖ while that of 1882 gave ―the right to hold all the
property belonging to her at the time of the marriage or acquired by
her thereafter as her separate property.‖35 Therefore, the common
law rules as to women‘s incapacity were not reversed, but to some
extent limited, in the sense that they did not operate for the case of
women‘s separate property being considered. While, however, the
spousal immunity doctrine was overcome for property torts, it was
not for personal torts.36
However, one can find, as early as the first decade of last
century, some exceptions to the immunity principle, as in the case
of car accidents which occurred among spouses, that ex post have
to be considered relevant in promoting the trend towards the
abrogation of immunity.
The breaches into the wall of the immunity rule were aimed at
making possible that a married woman could sue her husband for
the protection of her property. In this period, personal injuries and
damages for emotional distress (that have become common in the
United States) were not considered.
The doctrine of unity will be overtly overruled in England only
after 1962, when the Law Reform (Husband and wife) Act provided
wives with the power to sue the other ―as if they were not
married.‖ This power could be limited from Courts if ―no
substantial benefit would accrue to either party from the
35. S. CRETNEY, Supra note 29, at 97. The concept of ‗separate property‘
of husbands and wives will be removed by Married Women and Tortfeasors Act
1935.
36. In this regard, see J. SINGER, The Privatization of Family Law, Wis.
L. Rev. 1444, 1463 (1992), who, towards the U.S writes that: ―interspousal tort
immunity persisted in a majority of states until mid-1970s […] Since 1971, at
least twenty-five states have abolished interspousal tort immunity, thus allowing
spouses to sue each other for negligent and other tortuous behavior.‖ According
to this author, the overcoming of this immunity is the result of the fact that
married persons are seen as individuals, and represents a significant example of
the privatization of family law, which produced a shift from public to private
control over the definition and structure of family relationships. On the shift
from public to private choice, and the progressive disappearance of morals from
the field of family law (due to several legal and cultural factors, such as the
‗legal tradition of noninterference in family affairs‘, the ‗ideology of liberal
individualism‘, ‗American society‘s changing moral beliefs, and the ‗rise of
―psychologic man‖‘), see C.E. SCHNEIDER, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803 (1985).
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continuation of the proceedings.‖ However, also after this
important legal change, the Courts showed a certain degree of
resistance in leaving aside the ‗interspousal‘ immunity doctrine and
continued to stress the importance of protecting family harmony
and domestic peace.37 The operation of the immunity rule was
made possible by a narrow construction of statutes by courts.
While laws removed women‘s incapacity of concluding contracts
and of suing, they did not provide anything as to the possibility for
spouses to sue in tort.38
The immunity rule kept a very strong influence also when
divorce was introduced, notwithstanding the fact that divorce was
based on fault, and this latter is the natural ground on which
tortious conducts can be evaluated.
In case of dissolution of the spousal bond, the damages suffered
from one spouse during the marriage were not taken in account on
the ground of liability in tort, but on that of distribution of property
and of alimony.
III. THE OVERCOMING OF IMMUNITY RULE THROUGH THE SOCIAL
CHANGES CONCERNING FAMILY
With time, the model on which the family unit is based has
transformed itself radically from an authoritarian model,
characterized by the predominance of the pater familias over the
other family members and therefore linked to the notion of status,
to a more flexible model in which the other individuals in the
family unit are no longer annihilated in the superior interests of the
family group.39 The family becomes, therefore, a place in which the
personality—or subjectivity—of each individual member is
completed and enriched. The emancipation and economic
independence of women has significantly influenced this
evolution.40 This evolution produced as a result an increase under
37. S. PATTI, supra note 6, at 9.
38. In this regard, among U.S. scholars, M. L. EVANS, Wrongs
Committed During a Marriage: The Child that no Area of the Law Wants to
Adopt, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 465, 478 (2009).
39. D. MESSINETTI, Diritti della famiglia e identità della persona, in Riv.
dir. civ., 2005, 2, at p. 146.
40. In the Italian legal system, scholarship stressed the transition from
family- institution (which was the kind of family ruled by Civil Code of 1942), to
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Italian law in the search for judicial relief in the case of intrafamily damages, without, however, bringing about any significant
growth as to the recoverability of intra-family damages. Consider
that as late as the 1990s the Italian highest court did not recognise
liability in tort for damage suffered within the family.41 An
important distinction has to be made between cases involving the
award of monetary damages and those concerning non-monetary
damages. I will start dealing with the first group.
In one case, the Court declared that the damage suffered by the
family member could not be considered unjust, since the infringed
interest could not be described properly as a right.42 In another, the
personal separation of the spouses was considered a ―fundamental‖
right, in the sense that it can be considered among those aimed at
protecting the liberty of the person, and ―autonomous,‖ in the sense
that family law did not provide in this regard the enforcement of
tort law. The lack of an express provision, allowing tort claims in
that field, would lead, inevitably, to the exclusion of this remedy.43
The rationale of those pronouncements has to be searched for
beyond the statements of Court, focusing on the specific kind of
damage suffered from the plaintiff. In both cases, the damage
suffered was an economic loss consequent to the separation (the
diminution of value of the house where the spouses lived; loss of
economic advantages flowing from the sharing of incomes and
expenses), and not in an autonomous loss distinguishable from
those closely connected to separation. The actual principle of law
fixed by Court seemed to be that economic losses consequent to
family - community, in which the interests of single members have relevance and
protection. In 1984 S. PATTI, supra note 9, at 10 pointed out relevant changes in
family consisting in a ―minore enfasi nell‘identificazione della famiglia come
struttura unitaria,‖ and in the acknowledgement of the―autonoma individualità di
ciascun familiare all‘interno del gruppo‖ (at 10). On the issue of damage to
person within family, A. QUERCI, Responsabilità per violazione dei doveri
familiari, in Danno e resp., 2007, 1, p. 13; V. PILLA, La responsabilità civile
nella famiglia, Bologna, 2006, at pp. 175-196; M. SESTA, L‟evoluzione delle
relazioni familiari e l‟emersione di nuovi danni, in La responsabilità nelle
relazioni familiari, cit., at XXI.
41.
Cass. Civ., March 22, 1993, n.3367; Cass. Civ., April 6, 1993,
n.4108, in Mass. giust. civ., 1993, at 624.
42.
Cass. Civ., March 22, 1993, n. 3367 supra note 41.
43.
Cass. Civ., April 6, 1993, n. 4108, supra note 41: ―dalla separazione
personale dei coniugi può nascere […] solo un diritto ad un assegno di
mantenimento […]. Tale diritto esclude la possibilità di richiedere, ancorché la
separazione sia addebitabile all‘altro, anche il risarcimento dei danni a qualsiasi
titolo risentiti a causa della separazione stessa.‖
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marriage dissolution were not recoverable.44 But this did not mean
that one spouse can never sue in tort the other for damages incurred
before the dissolution of marriage and different from those caused
by dissolution. One senses the chasm existing between the apparent
breadth of maxims of Court (the rule seems to be that liability in
general is never admitted within family) and the actual rule
embedded in them, according to which one spouse can sue in tort
but only in certain cases and for specific kinds of damage. It is
necessary to verify if this operational rule is or is not generally
applied. Therefore I will consider some judgements pronouncing
on the possibility of awarding pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses
related to the infringement of spousal duties.
In a case of 1975, the Corte di Cassazione stated that the
spouse who violates the duty of fidelity may cause a pecuniary loss
to the other, implicitly admitting for the victim a remedy in tort
against the disloyal spouse.45 The view that the infringement of
marriage duties can be relevant in tort was followed by lower
courts.
In a case in the late eighties, the Tribunal of Rome dealt with a
lawsuit filed by a husband, after legal separation, from his wife
against wife‘s lover for compensation of two kinds of damage:
moral damage, flowing from the fact that the defendant took part in
the adultery committed by the plaintiff‘s wife and therefore caused
to him the loss of social respect, and financial damage, resulting
from loss of income allegedly consequential to the negligent
conduct at work of the wife‘s lover who was the plaintiff‘s
employee.46 Although the facts of this judgement differ from those
44. See Cass. Civ., May 26, 1995, n.5866, in Giur. it., 1997, 1, 843, with
a comment by A. AMATO, Giudizio di separazione: l‟addebito; il tenore di vita;
l‟indennità per le opere di miglioramento dell‟immobile in cui è stabilita la
residenza familiare; il diritto di ritenzione. In this case, the damage suffered
after the dissolution of the marriage by a wife was the cost of the rent of a new
house. The Supreme Court requires for tort liability to be acknowledged a
damage different from the one consequent to separation. Therefore, the damage
suffered from the wife has not been awarded.
45. Cass. Civ., June 19, 1975, n. 2468, in Mass. Foro it., 1975, at 591:
―la violazione da parte del coniuge dell‘obbligo di fedeltà, a parte le
conseguenze sui rapporti di natura personale, può anche costituire, in concorso
di determinate circostanze, fonte di danno patrimoniale per l‘altro coniuge.‖
46. Trib. Roma, Sept. 17, 1988, in Giur. Merito, 1991, 754, with a
comment by F. LATTANZI, Dovere di fedeltà e responsabilità civile e coniugale,
in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 1989, 1, at p. 559, with a comment by V. PALETTO.
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of the cases considered above, in that the liability of a third was
invoked, the liability of the defendant is claimed under the heading
of the infringement of conjugal duties, or more precisely of the
complicity in their violation.
The Court rejected the claim for moral damage since adultery
was no longer a crime. Therefore, it did not find in favour of the
plaintiff on the basis of sec. 2059 of the Italian Civil Code, ruling
the matter of non-monetary losses resulting from a tortious
conduct. The solution adopted by the court can be understood only
if one bears in mind that until recent times recovery of moral
damages was awarded only when these were consequent to crimes.
This narrow interpretation of this provision was the result of the
strict wording of it, stating that non-pecuniary losses have to be
compensated only in cases fixed by law, and of the fact that when
the Civil Code was enacted in 1942, the only instance in which law
expressly provided the compensation of non-pecuniary loss was
that of art. 185 of the Criminal Code, providing the duty for the
persons who are guilty for a crime to compensate monetary and
non-monetary damages.47
The court then went on to consider the main problem of
compensation of pecuniary losses which the plaintiff allegedly
suffered at the hands of the defendant.
The plaintiff complained that his company, during his absence
for other work commitments and temporarily managed by the
defendant, had an unjustified loss of income.
The court decided the case on the ground of violation of
conjugal duties. First, the court considered if the duties cited in sec.
143 C.C. were relevant merely on the ground of morals (in the
sense that their infringement does not give remedies at law) or of
law; secondly, if damages provoked by a third extraneous to the
family unit can be awarded under the heading of the infringement
of conjugal duties.
As to the first issue, the court recognised that conjugal duties
are legally binding as they have the nature of obligations.48 The
court asked itself if the conduct that has to be taken in the
47. The Italian text of sec. 2059 reads: ―Il danno non patrimoniale deve
essere risarcito solo nei casi determinati dalla legge.‖ For an in-depth analysis of
the issue of the construction of this provision, see next chapter.
48. Sec.1174 c.c. requires for the existence of a legal obligation that the
act of the obliged must have an economic value.
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fulfilment of these duties has an intrinsically economic value.
The court stated that since the duty of fidelity has the
substance of an obligation (therefore, it is enforceable), its
infringement can give rise to a pecuniary loss. The court however
rejected the claim because the plaintiff was not able to give
evidence of the damage suffered.
As to the issue of whether a third person can be held liable for
having concurred in a violation of a spousal duty, the Court went
through the issue of whether the requirements of the so-called
―wrongful inducement (by a third person) to the breach of an
obligation‖ were or not satisfied.49 According to Tribunal of Rome,
the wife‘s lover would have been liable for inducement to the
infringement of the duty of fidelity, only if evidence could be given
that his conduct increased the probability that such an infringement
can occur.50 In this case, the judge rejected the claim because the
plaintiff was not able to give evidence of the causal link between
the third party‘s conduct and the adultery of his wife.
This judgement is relevant because the court admitting the
evidence of the inducement of the third to the infringement of the
spousal duties implicitly acknowledges the enforceability of tort
liability rules in the case of violation of spousal duties.
More recently, in 2002, the Tribunal of Milan, pronouncing on
a case very similar to that decided from Tribunal of Rome (also in
this case the plaintiff claimed the liability of a third person),51
49.
The ‗wrongful inducement (by a third person) to the breach of an
obligation‘ (in Italian, ‗induzione all‟inadempimento‘) is a doctrinal framework
set to deal with the issue as to if a third party can be held liable in tort for having
wrongfully driven the debtor to the breach of an obligation arising from contract.
50. The Tribunal of Rome requires for third‘s liability a conduct ―che
determini un ampliamento delle probabilità che si verifichi violazione
dell‘obbligo di fedeltà.‖ Among the scholars, against the possibility for the third
to be held liable for having induced a married person to the infringement of
spousal duties, G. FACCI, I nuovi danni nella famiglia che cambia, Milano,
2004, at p. 28.
51. Trib. Milano, Sept. 24-Nov. 22, 2002, in Resp. civ. prev., 2003, at p.
465, with a comment by G. FACCI, L‟infedeltà coniugale e l‟ingiustizia del
danno; in NGCC, 2003, 1, 761, with a comment by D. CHINDEMI, Il tradimento
del coniuge non è fonte di responsabilità extracontrattuale per l‟amante, ma
può esserlo per il coniuge infedele. There is an important difference between the
pronouncements of the Tribunal of Rome and the Tribunal of Milan, as to the
possibility for the third party to be held liable for the violation of the duty of
fidelity, which was excluded by the Tribunal of Milan on the grounds that this
duty only concerns spouses.
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recognized that the breach of spousal duties can give rise to tort
liability.52
The two decisions state the principle that the violation of a
conjugal duty may be relevant in tort, but this effect is not
automatic.53 If the recovery of monetary damages is admitted in
marital torts, the award of non-monetary damages is more difficult.
In another case the Tribunal of Milan ruled on a claim
following separation due to the conduct of the husband
(―separazione con addebito‖).54 Namely, the wife claimed to have
suffered a moral damage because her husband neglected her during
pregnancy,55 was involved in a love affair and finally definitively
abandoned the matrimonial domicile (after repeated absences
during the period of gestation). In addition to the quantification of
money for maintenance, the Tribunal of Milan had to decide the
issue of compensation for moral damage claimed by the wife for
the misconduct of the husband. The Tribunal, as in the previous
cases discussed, based the judgement on two preliminary issues: a)
the judicial or merely moral nature of marital duties;56 b) the
possibility of an action in damage in addition to family law
remedies.
It is worth considering at first the preliminary question under
b). At the outset, the court emphasised the low efficiency of
remedies provided for by family law. Second, the court underlined
that family law is a set of rules open to the enforcement of liability
in tort; the construction of family law as an exhaustive and selfsufficient system would infringe upon sec. 2 of the Italian
52. In this case, however, the Tribunal of Milan required for liability in
tort of the wife the evidence of a ―serious‖ breach of the duty of fidelity, whilst a
simple breach is not enough. The rejection of the tort liability claim towards the
unfaithful spouse certainly influenced the rejection of the claim towards the
wife‘s lover.
53. For this position see also Cass. Civ., May 26, 1995, n.5866 supra
note 44.
54. Trib. Milano, June 4, 2002, in Giur. it., 2002, at p. 2291, with a
critical comment by O.B. CASTAGNARO, Osservazioni sul tema della
responsabilità civile da violazione di doveri coniugali; in Guida al diritto, 2002,
24, p. 40, with a critical comment by M. FINOCCHIARO, La ricerca di tutela per
la parte più debole non deve “generare” diritti al di là della legge.
55. On the infringement of the duties of moral support and financial aid
in a case of a serious illness of the spouse, see Trib. Firenze, June 13, 2000, in
Fam. dir., 2001, 2, p. 161, with a comment by M. DOGLIOTTI.
56. On the issue of the nature of marital duties see V. PILLA, La
responsabilità civile nella famiglia, supra note 40, at 10-12.
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Constitution, which provides the protection of ―inviolable rights‖
of the individual within the social bodies (like family) to which he
or she takes part.57 However, this does not mean that responsibility
will be enacted for every infringement of spousal duties, but only
when infringement is serious.58
The seriousness has to be evaluated at the light of the conduct
of both the spouses, and secondly of the causal link between the
violation of spousal duties and the crisis of marriage.
The first criterion has been particularly significant in directing
some other decisions.
A decision of the Tribunal of Milan rejected the claim for
compensation of a damage suffered by the wife/plaintiff
(‗biological damage and damage to social life‘) for alleged
violation of spousal duties affecting the sphere of ―affection and
sexual relation.‖59 The rejection of claim was based on the
circumstance that the impotence of the husband was well known
since the beginning of the marriage—which lasted for twenty
years—and therefore had to be regarded as accepted by the wife.
The court did not accept wife‘s claim that she tolerated the
impotence of the husband because of pressure put on her by her
mother and mother in-law while these latter were alive.
On the same basis, a judgement pronounced by the Tribunal of
Savona.60 A wife complained of the fact that the husband, after
having refused to have children, broke the spousal bond and started
another relationship with a woman with whom he, in fact, had a
child. The Tribunal of Savona rejected the claim of the wife
because the marriage went on for many years during which the
wife failed to lodge a complaint, and during which she could have
57. Sec. 2 Constitution reads: ―La Repubblica riconosce e garantisce i
diritti inviolabili dell‘uomo sia come singolo sia nelle formazioni sociali ove si
svolge la sua personalità.‖ This provision is the cornerstone of the recent debate
concerning non pecuniary damage in tort. On this issue, see next chapter.
58. Among scholars, A. ZACCARRIA, L‟infedeltà: quanto può costare?
Ovvero, è lecito tradire solo per amore, in Studium iuris, 2000, 5, 524, thinks
that tort liability rules are not enforceable in case of infringement of spousal
duties (except when it has been committed fraudulently).
59. Trib. Milano, Feb. 10, 1999, in Dir. Fam., 2001, 988; in Fam. dir.,
2001, p.185, with a comment by M. BONA, Violazione dei doveri genitoriali e
coniugali: una nuova frontiera della responsabilità civile?.
60. Trib. Savona, Dec. 5, 2002, in Fam. dir., 2003, 3, 248, with a
comment by F. LONGO, Famiglia e responsabilità civile: rapporti tra i coniugi e
danno risarcibile.
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indeed chosen to break the bond herself. In addition to this, she
failed to inform the court that she had suffered from a
psychopathological state which rendered her dependant on the will
of her husband.
The criteria which oriented the two decisions unfavourable to
the plaintiff were the acquiescence of the wives to the misconduct
of husbands. For that reason the conduct of the defendants cannot
be qualified as serious violation of spousal duties.
From the Italian decisions considered above, several rules can
be inferred. Tort liability, in the family sphere, is, in abstract,
possible. However, not only does recovery of damages require a
particularly serious violation of conjugal duties (especially when
non-monetary damages are involved),61 but also the damage must
be autonomous and distinct from the one that derives from
dissolution of marriage. These statements are generally accepted by
scholars.62
It has to be clarified however that in Italian law the overcoming
of the immunity of spouses from the operation of tort law has not
lead to the opposite situation of making relevant in tort conducts
that are not ordinarily relevant under this heading. It just means
that conducts that are relevant outside the family under a tortious
liability heading can now be relevant also if they occur within the
family unit.
Also in common-law systems the immunity rule has been
overcome and the admissibility of tort law rules within the field of

61. A violation ‗una tantum‘ is not enough. The case dealt by App.
Brescia, March 7, 2007, in Resp. civ. prev., 2008, p. 2073, with a comment by S.
CATERBI, Infedeltà coniugale e responsabilità civile, is interesting. In this
judgement it is discussed if a homosexual relation is a serious breach of the duty
of fidelity per se. The answer is negative: ―la particolarità dell‘infedeltà,
concretatasi in una relazione di tipo omosessuale, non può considerarsi
intrinsecamente grave e tale da far ritenere presunta la lesione del diritto
all‘integrità personale dell‘altro coniuge […] il parametro di valutazione risulta
estremamente soggettivo e può portare a valutazioni […] tali da far ritenere che
una relazione omosessuale possa rivelarsi anche meno dolorosa e dannosa
dell‗altra.‖ This position has been confirmed by the same Court some months
later: App. Brescia, June 5, 2007, in Resp. civ., 2008, 8, p. 616 with a comment
by L. BOCCADAMO, Torto endofamiliare e risarcibilità del danno esistenziale
per violazione di doveri coniugali: una duplice conferma.
62. Adverse to that position is M. FINOCCHIARO, supra note 54, who
thinks that violation of spousal duties ―trova la propria disciplina in via esclusiva
negli articoli 84 e seguenti del c.c. dedicati al matrimonio‖ (at 52).
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family is nowadays a widely accepted general principle.63 This
evolution was influenced by the shift from a fault-based divorce to
a non-fault based divorce. Tort law plays the role of giving
relevance to faulty conduct held during the marriage which cannot
give grounds to divorce. In the past, the harmfulness of some
marital conduct were relevant as statutory grounds for divorce and
were used, once that interspousal immunity doctrine had been
abolished, to affect the distribution of the property or the alimony
award.64
This, however, does not mean that at present the gates of
extracontractual liability in the family ambit are open without
restrictions. In the U.S., for example, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts of 1977 provides that ―a husband or wife is not immune from
tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship.‖
However, the Restament does not make clear which requirements
have to be proved for the tortious liability to be enacted. In fact, if
it is clear that the overcoming of the immunity does not mean ipso
facto that a ‗interspousal‘ conduct is relevant in tort law, when it is
not if occurring among strangers; things become less clear when
one asks himself which are the conditions to be met for a tort
lawsuit among spouses to be upheld. It is evident that not all the
possible harms can be considered relevant. Courts have to ascertain
if they are or are not the normal result of ―the ebb and flow of

63. One of the the U.S. landmark cases in which the overcoming of
immunite rule is tied to the enactment of womens‘ emancipation Acts is Self v.
Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683 (Cal. 1962).
64.
Even nowadays this approach is followed by some scholars. Among
the others, Harry D. KRAUSE, Propter Honoris Respectum: On the Danger of
Allowing Marital Fault to Re-Emerge in the Guise of Torts, 73 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1355 (1998).
Among the recent judgments following this approach, Leskun v. Leskun
[2006] S.C.J. n. 25. The court looked at the emotional distress suffered by the
wife for the infidelity of the husband as a cause for her incapacity after the
breakdown of the marriage to achieve post-separation economic sufficiency and
on this basis found the plaintiff to be entitled to economic support. The
interesting point raised by this judgement is that the emotional trauma was
considered as a relevant ground (although it was not the only one: also her
advanced age, her health problems, and her limited skill set were considered) for
the economic support order on behalf of the husband. On this judgement and
other previous decisions sharing the same approach, F. Kelly, Private Law
Responses to Domestic Violence: The Intersection of Family Law and Tort,
(2009) 44 S.C.L.R. 321, where the focus is on the economic effects of domestic
violence, i.e. affecting the earning capacity of the victim).
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married life.‖65
The most frequent cases in which the issue of tortious liability
among spouses arises are assault and battery, infliction of venereal
disease, interference with child custody, fraud, and emotional
distress.66
Whereas tortious liability is more easily accepted in the cases
of physical injury, the case of emotional distress is much more
controversial.67
Among the elements necessary for emotional distress, the
Restatement provides that the conduct has to be ‗outrageous,‘ but it
does not provide any standard for the courts to state the presence or
not of this requisite.68
Notwithstanding whether the relevance of tort law rules in the
field of family law is admitted as a general principle, the practical
operation of tort law rules can be made difficult by the existence of
procedural and substantive hurdles, such as in the United States,69
65. Leonard KARP & Cheryl L. KARP, Beyond the Normal Ebb and
Flow… Infliction of Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 Fam. L.
Q. 389 (1994-95).
66. On this point, J. KRISTYN KROHSE, No Longer Following the Rule of
Thumb–What to Do with Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims, 1997 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 923 (1997).
67. Among U.S. scholars critical towards the relevance in tort of
emotional distress in the marriage, H. KRAUSA, On the Danger of Allowing
Marital Fault, supra note 64. According to this writer, allowing tort claims may
lead to seriously unfair financial distribution of the assets among the spouses.
68. Unfavorable towards admitting the protection in tort for intentional or
negligent emotional distress are Ira Mark ELLMAN & Stephen D. SUGARMAN,
Spousal Emotional Abuse a Tort, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1268, 1280-84 (1996). They
endorse the restrictive approach followed by courts in some states awarding
emotional distress only in some specific cases.
As to the approach to ‗outrageousness‘ set by courts, a fixed standard for the
evaluation of marital conduct does not seem to have been reached. In two cases,
in which facts were very similar regarding physical and moral violence to wives,
the judgements given by the courts were completely opposite because of the
different meaning given to ‗outrageous.‘ See Simmons v.Simmons, 773 P.2d 602
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991). For an in-depth analysis on these cases, see Robert G. SPECTOR, Marital
Torts: The Current Legal Landscape, 33 Fam. L. Q. 745 (1999-2000). In some
cases, courts considered physical injuries and emotional distress on the grounds
of the distribution of marital property. This way of deciding was typical to the
regime of divorce based on fault: see in this regard, Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.
S.2d 449, 455 (App. Div. 2002).
69.
According to M.L. EVANS, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage,
supra note 38, at 481-489, examples of procedural hurdles can be found on the
ground of statutes of limitations, joinder of the claims (of tort and divorce), and
res judicata. As to joinder, an issue could rise when specialised family law
courts handle divorce claims. This occurs when a legal system acknowledges the
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or by the dearth of cases of tort law suits brought by one spouse
against the other, such as in England. The possible reasons for this
latter situation could be the length of civil cases, the knowledge
that the defendant is not able to pay damages, and/or the
inexperience of family law barristers in the personal injury area.70
In Italian law the main hurdle to the development of
interspousal claims nowadays regards non-monetary damages.
Therefore general conditions for recovery of these latter will be
focused in the next chapter to understand the most recent
developments in the field of marital torts.
IV. FROM THE PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY UNITY TO THE DEFENSE
OF INVIOLABLE RIGHTS OF SINGLE FAMILY MEMBERS
The issue of the conditions of relevance of damage to person
has therefore to be examined to better understand the Italian
situation. This is the last step of a process that produced as a result
a wider protection of non-financial interest of the individual. In
Italian law, the protection of each individual is no more limited to
pecuniary losses than in the past when infringements upon the
private sphere not causing either bodily or pecuniary harm were in
general not relevant.71
Due to restrictions to the compensation of non-monetary
damages fixed by sec. 2059, recovery was admitted only in a few
cases; among them, the most significant was that of moral damage
suffered from the victim of a crime. These limits, concerning the
dichotomy between courts of equity and courts of law. In this case, against the
possibility of joinder three main arguments are used: 1) joinder among these
claims would be contrary to the legislative intent for the evident inconsistency of
‗tort action‘ (based on fault) and ‗no-fault divorce;‘ 2) joinder would be not
possible because of the different aims lying at the basis of the two actions. This
conclusion does not seem to be accepted by Benjamin SHMUELI, Tort Litigation
between Spouses: Let‟s Meet Somewhere in the Middle, 15 Harv. Negot. L. Rev.
195, 206-08 (2010), according to whom the goals of family law and tort law
being different, tort suits would allow a more effective protection to the weaker
spouse; 3) joinder would be a disadvantage for the claimant because this latter
would be deprived of the right to a jury trial (allowed for tort claims, but not for
divorce actions).
70.
See SPECTOR, supra note 68, at 761-763.
71. A thorough analysis of the issues related to non pecuniary losses can
be found in the book by M. BARCELLONA, Il danno non patrimoniale, Milano
(2008).
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recoverability of damage to person, were loosened in 1986. The
Constitutional Court admitted, taking conjointly into account the
general clause of sec. 2043, that requires for compensation, as we
have already seen, unjustness of damage and sec. 32 of the Italian
Constitution which recognizes in health the nature of inviolable
right of the individual,72 the compensation of damage to health
(―danno biologico‖), notwithstanding its nature of non-pecuniary
loss.73
In this judgement the fundamental distinction is between
damage as wrongful event (the so called ―danno-evento‖) and
damage as negative economic effect flowing from the wrongful
action (the so called ―danno-conseguenza‖). Damage to health is a
―danno-evento,‖ because it is an injury to an interest relevant to the
Constitution, and is recoverable per se; that means that the plaintiff
does not have the burden of proving that he suffered an economic
loss, or anguish. Moreover, damage does not need to be committed
through a crime to be recoverable. Therefore, the strictures
provided by sec. 2059 can apply to injury to psycho-physical
integrity only in the case in which evidence of a moral damage
consisting in pain or anguish due to injury to psycho-physical
integrity is admitted.
Since 1986, damage to person was compensated in the cases of
injury to psycho-physical integrity (recoverable under sec. 2043) or
anguish suffered by victims of a crime (recoverable under sec.
2059). This approach is called ‗dualistic,‘ because the
compensation of the damage to person is drawn from two different
sections among those that regulate tort liability depending on the
kind of harm suffered.
In the above-cited decision of the Tribunal of Milan of 2002,74
the judge of first instance identified damage suffered by the
defendant wife in that her own ‗personal sphere‘ had deteriorated.
The ‗personal sphere‘ consists of the ―complex of activities, but
72. Sec. 32 of the Constitution provides that ―la Repubblica tutela la
salute come fondamentale diritto dell‘individuo e interesse della collettività.‖
73. Corte Cost., June 30, 1986 n.184, in Foro it., 1986, I, cc. 2976 (see
also, Corte Cost., July 12, 1979 n. 88, that qualified right to health ―come un
diritto primario ed assoluto […] da ricomprendere tra le posizioni soggettive
direttamente tutelate dalla Costituzione‖). The issue was if injury to health not
affecting the capacity of working (and earning money), i.e. not causing pecuniary
losses for the victim, could be redressed.
74. Trib. Milano, June 4, 2002, supra note 54.
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also of affective, emotional experiences, in which the individual
expresses personality;‖ the injury to the personal sphere is ―more
serious than the mere damage caused by the marriage breakdown
itself.‖75 The plaintiff alleges the violation of sec. 29, subsec. I and
II,76 and sec. 31 subsec. II of the Constitution,77 in that the conduct
of the husband constitutes the violation of the ‗legitimate
expectations‘ of the wife to ―equal well-being and equal personal
realisation in conjugal life, also in relation to various privileges and
experiences linked to the role of each spouse, and the indispensable
protection of maternity.‖
According to the Tribunal of Milan, the damage claimed by the
defendant wife should be covered by sec. 2043 of the Civil Code,
the application of which is not limited to financial loss, while—
according to the court—sec. 2059 applies only to moral damage.
Sec. 2043 covers, however, all the injuries to the person different
from moral damages.78 This judgement is directly affected by the
decision handed down in 1986 by the Constitutional Court.
A further step towards the general relevance of damage to
person was done in 2003 through a wider interpretation of sec.
2059 given in the judgments handed down by the Supreme Court
via the so-called ―twin decisions‖ no. 8827 and 8828.79 With these
75. The passages cited between inverted commas are an abridged
translation of the Italian version. The definition of ‗personal sphere‘ given from
the Court must be also cited in italian: ―complesso di attività, ma anche di vissuti
affettivi, emozionali e relazionali, in cui il soggetto esplica la sua personalità,
ben più grave del mero disagio comunque conseguente alla frattura dell‘unione
coniugale.‖
76. Sec. 29 provides that: ―1. La Repubblica riconosce i diritti della
famiglia come società naturale fondata sul matrimonio. 2. Il matrimonio è
ordinato sulla eguaglianza morale e giuridica dei coniugi, con i limiti stabiliti
dalla legge a garanzia dell‘unità familiare.‖
77. Sec. 31 provides that: ―la Repubblica […] protegge la maternità,
l‗infanzia e la gioventù, favorendo gli istituti necessari a tale scopo.‖
78. According to the Court, sec. 2043 would provide protection to the
person not only ―nella sua proiezione economica, ma anche soggettiva, e, quindi,
della lesione di diritti primari.‖
79. Cass. Civ., May 31, 2003 n. 8827; Cass. Civ., May 31, 2003 n. 8828
(in these cases the tortfeasor caused the death of a person, and was sued by the
relatives of the victim: these latter suffered a moral damage flowing from the
death of victim, in Italy called ‗da perdita del congiunto‘). These judgments have
been commented in all the most important law journals. See among others,
Danno e resp., 2003, 8-9, 816, with a comment by F. D. BUSNELLI, Chiaroscuri
d‟estate. La Corte di Cassazione e il danno alla persona, and by G.
PONZANELLI, Ricomposizione dell‟universo non patrimoniale: le scelte della
Corte di cassazione.
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two decisions the Supreme Court reconstructed in a different way
the respective ambits of application of sec. 2043 and 2059.
According to the previous approach, the first provision (sec. 2043)
would concern financial harm, the second (sec. 2059) nonpecuniary losses. This dualistic approach was set aside in favour of
a new one, that we could call, in contradistinction to the former,
―unitary.‖ According to the latter, sec. 2059 rules all the cases of
non-pecuniary loss.
In accordance with the ―twin decisions,‖ sec. 2059 operates not
only in the presence of moral damage suffered, but also in the
presence of violation of constitutional rights, causing a nonfinancial damage.
The Court of Cassation interprets the sentence of sec. 2059 ―in
the cases in which [the compensation of non-financial losses] is
provided by law,‖ from which depends the possibility to recover a
non-financial loss, in a meaning wider than that obtained through
literal interpretation. Compensation is admitted not only when law
expressly provides this result, but also when, notwithstanding the
lack of an express provision, the judge can infer from the
Constitution that the right injured was ―inviolable‖ in the sense of
sec. 2 of the Constitution. It is worth noting not only that, since
sec. 2 does not include a catalogue of inviolable rights, it is the
duty of Courts to decide if a right is or is not inviolable, but also
that sec. 2 does not provide the remedy of compensation in case of
injury to inviolable rights. The argument used by the Court to give
grounds to the remedy of compensation for the infringement of
inviolable rights is that insofar as the Constitution recognizes
inviolable rights (not having economic value), it implicitly also
allows their protection. Since compensation represents the essential
way of protecting rights, this protection is not to be limited,
otherwise a refusal of protection would occur in cases where
recovery is not expressly provided by law.80 Furthermore, as an
80. The passage sketched in the text reads: ―ritiene il Collegio che,
venendo in considerazione valori personali di rilievo costituzionale, deve
escludersi che il risarcimento del danno non patrimoniale che ne consegua sia
soggetto al limite derivante dalla riserva di legge correlata all‘art.185 c.p. Una
lettura della norma costituzionalmente orientata impone di ritenere inoperante il
detto limite se la lesione ha riguardato valori della persona costituzionalmente
garantiti. Occorre considerare […] che nel caso in cui la lesione abbia inciso su
un interesse costituzionalmente protetto la riparazione mediante indennizzo [….]
costituisce la forma minima di tutela, ed una tutela minima non è assoggettabile a
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additional argument the Court states that in case of harm to
interests enjoying a constitutional rank, recovery has to be admitted
because the reference made from sec. 2059 to the ‗cases provided
by law‘ must be interpreted, after the enforcement of the
Constitution, also in light of its provisions, since the
acknowledgement of ‗inviolable rights‘ inherent to the person
implicitly, and necessarily, calls for their protection, and in this
way represents a case provided by law, at the highest level, of
recovery of non-pecuniary loss.
Non-pecuniary loss, however, does not constitute an
autonomous category of damage in itself (that is an autonomous
injury compensable per se), but, as it is consequential damage, can
be recovered only if the victim gives adequate evidence of it.
This means that the violation of personal rights is not enough
for the victim to enjoy compensation (in contradistinction to the
finding of the Constitutional Court in 1986), but the offended party
must indeed prove the negative effects suffered as a consequence
of the violation.
In the footsteps of the judgements of 2003, it is worth
mentioning a decision of the Court of Cassation of 2005.81 The
circumstances regard a case in which the wife, after having already
been granted the divorce for the omitted consummation of
marriage, claimed damage for the fact that she was not informed
prior to marriage of her husband‘s „impotentia coeundi,‟ and in
addition that her husband had refused, after the wedding, to seek a
cure for his pathology.
The damage alleged by the plaintiff concerns the loss of a
chance to express her sexuality and her wish to be a mother. The
Supreme Court incorporated this chance within the inviolable
rights guaranteed under sec. 2 of the Constitution, and found in
favour of compensation of this type of damage under sec. 2059.82
specifici limiti, poiché ciò si risolve in rifiuto di tutela nei casi esclusi‖ (Cass.
Civ., May 31, 2003, n.8828, supra note 79, at 817).
81. Cass. Civ., May 10, 2005, n. 9801, in Fam. dir., 2005, 4, p. 365, with
a comment by M. SESTA, Diritti inviolabili della persona e rapporti familiari: la
privatizzazione “arriva” in Cassazione, and by G. FACCI, L‟illecito
endofamiliare al vaglio della Cassazione.; in Corr. giur., 2005, 7, p. 928, with a
comment by G. DEMARZO.
82. The Court describes the damage suffered by the plaintiff as a
―violazione della persona umana intesa nella sua totalità, nella sua libertàdignità, nella sua autonoma determinazione al matrimonio, nelle sue aspettative

140

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

Sec. 2059 of the Civil Code could be invoked—according to
the Supreme Court—not only in the case of moral damage
consequential to a crime, but also in the hypothesis in which the
fundamental rights of the personality have been harmed, and would
apply also in the specific context of the family when a duty related
to the position of spouse has been seriously infringed. The
character of the seriousness of the infringement has to be referred
to those conducts whose harmfulness cannot be tolerated within
family. The fundamental passages of the reasoning of the Court are
the following: a) the shift from the ‗family-institution‘ model to the
‗family-community‘ one;83 b) the recent enforcement of laws that
emphasize the relevance of the individual within family (such as
Law no. 154/ 2001, dealing with violent conducts within family);
c) the operation within the family unit of sec. 3 and 29 of the
Italian Constitution, dealing respectively with the principle of
equality of all individuals in general and, with specific reference to
family, with the ethical and legal equality of spouses. On the basis
of the principle of equality, spouses—as all the other members of
the family—have to enjoy protection in respect to every harm to
their dignity and the personality, since these have the status of
di armonica vita sessuale, nei suoi progetti di maternità, nella sua fiducia in una
vita coniugale fondata sulla comunità, sulla solidarietà e sulla piena esplicazione
delle proprie potenzialità nell‘ambito di quella peculiare formazione sociale
costituita dalla famiglia, la cui tutela risiede negli artt. 2, 3, 29 e 30 Cost.‖ This
passage is worth being translated: ―violation of the person wholly considered, in
her freedom-dignity, in her autonomous decision of marrying, in her expectations
of harmonious sexual life, in her plans of being mother, in her trust on a conjugal
life founded on community, on support and on the full development of her
potential within that peculiar social group called family, protected by sec. 2, 3,
29, 30 of the Italian Constitution.‖
83. The ‗family-community‘ model is clearly explained by the Court in
this way: ―la famiglia si configura quindi non già come un luogo di compressione
e di mortificazione di diritti irrinunciabili, ma come sede di autorealizzazione e
di crescita, segnata dal reciproco rispetto ed immune da ogni distinzione di ruoli,
nell‘ambito della quale i singoli componenti conservano le loro essenziali
connotazioni e ricevono riconoscimento e tutela, prima ancora che come coniugi,
come persone, in adesione al disposto dell‘art. 2 Cost.‖ On this issue, see G.
FACCI, I nuovi danni, supra note 50, at 91. The protection of the individual
within family is the main theme in App. Torino, 21 febbraio 2000, in (2000) 5
Fam. dir., 475, with a comment by R. C. DELCONTE ed. in (2000) I Foro it.,
1555, with a comment by L. DE ANGELIS. In this case the spouse – victim does
not sue the other in damages, but claims only separation. The judgement is
interesting because the Court of Torino applies the concept of mobbing used in
work claims. In this case, infact, there was evidence that the husband , among the
other conducts, made pressures on his wife to go away from their house (this
conduct has been characterized as mobbing).
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‗inviolable rights‘ by the effect of sec. 2 of the Italian Constitution,
regardless of the facts that infringement is made by family
members or third parties; d) family law remedies enforceable in
case of the breach of spousal duties do not bar a priori the recourse
to the protection afforded by tort law, since family law cannot be
considered as a closed and thorough system. The same conduct can
give rise, when seriously harmful and affecting inviolable rights of
the person, to the operation of both remedies.
However, the plaintiff has to give specific evidence of the
prejudice coming from the injury to her fundamental rights in
accordance with the principles laid down by the twin judgments of
2003.
The repercussions of this favourable orientation toward
compensation for damage to person in the family sphere, under sec.
2043 of the Civil Code, are evidenced in a decision of the Court of
Appeal of Milan,84 in which the qualification ‗danno esistenziale‘
is explicitly used. It granted the claim for damages submitted by
the husband (plaintiff) who found that he was not, in fact, the
father of a child born to his wife within their marriage (marriage
subsequently declared null and void on the basis of sec. 122,
subsec. 3, no. 5 Civil Code). The claim was based on the pain and
suffering caused by the wife who lied to him as to paternity of her
child in order to marry the plaintiff. The damage suffered was
considered ―danno-evento,‖ and for this reason recoverable without
requiring any evidence (the Court does not follow the principles
stated by the Supreme Court in 2003 as to the recoverability of
damage to person).
The Constitution-oriented interpretation of sec. 2059 adopted
in 2003 by the Corte di Cassazione found further confirmation in
four important decisions given by its United Chambers on
November 11, 2008, that extended the principles laid down by the
former sentences of 2003 to the case of non-financial damage
consequent to a breach of contractual duties.85 According to the
84. App. Milano, Apr. 12, 2006, in Fam. Dir., 2006, 5, p. 509 , with a
comment by G. FACCI, L‟illecito endofamiliare tra danno in re ipsa e
risarcimenti ultramilionari.
85. Cass. Civ., United Chambers, November 11, 2008 n. 26972-2697326974-26975. These judgments have been analysed by many scholars; among
others, see P. G. MONATERI, Il pregiudizio esistenziale come voce del danno non
patrimoniale, E. NAVARRETTA, Il valore della persona nei diritti inviolabili e la
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United Chambers, the recoverability of non-pecuniary damage to
be recoverable depends on the infringement of an interest relevant
on the grounds of the Italian Constitution. The list of interests
which can be qualified ‗inviolable‘ is not closed. The Court states
that due to the ‗open text‘ of sec. 2 of the Constitution, protection
is not limited to those inviolable rights expressly acknowledged at
the present, but also to other interests surfacing in the social
situation and to be considered in the light of indications which can
be found in the Constitution, related to inviolable aspects of human
person.86 The judgement no. 26972 considers among the examples
of non-pecuniary damages whose recoverability has to be admitted,
besides the case of loss of a relative, the harm of the inviolable
rights (art. 2-3 of the Constitution) of the individual within the
family.87 These examples show that a right to be considered
‗inviolable,‘ must be strictly inherent to the person.
The difficult theoretical issue dealt with by Court of Cassation
is whether the requirement of unjustness provided by sec. 2043
complessità dei danni non patrimoniali, in Resp. civ. prev., 2009, 1, p. 56; C.
CASTRONOVO, Danno esistenziale: il lungo addio, M. FRANZONI, Il danno non
patrimoniale del diritto vivente, A. PROCIDA MIRABELLO DI LAURO, Il danno
non patrimoniale secondo le Sezioni Unite. Un “de profundis” per il danno
esistenziale, S. LANDINI, Danno biologico e danno morale soggettivo nelle
sentenze della Cass.Sez.Un. 26972, 26973, 26974, 26975/2008, C. SGANGA, Le
sezioni unite e l‟art. 2059 c.c.: censure, riordini e innovazioni del dopo
principio, in Danno e resp., 2009, 1, p. 5. On the way marked out by the United
Chambers of the Corte di Cassazione, it is worth citing Trib Venezia, May 14,
2009, in Danno e resp., 2010, 2, p. 187, with a comment of A. D‘ANGELO,
Un‟infedeltà coniugale oltraggiosa della dignità della persona ed i suoi risvolti
aquiliani all‟indomani delle sezioni Unite del 2008 . Trib Prato, Febr. 18, 2010,
in Dir. Fam. Pers., 2010, 3, p. 1269, with a comment of A. LOMBARDOA,
L‟illecito endofamiliare trova un ulteriore riconoscimento nella giurisprudenza.
86. The passage reads in Italian: ―Il catalogo dei casi in tal modo
determinati non costituisce numero chiuso.
La tutela non è ristretta ai casi di diritti inviolabili della persona
espressamente riconosciuti dalla Costituzione nel presente momento storico, ma,
in virtù dell‘apertura dell‘art. 2 Cost., ad un processo evolutivo, deve ritenersi
consentito all‘interprete rinvenire nel complessivo sistema costituzionale indici
che siano idonei a valutare se nuovi interessi emersi nella realtà sociale siano,
non genericamente rilevanti per l‘ordinamento, ma di rango costituzionale
attenendo a posizioni inviolabili della persona umana.‖
87.
The passage summarized in the text from the judgment no. 26.972
reads: ―in assenza di reato, e al di fuori dei casi determinati dalla legge,
pregiudizi di tipo esistenziale sono risarcibili purchè conseguenti alla lesione di
un diritto inviolabile della persona. Ipotesi che si realizza, ad esempio, nel caso
dello sconvolgimento della vita familiare provocato dalla perdita di congiunto
(c.d. danno da perdita del rapporto parentale), poichè il pregiudizio di tipo
esistenziale consegue alla lesione dei diritti inviolabili della famiglia (artt. 2, 29,
30 Cost.).‖
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regards only pecuniary losses or also non-pecuniary ones. The
answer is that the requirement of unjustness covers also nonpecuniary losses. In the case of non-pecuniary losses, damage is
unjust when there is harm to inviolable rights according to
Constitution. If this kind of harm is lacking, there is no way to
compensation.
The harm of inviolable rights is not sufficient per se to uphold
the claim for the recovery of non-pecuniary loss. As this latter has
to be seen as a result of the infringement of the right, it has to be
specifically proved. In particular, the victim has to give objective
elements in support of the claim for the recovery. On the basis of
these elements, the Court may resort to presumptions for the
quantification of the sum because it also has to take account of any
future repercussion of the infringement.
The discussion concerning the issue of non-pecuniary losses
has to be linked with that of the breach of spousal duties.
According to one approach recently suggested, the harmful conduct
of one spouse against the other should be ordered in three
concentric circles.
Within the inner circle, there would be conduct which, though
harmful, do not produce liability, because they represent the
ordinary risk in a marriage (for example, non-serious quarrelling);
in the intermediate circle, conduct that could legitimate the
recourse to family remedies (for example, an isolated infidelity);
in the external circle, conduct that is so seriously harmful that they
could give rise to actions in tort (for example, reiterated
infidelities).
There has been objection to this opinion in that the second and
the third hypothesis are not clearly distinguishable.88 A different
criterion has been proposed to separate conducts that are not
relevant for the enforcement of legal remedies from those which
are relevant only for the application of family law remedies and
those which are relevant not only on the ground of family law
remedies, but also in tort. The criterion is that of ‗accepted risk,‘
used also in the case of damages incurred in the sporting

88. GAUDINO, La responsabilità civile endofamiliare, in Resp. civ. prev.,
2008, 6, 1238, at 1262-1264.
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practice.89
This criterion does not seem however to be able to give more
certain solutions than the other.90
It is, however, evident, notwithstanding the fact that at present
liability in tort between spouses is admitted, that its constituents
are not sufficiently clear.
V. CONCLUSION
The process above summarised concerning interspousal torts
in Italian and American legal systems may be described as an
evolution. This evolution has in part followed similar paths, and in
part was different. In the past, in all the legal systems considered
there was an immunity rule which barred the operation of tort law
among spouses. However, this rule was grounded on a different
rationale. In the common law systems, the immunity rule was
rooted in the doctrine of the unity of spouses, from which the
status of legal incapacity of married women stemmed.
In Italy the immunity rule was grounded on custom.
Notwithstanding the absence of provisions stating marital
immunity, tort claims within the family were not even started
because of the conception, which was deeply rooted within
society, of the family as an environment extraneous to law. In the
superseding of this rule a major role was played by the profound
social transformation of the family, with the replacement of the
model based on pater familias authority with one based on the
89. Id. at 1264-65.
90. Recently, P. VIRGADAMO, Rapporti familiari e danno non
patrimoniale: la tutela dell‟individuo tra diritti personali a inviolabilità
strutturale e interessi familiari a inviolabilità dinamica, in Dir. fam. pers., 2006,
4, 1894 as to the relevance of tortious liability in the field of family has proposed
to distinguish three hypothesis. The first would deal with pecuniary losses
consequent to breaches of spousal duties recoverable under the heading of art.
2043, the second, with non pecuniary losses flowing from the infringement of
inviolable rights relevant also outside the family unit, and that for this
characteristic are defined ―rights inviolable as to their structure‖ (―diritti a
struttura inviolabile‖), while the third with non pecuniary losses suffered as a
result of serious violations of familial interests protected by spousal duties. In
this case the interests infringed cannot be qualified as ‗inviolable rights,‖
because their ambit of relevance is within family, but recovery would be
admissible for the special seriousness of the infringement (for this reason they
are qualified by the author as ‗interessi a inviolabilità dinamica,‖ i.e. ‗interest
prospectively inviolable‘).
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acknowledgement of the equality of spouses, which paved the way
for the central role of individuals within the family. Given that the
family is now recognised as a place of self-realisation and
enrichment of individuals, there is no a priori hurdle to the
compensation of damage consequent to wrongful conducts
hampering the individual‘s self-realisation, notwithstanding the
fact that the damaging person is or is not a family member.
In all the systems considered, however, some limits are put to
the possibility of making recourse to tort liability within the area
of the family. In the United States, procedural and substantive
hurdles have set strict boundaries to tort claims. Res judicata can
be considered a good example for the first since, according to one
opinion, the facts alleged in tort claims and in divorce claims are
the same. The two claims, then, should be joined in one suit. Tort
suits could not then be filed separately after the divorce
proceeding has been concluded.91
The case of emotional distress may be taken as a significant
example of hurdles set by substantive law. Damages flowing from
emotional distress are recoverable only if the conduct of the
wrongdoer may be qualified as ‗outrageous.‘ On a practical
ground, protection against emotional distress is made difficult
from the fact that for courts the meaning of this requirement is still
highly controversial. It is therefore easy to understand why,
whereas courts are more willing to uphold interspousal tort claims
as to monetary damages, they are much less willing to do so when
non-monetary damages are involved. Lastly, possible financial
limitations of the tortfeasor have to be considered as they may
render useless the recourse to tort law suits.
In Italy, the upholding of interspousal tort claims depends on
the preliminary issue as to if the breach of spousal duties could be
relevant not only on the ground of specific family law remedies,
but also on that of the recovery of damages. The award of nonpecuniary damages is difficult because of the express provision of
sec. 2059 Civil Code, which admits recoverability of them only in
the cases expressly provided by law. Courts however went beyond
this textual stricture in the case of the infringement of the
91. Andrew SCHEPARD, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res Judicata,
24 Fam. L. Q. 127 (1990-1991).
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fundamental rights of the individual, acknowledging the
possibility to the victim of harmful conduct to claim for damages
notwithstanding the lack of an express provision.92 The current
trend sketched above as to interspousal torts has to be commended
in so far individuals are more protected within the family unit than
they were in the past.
However, several reasons militate for clear boundaries to
liability in tort to be set in the realm of family. Firstly, the remedy
of damages, whose main aim is of restoring the economic
resources destroyed by the harmful conduct and whose general
field of operation is the suit involving two strangers, are not
always the most appropriate instrument to deal with the
infringement of non-patrimonial interests. Secondly, tortious
liability is focused on the protection of individuals, whereas
family has a kernel that cannot be reduced to the individuals who
form it. Moreover, since the intimate relationship created by
marriage increases the risk for the spouses of reciprocal harmful
conduct in everyday life, a higher degree of tolerance has to be
expected by them than in the case in which damage flows from the
wrongful conduct of a stranger. Interspousal tort law suits have to
be admitted, but they have to be assessed in the broader context of
family. Therefore, a set of criteria must be still found which can
achieve a balance between the protection of the interests of the
individual (an area developing under a flow of judgements as to
non-monetary damages) and that of the family as a whole. The
history of conjugal tort has still a long way to go before reaching a
satisfactory conclusion.

92. In this sense, Cass. Civ, May 10, 2005, n. 9801, supra note 81, at
368, which excludes that ‗diritti definiti come inviolabili ricevano diversa tutela
a seconda che i loro titolari si pongano o meno all'interno di un contesto
familiare.‘
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Shareholders are stupid and impertinent: stupid, because they
buy shares, and impertinent, because they demand a return.”1 This
is how Carl Fuerstenberg, a high profile German banker of the
between-wars period once referred to minority shareholders.
Today, the argument that minority shareholders are mere
*
Professor of Law, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Law School, São Paulo,
Brazil; bruno.salama@fgv.br.
†
Professor of Law, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Law School, São Paulo,
Brazil; viviane.prado@fgv.br.
1.
Theodor Baums & Kenneth Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection
Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 31 (2005) (quoting Carl Fuerstenberg).
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opportunists lacks foundation.2 It is now well established that the
existence of vibrant stock markets with ample participation by
minority shareholders is an important vehicle for savings
mobilization, financial development and economic growth.3 In
recent years a number of studies have shown that enhanced
minority shareholder protection is associated with higher valuation
of corporate assets and with more developed and valuable capital
markets.4 Because of this, in the past decade a consensus emerged
in academic circles suggesting that minority shareholders deserve
legal protection not only for equitable reasons, but for efficiency
considerations as well.
This article examines key elements in the history, structure,
and application of the legal framework offering protection to
minority shareholders in Brazilian listed corporations. Such an
examination is particularly timely. The Economist recently
predicted that in the next 10-15 years, Brazil shall become the
world‟s fifth-largest economy, surpassing both France and Britain.5
As an increasing number of Brazilian corporations become
publicly traded, and stock ownership becomes dispersed,
international companies seeking to acquire Brazilian assets will
2.
In older texts, it is common to find minority shareholders portrayed
on a negative light. See, e.g. Walter Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen, 128 REVISTA
DE DIREITO MERCANTIL202 (2002) (translated into Portuguese).
3.
See e.g., Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law,
Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107 (1998) (showing that in countries
with active stock markets firms were able to obtain larger funding); Ross Levine
& Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 537 (1998) (relating financial development to economic growth); Maurice
Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversification and Growth, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
1310 (1994) (showing that growth is encouraged by the ability of investors to
diversify investments through markets); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998) (showing
that in countries with better protection of external investors the industries
dependent on external finance are more developed); see also Hal S. Scott,
International Finance: Rule Choices for Global Financial Markets, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, (A. Guzman & A.
Sykes eds. 2007).
4.
Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership around the World. 54 J.
OF FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection: Origins,
Consequences and Reform, NBER WORKING PAPER, n. W4728 (1999); Edward
Glaeser et al., Coase versus the Coasians, 116:3 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 853899 (2001); Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and
Equity Markets, HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPER NO. 1906
(2000); Robert D. Cooter, Innovation, Information and the Poverty of Nations,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2005).
5.
Brazil Takes-Off, THE ECONOMIST MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2009, at 15.
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have to deal with Brazilian regulations governing tender offers,
minority shareholder rights, and fairness opinions and valuations.
This paper proceeds in Section II by examining the history of
minority shareholders protection in Brazil. This will give some
context to the main reformations to the Brazilian Corporations Law
of 1976.6 It will also highlight recent developments in the Brazilian
stock markets, particularly the fact that dispersed ownership can
for the first time in Brazilian history be found in a few listed
corporations. Section III presents the main features of the current
legal framework for the protection of minority shareholders. It
analyzes the most important provisions under the Brazilian
Corporations Law, as well as the most relevant regulations issued
by the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa). Section IV
presents the results of an empirical study of the degree of
enforcement of laws and regulations protecting minority
shareholders. The data shows that judicial and administrative
application of such legal provisions is still relatively unpredictable
and time consuming. Section V concludes.
II. THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Corporations Law in Brazil governs joint stock companies
and contains the most important legal provisions dealing with the
protection of minority shareholders in Brazil. Its intellectual
foundations can be traced to the Second Plan of National
Development (“PND II”), a set of guidelines for national industrial
policies that were put in place during the 1970s.7 At that time, the
formation of large national economic groups was viewed as a
central component of development strategies across the developing
world. Inspired by a similar law in South Korea, the Corporations
Law was conceived as a vehicle that would foster the creation of
6.
7.

Federal Law No. 6,404 of 1976.
See IV SECOND PLAN OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER
(ECONOMIC STRATEGIES: BASIC OPTIONS. STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL
COMPANY AND FOREIGN CAPITAL); see also 1 ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ
LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S.A.: PRESSUPOSTOS, ELABORAÇÃO E
MODIFICAÇÕES (3d ed., Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 1997); EGBERTO LACERDA
TEIXEIRA & JOSÉ ALEXANDRE TAVARES GUERREIRO, DAS SOCIEDADES
ANÔNIMAS NO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 3-12 (São Paulo 1979); Orlando Gomes,
Fontes e Significado das Inovações da L. n. 6.404, 275 REVISTA FORENSE
(1981).
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national “champions”—that is, large conglomerates controlled by
Brazilian groups.8
The Corporations Law of 1976 reflected the political dynamics
of the time. The then-incumbent military regime was striving to
develop the economy while keeping political power concentrated.9
Similarly, the Corporations Law intended to spread capital
ownership of listed corporations without democratizing the
political power within them. According to most Brazilian legal
scholars, the Corporation Law‟s central objective was the
preservation of the interests of large business groups.10 At the same
time, and sometimes in tension with the goal of protecting
controlling shareholders, the Corporations Law sought to extend
enough protection to minority shareholders, so as to entice
investors to voluntarily turn to the stock market.11
In order to maintain the power structure within the Brazilian
corporations that decided to go public, the Corporations Law of
1976 allowed corporations to issue preferred shares. Originally, up
to 2/3 of the total capital stock could be comprised of preferred,
nonvoting stock.12 At the same time, the Corporations Law
8.
See DAVID TRUBEK ET AL., O MERCADO DE CAPITAIS E OS
INCENTIVOS FISCAIS (Rio de Janeiro, TN-APEC 1971); see also MÁRIO
HENRIQUE SIMONSEN & ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS, A NOVA ECONOMIA
BRASILEIRA 206-207 (3d ed., Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 1979)
(discussinghow the enactment of the Corporations Law was part of a broad set
of complementary measures designed to develop the Brazilian stock markets,
including the granting of tax benefits for both companies that decided to go
public and minority investors in the stock market.).
9.
A military coup set the military forces in power in Brazil in 1964.
The country remained under a military regime until 1985, when civil
government was reinstated. A new Federal Constitution was enacted in 1988 and
has been in full force ever since.
10.
See e.g. MODESTO CARVALHOSA, A NOVA LEI DAS SOCIEDADES
ANÔNIMAS. SEU MODELO ECONÔMICO (Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1976).
11.
This dual concern for strengthening of the Brazilian conglomerates
and protecting minority shareholders can be found in the Motives (“Exposição
de Motivos”) of the Corporations Law (EM No. 196/76) written by Mário
Henrique Simonsen, then Minister of Finance:
4. The project basically aims at creating the legal structure necessary
for strengthening of the country‟s capital markets, which in the
current stage of the development of the Brazilian economy is
indispensable for the survival of private companies. The voluntary
mobilization of savings toward the productive sector requires the
establishment of a system that ensures minority shareholders the
observance of clear and equitable rules that are appealing in terms of
security and profitability without paralyzing the business community.
MÁRIO HENRIQUE SIMONSEN, EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS.
12.
The permission to issue up to 2/3 of nonvoting stocks means that in
the simplest ownership structure a company could be controlled with just one
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required that such preferred nonvoting shares were granted some
economic advantages over voting shares. It thus became common
for listed corporations to establish a very narrow economic
advantage for nonvoting stock only for the purposes of fulfilling
this legal requirement. Listed corporations usually had bylaws
establishing that nonvoting shares had a priority over voting shares
upon liquidation. In practice, however, bankruptcy proceedings
were such that shareholders (both voting and nonvoting) were left
with hardly any value upon conclusion of the liquidation. The
Corporations Law awarded minority shareholders a set of
individual rights and established fiduciary duties and obligations
for the corporation‟s administrators and controlling shareholders.
Furthermore, the government created the Brazilian Securities and
Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários - CVM)
which was, and still is, in charge of regulating and supervising
securities markets.13
The Brazilian Corporations Law was basically in line with the
state-led, import substitutions industrialization models of
development prevailing in the mid-1970s.14 This largely explains
why the law was not substantially amended until those models lost
their supremacy in the policy debate. In Brazil, the shift between
economic models gained momentum with the country‟s
democratization and the economic reforms championed by
President Fernando Collor (1990-1992), and consolidated by
presidents Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and Fernando Henrique
Cardoso (1995-2003). As a result, the Corporations Law was twice
reformed, first in 199715 and later in 2001.16
The 1997 reform of the Corporations Law aimed at facilitating
the ongoing Brazilian privatizations program that was occurring at
that time.17 The most relevant, and most polemic, change brought
sixth of its capital. Moreover, with additional layered structures control could in
theory be exercised with an insignificant capital stake.
13.
The CVM was created by Federal Law No. 6,385 of 1976. It is a
federal agency linked to the Ministry of Finance.
14.
Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging
Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT‟L LAW 875
(1999).
15.
Federal Law No. 9.457, of 1997.
16.
Law No. 10.303, of 2001. In addition, the sections of the
Corporations Law establishing account rules were amended in 2007. See infra
note 106.
17.
The National Program of Privatizations (Programa Nacional de
Desestatização–PND) was created in 1990 under Law No, 8.031. This law was
later revoked by Law No. 9.491, of 1997, which revamped the program.

152

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

about was the elimination of tag along rights for minority voting
shareholders.18 As originally enacted in 1976, the Corporations
Law had provided for a mandatory tender offer for all of the
outstanding voting stocks in case of a control transfer.19 The tender
offer was required to be made for a price equal to that paid for the
controlling block. Tag along rights compelled controlling
shareholders to include the holdings of voting minorities in sale
negotiations. In practice, controlling shareholders were then forced
to share the control premium with all of the remaining voting
shareholders. This framework placed an important check on the
controlling groups‟ actions to capture private benefits of control.
Many of the state-controlled companies that were privatized by
the end of the 1990s had minority voting shareholders. The
removal of tag along rights meant that new owners could buy the
controlling block without having to make tender offers for the
shares of any minority groups. As a result, the government
managed to capture the entire control premium paid by acquirers.
The 1997 reform also abolished other minority protection
mechanisms. Most noticeably, it eliminated shareholder
withdrawal rights in mergers and spin-offs, and it lowered the price
at which shareholders could withdraw in the cases where that right
continued to be effective.20
In Brazil, the immediate impact of the privatization program on
the development of the local stock market was at best discrete, if

18.
It has never been a mandatory requirement that the holders of nonvoting shares receive tender offers directly.
19.
Corporations Law, article 254:
The transfer of the control of a listed company shall be subject to the
prior authorization of the Securities Commission. Paragraph 1-The
Securities Commission shall ensure that the minority shareholders
receive equitable treatment by means of a simultaneous public offer
for acquisition of stocks. Paragraph 2.-If the number of stocks being
offered, including those belonging to the controlling or majority
shareholders, exceeds the limit set forth under the public offer, an
apportionment as provided for in the instrument of offer shall be
made.
(As of 1997, this provision is no longer in force.)
20.
Before the 1997 reform, dissenting shareholders had the right
to withdraw at a price equal to the book value of their stocks. The
reform allowed the bylaws to establish that the redemption amount
could be lower than book value if such redemption amount were
calculated based on the economic value of the company, which
would be based on forecast profits assessed through a discounted
cash flow valuation or other criteria as set forth under the bylaws.
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not negative.21 Accordingly, the 1997 reforms are now believed to
have generally reduced minority investors‟ confidence.22 In fact,
by the end of the 1990s the Brazilian stock market was facing a
serious crisis. The number of corporations listed on
BM&FBovespa had dropped from 550 in 1996 to 440 in 2001. The
trade volume dropped from US$ 191 billion in 1997 to US$ 101
billion in 2000 and US$ 65 billion in 2001.
This plunge in the Brazilian stock market was hastened by
several additional factors. First, Brazil and a number of other
countries (Mexico in 1995, South Korea and Thailand in 1997,
Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Turkey in 2000-2001 and
Argentina in 2001-2002) faced a serious liquidity crisis.23 In all of
these countries, a combination of large short-term liabilities and
relatively scarce internationally liquid assets resulted in extreme
vulnerability and eventually in a confidence crisis and a reversal of
capital flow. As international financial conditions worsened, Brazil
experienced a recession and its currency devalued rapidly. In 199899, the average annual growth rate fell to 0.5%, the Brazilian
currency lost approximately one-third of its purchasing power from
April 1998 to April 1999, and fiscal deficits skyrocketed. Second,
distortionary taxation contributed to further depress the local stock
markets. In particular, fiscal deficits prompted the government to
levy a tax on every financial transaction, including on every
purchase and sale of stocks.24 Finally, Brazilian corporations were
21.
Érica Rocha Gorga, Direito Societário Brasileiro e Desenvolvimento
do Mercado de Capitais: Uma Perspectiva de “Direito e Economia”, 93,
Doctoral Thesis, Law School, University of São Paulo, 2005. (“the Brazilian
privatization program, [contrary] to similar programs in other parts of the world,
did not result in the consistent development of the national capital markets“).
22.
In early 1999, the CVM issued Ordinance No. 299 partially in an
attempt to remedy the deleterious effects of the 1997 reform on the Brazilian
stock market. In 2002, Ordinance No. 299 was partially revoked by Ordinance
No. 358, which in turn was amended by Ordinances No. 369 in 2006, and 449 in
2007. The requirement to disclose the price of sales of 5% blocks of voting
stock was maintained (in fact, enhanced) throughout all of this process.
23.
Nelson H. Barbosa Filho, International Liquidity and Growth in
Brazil, Center for Economic Policy Analysis Working Paper, 2001,
http://newschool.edu/cepa/publications/workingpapers/archive/cepa200104.pdf
(last visited April 21, 2011).
24.
The tax on financial transactions (named CPMF) was levied on
every debit (withdrawals and transfers of cash) made in bank account. It was
originally charged at 0.2% but with time that rate went up to 0.38%. It was
created in 1997 as a temporary tax and remained in force and effect until 2007.
An exemption for investments in the stock markets was in place from 2004 to
2007.
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given the option to negotiate their stock in the American market
using American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), thus reducing even
further the liquidity of the Brazilian stock market.25
In reaction to this series of events, the Brazilian Congress
started to debate a new round of reforms to the Brazilian
Corporations Law. At first, Congress seemed to aim at eliminating
nonvoting stock altogether and at reinstating full-fledged tag along
rights. Political pressure from controlling groups however led the
reformation to accomplish much less.26 Instead of eliminating
nonvoting stocks, as originally intended, the reform finally enacted
in 2001 only reduced the limit for nonvoting stocks from 2/3 to
50% of the total capital stock.27 Most importantly, existing listed
corporations were exempted from the new limits. Furthermore, tag
along rights were reinstated, but only for holders of voting shares
and were limited to 80% of the price paid for the controlling
stock.28
To compensate for not eliminating the existence of preferred
stocks, the 2001 reforms tried to give more palpable advantages for
preferred shareholders. As detailed later on in this paper, this was
done by giving the corporation the option to choose among
establishing certain mandatory minimum dividends for preferred
25.
In July of 2002, The New York Times wrote that the CPMF had
made BM&FBovespa‟s transaction costs as much as 165% higher than those of
The New York Stock Exchange. Between 1997 and 2002, about 40% of
BM&FBovespa investors migrated to American Depository Receipts of bluechip Brazilian corporations. See Tony Smith, Stoking a Stock Market
'Revolution', THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 30, 2002 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/30/business/stoking-a-stock-marketrevolution.html (last visited April 21, 2011).
26.
See Érica Rocha Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case
Study of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 803 (2006) (arguing that in the 2001
reformation “controllers' interest groups were able to „capture‟ the legislation
both directly and indirectly. Directly, and most effectively, the interest groups
exerted pressure on legislators and the President to drop amendments aimed at
increasing minority shareholders' rights. . . The interest groups were also able to
indirectly influence the proposed reforms by adding several amendments to the
text of the law. These amendments reduced the effectiveness of minority
rights.”).
27.
Corporations Law, art. 15.
28.
See id. at art. 254A (“The direct or indirect transfer of control of a
listed corporation can only be effected under the condition that the purchaser
agrees to conduct a public offer to acquire the voting stocks owned by the
remaining shareholders. The offer price for such stocks shall be at least 80% of
the amount paid for the voting stocks comprising the controlling block”); see
also id. at art. 17, §7 (The 2001 reform also created the possibility that the
government could have a golden share [giving special veto powers] in the
corporations being privatized.).
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stocks, establishing dividends for preferred stocks higher than
those applying to voting stocks, or establishing limited tag along
rights for preferred shareholders upon sale of the controlling
interest.29
It is fair to say that the 2001 reformation of the Corporations
Law increased the overall level of protection of minority
shareholders. Improvements included a requirement for making a
tender offer to minority shareholders in case of delisting,30 the
enactment of provisions expressly prohibiting and criminalizing
the practice of insider trading,31 and increased representation of
minority shareholders in the board of directors of listed
corporations.32 At the same time, the preservation of nonvoting
stocks and the limitations in tag along rights meant that the
improvements to the position of minority shareholders were less
significant than what was boasted by numerous politicians of the
time.
It was self-regulation—rather than state regulation—that
created the conditions for truly enhanced corporate governance
practices and higher protections for minority shareholders in
Brazil. In December of 2000, just before the enactment of the 2001
reform of the Corporations Law by Congress, BM&FBovespa
created three special corporate governance listing segments.33 In
29. Id. at art. 17. See infra notes 72-74.
30. Id. at art. 4 (“The public listing of a corporation may only be
canceled if the corporation that issued the stocks, the majority shareholder or the
controlling corporation directly or indirectly makes a tender offer to acquire all
of the outstanding stocks for a fair price, at least equal to the appraised equity
value of the corporation, calculated based on one or more of the following
criteria: accounting net worth, equity value calculated at market value,
discounted cash flow, multiples comparison, market value, or another criterion
adopted by the Brazilian Securities Commission.” . . . Shareholders holding at
least 10% of outstanding stocks of a listed corporation may request the officers
to call a special shareholders‟ meeting with holders of outstanding stocks in
order to determine a new appraisal, based on the same or different criteria from
those originally adopted, for purposes of determining the valuation of the
corporation as provided for [above]”).
31.
Id. at art. 155; see infra notes 127-130.
32.
Id. at art. 141.
33.
The rules enacted by BM&FBovespa governing the new listing
segments are currently being revised. The main topics being debated involve a
requirement for the election of independent directors, the extension of
arbitration to all shareholders, and the definition of “diffuse control.” The
amended version of current rules is expected to be published still in 2010. Under
the deliberation procedures presently in place, a proposed amendment must be
previously presented in a closed hearing to the corporations listed in each
segment. The proposition can be blocked by a formal rejection of at least 1/3 of

156

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

these new listing segments, corporations could voluntarily agree to
adopt governance practices that went far beyond the minimum
standards established under the Brazilian Corporations Law,
arguably providing much greater transparency and strengthening
the rights and protections of minority shareholders.34
The three listing segments were named Novo Mercado
(literally, “new market”), Level 2 and Level 1. Novo Mercado‟s
biggest advance was to do away with the nonvoting stock that had
caused so much political controversy in the past.35 Corporations
listed in the Novo Mercado were also required to grant unrestricted
tag along rights to all of their shareholders.36 In addition, they were
required to fulfill a number of additional obligations, for example:
the corporations listed in each such segment. Moreover, before coming into
force, the amended regulations must be approved by the CVM. See Novo
Mercado Listing Rules, item 14.2 available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/enus/markets/download/regulamento.pdf; Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing
Rules,
item
9.2
available
at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/enus/markets/download/regulamento_ niveisI_ingles.pdf; Corporate Governance
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 14.2 available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/enus/markets/download/regulamento_niveis_ingles.pdf (last visited April 21,
2011).
34.
The creation of these special listing segments was partly inspired by
the Germany‟s Neuer Markt. See Jose Roberto Menconca de Barros et al.,
Desafios e Oportunidades para o Mercado de Capitais Brasileiro, MB
Associados, June 2000 available at http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/abmfbovespa/download/mercado capitaisdesafios.pdf. Notice that special
European listing segments, such as Germany‟s Neuer Markt, were generally
designed to attract companies from fast-growing markets and high tech,
especially in areas such as internet, telecommunications, media, and
biotechnology. Conversely, BM&FBovespa‟s special listing segments place no
restriction on fields of activities, nor are they reserved for small companies. See
Stijn Claessens et al., Corporate Governance Reform Issues in Brazilian Equity
Markets,
available
at
www.ifc.org/
ifcext/corporategovernance.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/BrazilCG%2BReform%2BIssues%2B(2001).pdf (surveying the studies that led to the
creation of the Novo Mercado); Maria Helena Santana et al., Global Corporate
Governance Forum, Novo Mercado and its followers: Case Studies in
Corporate Governance Reform, FOCUS 5 (2008), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Focus+5/$FILE/Novo+M
ercado+text+screen+4-21-08.pdf (describing the history of the creation,
implementation and assessing the concrete results within each listing segment);
see also Ronald Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy:
Corporate Reform in Brazil, the U.S. and the EU, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK, March 1, 2010 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1541226 (using
Brazil‟s special listing segments as a case study for a theory of non-state,
parallel securities regulation) (last visited April 21, 2011).
35.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 3.1, VI.
36.
Id. at item 8.1 (providing that in the event of sale of control the
buyer must make a tender offer to buy all outstanding stocks under equal terms,
with no 80% ceiling).
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(1) maintaining a minimum of 25% of capital stock in free float,37
(2) establishing a unified maximum two-year term for the entire
board of directors with at least five directors,38 (3) submitting
yearly financial statements pursuant to US GAAP or IRFS norms,
improving the disclosure of information in the quarterly financial
statements,39 and (4) making tender offers based on economic
value to holders of stock in free float both in case of delisting and
of withdrawal from the Novo Mercado.40 Moreover, any disputes
between corporation and shareholders would be solved by binding
arbitration.41
The key distinction between the Novo Mercado and Level 2 is
that the latter allows the corporations to have nonvoting shares,
while the former does not.42 Still, holders of preferred stock of
corporations listed in Level 2 must be granted the right to vote in
certain matters such as incorporation, merger, spin-off, the
approval of contracts entered into between the corporation and
firms of the same holding group, appraisal of assets contributed to
pay up capital increases, the choice of the independent expert in
charge of valuating the corporation, and the amendment to the
corporation‟s bylaws, including with respect to its rules of
corporate governance.43 Moreover, in case controlling shareholders
sell their stake, a tender offer must be presented to the preferred
shareholders in the amount of at least 80% of the value/conditions
paid to the controlling group (remember that under the
Corporations Law, preferred shareholders have no tag along
rights).44 As to Level 1, which is the less stringent of the special
listing segments, the adhering corporations have to fulfill less
rigorous variations of obligations that apply to the Novo Mercado
and to Level 2. Although Level 1 also requires corporations to
maintain a minimum of 25% of capital stock in free float, most of
37.
Id. at item 7.3 and item 2.1 (defining “Minimum Free Float”).
38.
Id. at items 4.3 and 4.4.
39.
Id. at items 6.1 e 6.2.
40.
Id. at item 10.2; and, see also, id. at item 11.7 (providing that the
corporations‟ securities cannot be traded on the Novo Mercado for at least 2
years after the delisting is formalized).
41.
Id. at item 13.1.
42.
Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, item 3.1, (i).
43.
Id. at item 4.1.
44.
Id. at item 8.1.3. See RICARDO LEAL & ANDRÉ CARVALHAL DA
SILVA, PRÊMIO IBGC DE GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA( 2007) (noting that the
percentage of corporations where nonvoting preferred stocks represents less than
20% sharply increased from 17.9% in 1998, to 39.6% in 2007).
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its provisions deal with mechanisms that enhance transparency and
disclosure requirements.45 In any case, corporations listed in any of
the special listing segments will always have to abide by the
minimum standards set forth under the Corporations Law.
After a slow start, BM&FBovespa‟s new listing segments
eventually took off. In November of 2007, the Financial Times
wrote: “Not long ago the São Paulo Stock Exchange was a sleepy
backwater, much like any other stock exchanges in Latin America .
. . Since then, things have changed. By 2006, average daily trading
had risen to R$2.4bn ($1.1bn). The [BM&FBovespa]‟s
extraordinary initial public offering on October 26 shot it into the
top rank of world capital markets.” BM&FBovespa closed 2007
with an accumulated rise of 72% (measured in U.S. dollars), the
third biggest rise among the world‟s stock exchanges.46 It should
also be noted that the effects of the most recent international
financial crisis on the Brazilian stock exchange have so far been
mild. In truth, 2008 witnessed a reduction both in the number of
corporations listed at the BM&FBovespa, as well as in total market
capitalization.47 However, this trend was soon reversed, as
BM&FBovespa‟s market capitalization in 2009 ended 82.5%
higher than that of 2008.48
In the beginning of 2010, almost half of BM&FBovespa‟s 433
corporations were listed in a special segment: 106 corporations
were listed in the Novo Mercado, 19 in Level 2, and 35 in Level
1.49 The remaining 273 corporations are still listed at
BM&FBovespa pursuant to traditional, legally required levels of
corporate governance, but most of them had previously gone
public. In fact, voluntarily adherence to one of the special listing
segments has now become standard practice for the numerous

45.
Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, Part IV, item 5.2.
46. Bovespa fecha o ano como 3ª mais rentável do mundo, com alta de
72% em dólar, O GLOBO ONLINE, (December 28, 2007) (The annual rise was
overcome only by Shenzhen (180.84%) and Shanghai (110.15%) stock
exchanges, both located in China. BOVESPA's main competitor in Latin
America, Mexico's BMV accumulated a rise of 11.32% in 2007).
47. BM&FBovespa
2008
Annual
Report,
available
at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/Relatorio2008/english/index_ Anual.pdf (last visited
April 21, 2011).
48.
BM&FBovespa, Boletim Empresas, Edition 12, Year 2, available at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/empresas/boletim_ empresas.asp (last visited April
21, 2011).
49.
Id.
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IPOs that took place through BM&FBovespa during the last
decade.
While the link between law and economic development
remains a theoretical quagmire,50 academics debate about whether
improved corporate governance was a cause or a consequence of
economic improvements in Brazil.51 There is no doubt that the
protective framework for minority shareholders that emerged from
the crisis of 2001 was the product of institutional fiat. However, it
cannot be ignored that Brazil‟s robust economic cycle reinforced
the effectiveness and stability of such a legal design. Be that as it
may, the fact remains that the protection of minority shareholders
is now substantially higher than when the Corporations Law was
originally enacted.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROTECTING
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
The legal framework pertaining to the protection of minority
shareholders of listed corporations is fragmented and contained in
essentially two, and in some cases three, statutory bodies. First, the
Corporations Law itself;52 second, the myriad of instructions
enacted by the supervising authority, the CVM; and third, in the
special regulations enacted by the BM&FBovespa that apply to
corporations listed in the special listing segments, as the case may
be.
The starting point for an examination of the legal framework
protecting minority shareholders of listed corporations should be
the “essential” rights specified in the Corporations Law.53 These
50.
See e.g. Michael Trebilcock & Kevin Davis, The Relationship
Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
895 (2008) (surveying the literature on the topic).
51.
See Érica Gorga, Changing The Paradigm of Stock Ownership from
Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and
Consequences for Emerging Countries, 29 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 439, 444
(2009). See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of
Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 469
(2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 76
(2001).
52.
In Brazil, securities and corporations are governed by federal
legislation.
53.
See WALDÍRIO BULGARELLI, REGIME JURÍDICO DA PROTEÇÃO ÀS
MINORIAS NAS S/A (DE ACORDO COM A REFORMA DA LEI N.º 6.404/76) (Rio de
Janeiro, Renovar, 1998) (with an overview of the protection of minorities
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rights are established by Congress and they cannot be suppressed
by the corporation‟s bylaws, or by a resolution of a shareholders
meeting. There are five essential rights: (1) the right to receive
dividends, (2) the right to participate in the sale of the
corporation‟s assets upon liquidation, (3) the right to supervise the
corporation‟s bodies, (4) the right of first refusal that arises upon
the subscription of shares, founders‟ shares convertible into shares,
debentures convertible into shares and subscription bonuses, and
(5) the right to withdraw from the corporation in specific instances
set forth under the Corporations Law.54
These and other rights gain clearer focus through examination
of various instances of Brazilian legislation. A more systematic
description based on state and non-state law can be observed by
categorizing minority shareholder rights based on their nature.
Accordingly, they can be divided into political rights, economic
rights, oversight and information rights and procedural rights, as
follows.
A. Political Rights
Political rights allow shareholders to participate in the
corporate bodies that make decisions on behalf of the corporation,
particularly the shareholders‟ meeting (“assembléia geral”) and the
board of directors (“conselho de administração”).
The most important political right set forth under the
Corporations Law is the right to vote at shareholders‟ meetings.
The law establishes certain formalities that have to be followed in
order to safeguard the participation of voting minority shareholders
in these meetings. These formalities include giving prior public
notice of the meetings, having a minimum quorum for the holding
of valid shareholders‟ meetings, and having the minimum
percentage of votes for the approval of certain topics. Lack of
observation of such formalities may cause the resolutions to be
declared void by courts.55
shareholders in Brazil); see also José Alexandre Tavares Guerreiro, Direito das
Minorias na Sociedade Anônima, 63 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 106-111
(1986); and Tullio Ascarelli, Usos e Abusos das Sociedades Anônimas, 88
REVISTA FORENSE 5-33 (1941); TULLIO ASCARELLI, PROBLEMAS DAS
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS E DIREITO COMPARADO (2d ed. 1969).
54.
Corporations Law, art. 109.
55.
Id. at arts. 121-137. See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES,
VÍCIOS EM ASSEMBLÉIA-GERAL ORDINÁRIA. ESTUDOS E PARECERES SOBRE
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Historically, the notice requirements for listed corporations
before the valid holding of a shareholders‟ meeting was not a
major concern of regulators, and for understandable reasons.
Where there is a clear block of controlling shareholders,
shareholder meetings are themselves oftentimes just a formality.
Recently, however, the emergence of corporations with dispersed
ownership led the CVM to start paying closer attention to
formalities in shareholder meetings. Accordingly, the CVM
established a detailed list of information to be provided to
shareholders before a shareholder meeting can validly take place.
In addition, the CVM finally allowed and regulated the exercise of
proxy voting in shareholders‟ meetings.56 It is notable that as of
March of 2010, BM&FBovespa had five corporations in which the
three largest shareholders jointly held less than 25% of total voting
capital.57 Furthermore, there were over a dozen corporations in
which the three largest shareholders held between 25% and 49.9%
of total voting capital.58
Although there are now a few corporations with dispersed
ownership in Brazil, a cautionary note still applies to the topic of
political control in listed corporations. The general pattern of
corporate control within Brazilian listed corporations is one of high
political concentration.59 The block of controlling shareholders
systematically holds the majority vote in shareholder meetings,
being able to solely adopt resolutions and to elect the
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS 154-166 (1989) (discussing the legal requirements
generally applicable to the adoption of valid resolutions in shareholders‟
meetings).
56.
CVM Ordinance No. 481 of 2009.
57.
BM&FBovespa; Gafisa, Lojas Renner, Ideiasnet, and Dimed.
available
at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-listadas/empresaslistadas/BuscaEmpresaListada.aspx?idioma=en-us (last visited April 21, 2011).
58.
Eternit, Tecnosolo, Bematech, Embraer, Tovs, Cia Hering, BR
Brokers, Dasa, Odontoprev, ALL Amer Lat, Itaúsa, Mont Aranha, Agra Incorp,
Tempo Part, Cremer, São Carlos, among others, available at:
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-listadas/empresaslistadas/BuscaEmpresaListada.aspx?idioma=en-us. (last visited April 21, 2011).
59.
See Alexandre di Micelli da Silveira et al., Evolution and
Determinants of Firm-Level Corporate Governance Quality in Brazil, June
2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995764 (last visited April 21, 2011)
(as of 2004, the three largest shareholders of Brazilian corporations held, on
average, 79,3% of voting capital). See also Eduardo Secchi Munhoz, Desafios
do Direito Societário Brasileiro na Disciplina da Companhia Aberta: Avaliação
dos Sistemas de Controle Diluído e Concentrado, in 1 DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO:
DESAFIOS ATUAIS 119-155 (Monteiro de Castro & Santos de Aragão eds. 2009)
(discussing the optimal legal regime for corporations with concentrated control
in Brazil).
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administrators. Therefore, minority shareholders seldom take an
active role in corporate matters. This is true notwithstanding the
existence of voting rights that are strictly protected as a matter of
law. In practice, minority shareholders tend to exercise their voting
rights more often while supervising the actions of controlling
shareholders. This commonly arises when certain matters must be
made public and approved by the shareholder regardless of
whether there is a controlling block at the meeting or not. These
matters include the distribution of dividends, the approval of
financial statements, and the election of administrators. Publicity
of such information opens the possibility of questioning by
minority shareholders in court or through the CVM.
The right to vote can be restricted by the corporations‟ bylaws,
giving rise, as is common, to preferred shares with limited, or no
voting rights. A longstanding debate surrounds the existence of
nonvoting preferred stocks in Brazil. In line with the original
justification for their creation in the 1970s, some authors hold that
preferred stock is a practical and effective alternative for
corporations to raise capital.60 Accordingly, the market itself would
determine the value of non-voting stock, while allowing business
groups to reach the stock markets without having to share control.
Other authors believe that lack of voting rights is intrinsically
detrimental to minorities and to the development of the stock
markets more broadly.61 As previously mentioned, the
Corporations Law currently allows listed corporations to issue
nonvoting preferred stock corresponding to up to 50% of the total
60. See 1 ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI
S.A.: PRESSUPOSTOS, ELABORAÇÃO, APLICAÇÃO 182-197 (3d ed. 1997)
(examining the historical debates surrounding the enactment of the Corporations
Law in the 70s decade); see also Arnoldo Wald, Em Defesa das Ações
Preferenciais, 78 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 19-23 (1990); Mauro
Rodrigues Penteado, Ações Preferenciais, in JORGE LOBO, REFORMA DA LEI DAS
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS: INOVAÇÕES E QUESTÕES CONTROVERTIDAS DA LEI n.
10.303, de 31.10.2001 (2002); NELSON EIZIRIK, REFORMA DAS S.A. E DO
MERCADO DE CAPITAIS 29-52 (2d ed. 1998).
61. That was the official opinion held by the Rio de Janeiro Stock
Exchange in the course of the debated surrounding the Corporations Law in the
70; See ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S.A.
190-205 (1992); See also Érica Gorga, Análise da Eficiência de Normas
Societárias: Emissão de Preferenciais, Tag Along e Composição do Conselho
Fiscal, Berkley Program in Law & Economics, Latin American and Caribbean
Law and Economics Association (ALACDE), Annual Paper 050307-01,
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6xd441jc (last visited April 21,
2011).
DAS
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capital stock.62 It must be noted, moreover, that nonvoting
preferred shares automatically acquire voting rights when the
corporation fails to pay the fixed or minimum dividend to which a
certain stock is entitled; and such rights to vote endure until
payment has been made, if the dividend is not cumulative, or until
all cumulative dividends in arrears have been paid.63
Minority shareholders can also supervise the actions of
controlling groups by appointing members to the board of
directors.64 Minority shareholders representing at least 10% of the
voting capital have the right to request a multiple voting (“voto
múltiplo”) for the election of the members of the board of
directors.65 Multiple voting is a mechanism whereby each voting
stock is given the right to make as many votes as the number of
vacant positions in the board of directors. For instance, if the
shareholders are electing five board members, each voting stock
will cast five votes. By concentrating all votes in one or two
candidates, this procedure empowers minorities to elect at least a
small number of board members.66
It should also be noted that the 2001 reform to the Corporations
Law established other means for the participation of minority
shareholders in electing the Board of Directors. Minority
shareholders representing 15% of the voting stocks can elect a
member for the board of directors.67 This same right was extended
to shareholders having nonvoting preferred stocks that represent at
least 10% of the corporation‟s total stock capital.68 In addition,
corporations listed in the special listing segments follow more
stringent rules: the board of directors of corporations listed in the
62.
63.

See supra note 28.
Corporations Law, art. 111; see also ERASMO VALLADÃO AZEVEDO
E NOVAES FRANÇA, TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO, FALIMENTAR E TEORIA DA
EMPRESA 483-508 (2009).
64.
See Nelson Eizirik, Ações preferenciais, Não pagamento de
dividendos. Aquisição do direito de voto, 146 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL
23-29 (2007) (arguing that the right to appoint members of the board of directors
only applies to shareholders having right to fixed or minimum dividends).
65.
Corporations Law, art. 141.
66.
Id. at art. 141 (providing that even if the election of the Board of
Directors is conducted through multiple voting, the shareholders bound by
voting agreements representing more than 50% of voting stocks will have the
right to appoint the same number of members appointed by the remaining
shareholders plus one, regardless of the number of board members specified in
the bylaws).
67.
Id. at art. 141, §4, I.
68.
Id. at art. 141, §4, II.
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Novo Mercado and in Level 2 must be composed of at least five
members, 20% of which must be independent directors.69
However, controlling shareholders retain the right to appoint the
majority of the members of the board of directors in any case.70
Because of this, the right to be represented within the board of
directors does not necessarily cause minority shareholders to have
the power to actively influence decision-making within the board
of directors. Nevertheless, representation within the board of
directors creates at least an additional instance where minorities
can obtain information about the corporations‟ business and
sometimes oppose or question resolutions.
69.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 4.3 & Corporate Governance
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 5.3. (An “Independent Member” is defined as “a
member of the Board of Directors who: (i) has no ties to the Company except
for owning an equity share of its capital stock; (ii) is not a Controlling
Shareholder, the Controlling Shareholder‟s spouse or a relative to the second
degree, is not or has not been linked in the last 3 (three) years to a company or
entity with ties to the Controlling Shareholder (this restriction does not apply to
people linked to governmental institutions of education and research); (iii) has
not been a Senior Manager of the Company or employed by or worked for the
Company, the Controlling Shareholder or any other company controlled by the
Company; (iv) is not a direct or indirect supplier or purchaser of the Company‟s
services or products or both, to a degree that results in loss of independency; (v)
is not an employee or manager of a company or entity that supplies services or
products or both to, or buys these from, the Company; (vi) is not a spouse or a
relative to the second degree of any Senior Manager of the Company; (vii) does
not receive any compensation from the Company except for that related to its
activities as member of the Board of Directors (this restriction does not apply to
cash from equity interests in the capital stock.”)); see Rafael Liza Santos,
Alexandre di Miceli da Silveira & Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros, Board
Interlocking in Brazil: Directors’ Participation in Multiple Companies and its
Effect
on
Firm
Value,
Jan.
2009,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1018796 (last visited April
21, 2011) (showing that having interlocking directorates is a common practice in
Brazilian corporations, and also that larger boards, dispersed ownership, and
larger corporation size are associated with higher levels of board interlocking
and lower stock value).
70.
The legal regime governing the participation of minority
shareholders in the Board of Directors has been the subject of much legal
controversy. The CVM has twice ruled on the subject. Firstly, it decided that, if
the corporation has no preferred stocks, voting shareholders owning 10% of the
total capital can appoint a member to the Board of Directors (even though the
Corporations Law establishes a 15% requirement). See CVM/RJ Administrative
Procedure 2005/5564 (“Processo Administrativo Sancionador 2005/5564”),
avalilable at www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/respdecis.asp?File=4846-2.HTM.
Secondly, upon a formal consultation, the CVM decided that if a shareholders
exercises its right to appoint a member to the Board of Directors in a separate
election at the general meeting, it cannot make use of multiple voting. See
“Consulta de Ultrapar Participações S.A. sobre Eleição de Conselheiros, Reg.
3649/02,” avalilable at www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/resp.asp?File=2002016D16042002.htm (last visited April 21, 2011).
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B. Economic Rights
Stock value is a function of the bundle of rights contained in
each stock. Thus, most (if not all) of the individual rights contained
in the Corporations Law are in some sense “economic” rights,
because the stock valuation presumably reflects the present value
of these rights—even if imperfectly so. Here, however, the
expression “economic rights” is employed in the narrower sense
typically used in doctrinal studies of Brazilian corporate law.71
From this perspective, the basic economic rights are the right to
receive dividends, tag along rights, dissent and appraisal rights,
and rights of first refusal.
To begin with, in principle, at least 25% of the corporation‟s
yearly net profits must be paid as dividends. The corporation‟s
bylaws can however establish a lower percentage.72 In addition, the
percentage of the net profits that have to be paid out as dividends
for the different types of stocks is flexible.73 Nonvoting preferred
stock can only be accepted for trading in the stock market if they
are afforded at least one of three advantages: a priority in the
receipt of dividends corresponding to at least 3% of the stock‟s net
worth, dividends at least 10% higher than the dividend assigned to
the voting stocks, or the same tag along rights as those held by
voting shareholders (that is, tag along rights with tender offer value
based on 80% of the price paid to controlling shareholders).74
Tag along rights have also been dealt with under the rubric of
“economic rights.” The existence of tag along means that the
purchaser of a controlling stake of a corporation must make a
tender offer to holders of minority shares.75 As previously
71.
See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, DO DIREITO DO
ACIONISTA AO DIVIDENDO (1969); DIVIDENDO OBRIGATÓRIO E PARTICIPAÇÃO
DOS ADMINISTRADORES NOS LUCROS DA COMPANHIA. ESTUDOS E PARECERES
SOBRE SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS (Revista dos Tribunais 1989) (examining the
right to receive dividends).
72.
Corporations Law, art. 17. (announcing that the yearly net income
should be calculated as set forth under article 202 of the Corporations Law and
according to the following criteria: (i) a priority in the receipt of dividends
corresponding to at least 3% of the stock‟s equity value; and (ii) the right to
have interest in the profit distributed in conditions equal to the common stocks,
after a dividend equal to the minimum priority as set forth in item a is assured.).
73. Id. at art. 202, § 2d.
74.
Id. at art. 17.
75.
The Corporations Law defines a transfer of control as “transfer,
whether direct or indirect, of stocks comprising the controlling block, of stocks
bound by shareholders‟ agreements and of securities convertible into voting
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mentioned, the 2001 reforms of the Corporations Law reinstated
tag along rights, albeit in a limited fashion. Mandatory tag along
rights were made applicable only to bearers of voting shares, and
tender offers can be limited to 80% of the price paid for the block
of controlling shares.76 In addition, the 2001 reformation also
established an alternative mechanism for companies seeking to
acquire control of listed corporations to remunerate minority
shareholders. As currently set forth under the Corporations Law,
purchasers can decide to offer minority shareholders the option to
keep their holdings in the corporation in exchange for payment of a
premium.77 This premium should be equivalent to the difference
between the market value of the stocks and the amount paid for
shares comprising the controlling block.
The special listing segments establish more stringent rules. In
the Novo Mercado, where nonvoting preferred stocks are
forbidden, full tag along rights apply to all minority stocks. 78 The

stocks, assignment of stock subscription rights and other rights related to
securities convertible into stocks which may result in the transfer of corporate
control.” (art. 254, § 1st ). In addition, CVM Ordinance No. 361 of 2002 defines
transfer of control as the “operation, or a set of operations, of securities
alienation with voting rights, or to which are convertible, or of onerous
assignment of subscription rights to these securities, performed by the
controlling shareholder or by people which are partners of the control group, by
which a third party or a group of third parties representing same interests acquire
the corporation control power, as defined in the art. 116 of the [Corporations
Law].” The aforementioned art. 116 of the Corporations Law defines controlling
shareholder as “an individual or a legal entity, or a group of individuals or legal
entities by a voting agreement or under common control, which: (a) possesses
rights which permanently assure it a majority of votes in resolutions of general
meetings and the power to elect a majority of the corporation officers; and (b) in
practice uses its power to direct the corporate activities and to guide the
operations of the departments of the corporation.”
76.
In practice, the debates over the exact events that trigger a transfer of
control tend to end in controversy. A famous case involving this topic was the
sale of Telecom Italia, which is the indirect controller of TIM, which provides
cell phone services in Brazil. In a non-unanimous decision, the CVM ruled that
a tender offer was mandatory. However, each member of CVM‟s decisions body
justified
his
vote
on
different
grounds
available
at:
www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/resp.asp?File=2009-026ED15072009.htm
(last
visited April 21, 2011). See also GUILHERME DÖRING CUNHA PEREIRA,
ALIENAÇÃO DO PODER DE CONTROLE ACIONÁRIO (1995); ROBERTA NIOAC
PRADO, OFERTA PÚBLICA DE AÇÕES OBRIGATÓRIA NAS S.A.: TAG ALONG
(2005); CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, Alienação de Controle: O Vaivém da
Disciplina e seus Problemas, in O NOVO DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO 117-140 (2d. ed.
2002).
77.
Corporations Law, art. 254, § 4th.
78.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 8.1.

2011] PROTECTIONS FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

167

same rule applies to the voting common stocks traded at Level 2.79
This listing segment allows corporations to issue nonvoting
preferred stocks, but the latter must be granted tag along rights
corresponding to least 80% of the value/conditions applicable to
the controlling group.80
The Corporations Law also establishes an appraisal right
(“direito de recesso”) for shareholders dissenting from certain
corporate resolutions. Appraisal rights can be triggered by the
following events: a change in the proportion of classes of stock
that causes a loss to the dissenting shareholder (unless this is
expressly allowed for in the bylaws), a change in the redemption or
amortization terms of one or more classes of preferred shares, or
the creation of a new, more favored class that causes a loss to the
dissenting shareholders.81 The dissent and appraisal right will also
be triggered by a reduction of the compulsory dividend or a change
in the corporate purpose.82 Dissenting shareholders of listed
corporations that own illiquid stocks can also request the appraisal
of their stocks in case of merger or incorporation by another
company or participation in a “group of corporations.”83 The same
appraisal rights also apply in case of a spin-off of the corporation,
but only if the spin-off results in a change in the corporate
purposes (except when the spun-off assets are transferred to a
company with a main line of business that coincides with that of
the corporation originally spun-off), if there is a reduction in the
mandatory dividend, or if the spin-off causes shareholders to join a
group of corporations.84
The bylaws can establish the criteria for appraisal of the stocks
of dissenting shareholders, subject to a minimum value based on
the book value of the corporation as recorded in the latest financial
79.
Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, item 8.1.
80.
Id. at item 8.1.3.
81.
Corporations Law, art. 137, I, & art. 136, I and II (providing that in
these cases, appraisal rights will apply only if the shareholder was harmed by the
transaction).
82.
Id. at art. 137, main provision, & art. 136, III and VI.
83.
Id. at art. 137, II & art. 136, IV and V. The Corporations Law states
that in these cases, the holders of stocks of a class or type that have market
liquidity and dispersion shall not have the right to withdraw, provided that:
liquidity is evidenced when the type or class of stock, or the certificate that
represents it, is part of a general index representing a portfolio of securities in
Brazil or abroad, defined by the CVM; and dispersion is evidenced when the
majority shareholder, the controlling corporation or other corporations under
their control hold less than half of issued stocks of the applicable type or class.
84.
Id. at art. 137, III & art. 136, IX.
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statements.85 That said, appraising stock in concrete cases often
gives rise to controversies and lawsuits.86 In Brazil, this is
particularly common in transactions involving the incorporation of
a controlled company.87 The Corporations Law establishes that in
these cases the exchange ratio of stock shall be based on the net
worth value of the shares of both controlling and controlled
companies, the assets and liabilities (of both of them) valued
pursuant to the same criteria and on the same date, at market
prices, or according to another criteria indicated by the CVM.88
However, if the conditions for the exchange of the stock of the
non-controlling shareholders are considered less advantageous than
those resulting from such criteria, dissenting shareholders have the
right to choose between having the exchange ratio adjusted or
having their stock appraised and refunded.89 To mitigate the
problems associated with conflicting of interests that inevitable
arise in these kinds of transactions, in 2008 the CVM enacted a
Guideline Opinion (“Parecer Orientação No. 35/2008”)
containing a number of procedures to be followed during the
negotiation of the merger protocol (including those involving
downstream mergers). These procedures include the creation of an
independent committee to opine on the fairness of the merger.
As of 2001, delisting is only possible if the corporation that
issued the stock, the majority shareholders, or the controlling
corporation makes a tender offer to acquire the outstanding
shares.90 The price of the tender offer will be calculated based on
85.
Id. at art. 45, § 1st.
86.
See Mary Siegel, Back To The Future: Appraisal Rights In The
Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79 (1995) (surveying the history of
the remedy in the United States).
87.
A leading case on this topic involves VASP, formerly a Brazilian
airline corporation which went out of business after bankruptcy. The CVM
examined the exchange ratio of stocks and ruled in favor of the minority
shareholders. See CVM Administrative Procedure 23/99 (“Processo
Administrativo Sancionador 23/99”). Another leading case was the
incorporation of Banco Santander Noroeste S.A. by its controlling company,
Banco Santander Brasil S.A. After the CVM ruled in favor of minority
shareholders, Banco Santander appealed in court, but the CVM decision was
ratified. See CVM Administrative Procedure 24/04 (“Processo Administrativo
Sancionador 24/04”) and decisions by the São Paulo Appeal Court (“Tribunal de
Justiça de São Paulo”) Nos. 510.984-4/8, 219.385-4/2, and 516.357-4/0.
88.
Corporations Law, art. 264.
89.
Id. at art. 264, § 3d.
90.
In Brazil, there is no distinction between admission to listing and
admission to trading. Once a corporation goes public, all of its securities may be
negotiated on a stock exchange (or on the OTC market) as long as the more
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one or more of the following criteria: net assets appraised at
market value, discounted cash flow, comparison by multiples,
share quotation in the securities market, or other criteria adopted
by the CVM.91 If less than 5% of all stocks issued by the
corporation are outstanding after the expiration of the tender offer,
the corporation can unilaterally decide to redeem these outstanding
shares (squeeze out).92 For corporations listed in the Novo
Mercado or in Level 2, the valuation for the tender offer cannot be
lower than the economic stock value.93
Finally, shareholders have a right of first refusal for the
subscription of a capital increase in proportion to the number of
shares they currently own.94 In order to avoid capital increases
made only for the purpose of diluting minority holders, the
Corporations Law requires that every proposal to increase the
corporation‟s capital contain a detailed explanation of why the
capital increase is necessary and the criteria used for the
calculation of the price of the stocks being issued.95
specific trading requirements are complied with. Currently, the only Brazilian
stock exchange trading stocks is BM&FBovespa. To be admitted to listing and,
consequently, to have its securities admitted to trading, a corporation must also
be registered with the CVM.
91.
Corporations Law, art. 4, § 4th.
92.
Id. at art. 4, § 5th.
93.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 10.1 and Corporate Governance
Level 1 Listing Rules, item 10.1. The 2001 reform to the Corporations Law also
established that if the controlling shareholder acquires stocks of a listed
corporation that is already under his control, and these stocks increase his
interest in a certain class of stocks in a way that reduces the market liquidity of
the remaining stocks, the controlling shareholder must make a tender offer for
such remaining stocks (Corporations Law, art. 4, § 6th). CVM Ordinance No.
361 of 2002, art. 26, established that such tender offer should be performed
whenever the controlling shareholder acquires directly or indirectly, other than
through an IPO, stocks which represent more than a 1/3 of the total stocks of
each type or class of stocks of the corporation.
94.
Corporations Law, art. 171. The message from the house
(“exposição de motivos”) grounding the Corporations Law contended that the
“the elimination [of the right of first refusal] in listed companies is permitted
only where the right of first refusal, besides rendering it difficult the
organization and distribution of the issued stocks in the market, has no
importance as an instrument for the protection of shareholders against the
change of their capital stake, because anyone can acquire stocks in the market.”
See Erasmo Valladão Azevedo & Novaes França, A Proteção dos Credores e
Acionistas nos Aumentos de Capital Social, in TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO,
FALIMENTAR E TEORIA DA EMPRESA 230-252 (São Paulo, Malheiros 2009); 2
MODESTO CARVALHOSA, COMENTÁRIOS À LEI DAS SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS 290
(São Paulo, Saraiva 1997).
95.
Corporations Law, art. 170. The criteria for calculation of issuance
price can only be the expected profitability of the corporation, the equity value,
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C. Oversight and Information Rights
Minority shareholders typically exercise their oversight and
information rights through the statutory audit committee
(“conselho fiscal”). The corporation‟s bylaws can, but need not,
require the audit committee to function indefinitely.96 When the
audit committee is not permanent, it can be brought to act upon the
request of shareholders representing 10% of the corporation‟s
voting stocks or 5% of the corporation‟s nonvoting stocks.97 All of
the preferred shareholders holding nonvoting or restricted voting
shares can jointly appoint a member of the audit committee in a
separate voting session, and that same right is granted to minority
shareholders who own at least 10% of the voting capital.98
However, the ability of minority shareholders to restrict the
controlling group of shareholders by means of the audit committee
is limited because the law guarantees the right of the controlling
group to appoint the majority of the members of the audit
committee.99
or market value. See MAURO RODRIGUES PENTEADO, AUMENTO DE CAPITAL DAS
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS (1988).
96.
Corporations Law, art. 161.
97.
Id. CVM Instruction No. 324 reduces the percentages of votes
necessary to bring audit committees into action proportionally to the
corporation‟s capital.
98.
The CVM recently issued a formal warning against the chairman of
a shareholders‟ meeting for him having blocked the attempt of a minority
shareholder to appoint a member to the audit committee based merely on formal
considerations. See CVM/RJ Administrative Procedure 2008/12062 (“Processo
Administrativo
Sancionador
2008/12062”),
available
at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2009/rordinario/inqueritos/TA%20RJ200812062%20 Telebr%C3%A1s (last visited April 21, 2011).
99.
Corporations Law, art. 161, § 4th. See also CVM Guideline Opinion
No. 19/1990 (“Parecer Orientação No. 19/1990”) establishing that the
controlling shareholder cannot appoint members to the audit committee using its
preferred, nonvoting stocks. Recently there have been cases where controlling
shareholders acted contrarily to this CVM guideline, and the CVM ruled such
appointments illegal. See CVM Administrative Procedure 02/07 (“Processo
Administrativo Sancionador 02/07”), where the CVM found abusive the
appointment to the audit committee of persons connected to the controlling
shareholder, where such appointment was made in a separate voting available at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2009/rordinario/inqueritos/IA%200207%20T%C3%AAxtil% 20Renaux%20SA.asp. Other cases on this topic
include CVM Administrative Procedure 20/04 (“Processo Administrativo
Sancionador 20/04”), available at www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2008/
rordinario/inqueritos/IA% 2020-04%20Springer.asp; CVM Administrative
Procedure 07/05 (“Processo Administrativo Sancionador 07/05”), available at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2007/rordinario/inqueritos/04_24_07-05.asp;
and CVM Administrative Procedure 2002/4985 (“Processo Administrativo

2011] PROTECTIONS FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

171

The audit committee does not have powers to make corporate
resolutions. Nevertheless, its members can individually give an
opinion about certain topics, particularly as regards the integrity of
the management‟s actions and the fulfillment by the officers of
their legal duties.100 Upon the request of any of its members, the
audit committee can also request information from the
administrative bodies, as well as require the preparation of special
financial or accounting statements.101 In addition, the audit
committee opines on the management‟s annual report and on the
management‟s proposals and plans to increase corporate capital, to
make new investments, to distribute dividends and to undergo
incorporations, mergers or spin-off transactions.102 Moreover, it is
in charge of calling shareholders‟ meeting if the officers fail to
timely do so, and of examining the corporation‟s books on a
quarterly basis.103
Minority shareholders can also act independently of the audit
committee. At the request of shareholders representing at least 5%
of the total stock capital, a complete inspection of the books of the
corporation may be ordered by the court, whenever acts contrary to
the law or to the bylaws occur, or there are grounds to suspect that
serious irregularities may be present.104
Brazilian listed corporations must publish annual financial
statements that should include a balance sheet, a statement of
retained earnings, a statement of income and a statement of
changes in financial position.105 In December of 2007, the section
of the Corporations Law dealing with financial statements was
amended with a view toward bringing Brazilian GAAP closer to
international accounting standards.106 These amendments created
Sancionador
2002/4985”),
available
at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/
inqueritos/2005/rordinario/inqueritos/11_08_RJ2002-4985.asp) (last visited
April 21, 2011).
100. Corporations Law, art. 163.
101. Id. at art. 163, § 2d.
102. Id. at art. 163, III.
103. Id. at art. 163 V & VI.
104. Id. at art. 105.
105. Id. at art. 176.
106. Federal Law No. 11,638 of 2007. Furthermore, CVM Ordinance No.
457 of 2007 has established that “listed companies shall, starting from reporting
periods ending in 2010, present their consolidated financial statements according
to International Financial Reporting Standards-IFRS, as issued by the
International Accounting Standards Board-IASB . . . Until the reporting period
ending in 2009, public corporations may, optionally, present their consolidated
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the statement of cash flows and the value added statement,
changed rules concerning accounting criteria and methods,
classification of assets, restrictions for the use of deferred asset
accounts, established criteria for valuation of cash equivalents,
intangible assets and assets allocated to long-term operations and
long-term liabilities. In addition, a few regulations have been
issued more recently with to the goal of standardizing information
available to regulators and investors. Under CVM Ordinance n.
480, of 2009, issuers are required to send periodical information to
CVM according to a new format and to keep the data available for
investors (including on their webpage) for three years.107 Chiefly
among such information to be disclosed is that involving
transactions with related parties and the remuneration of officers
and directors.108
Corporations listed at BM&FBovespa‟s special segments face
higher disclosure requirements. At the Novo Mercado and at Level
2, corporations must prepare annual balance sheets pursuant to
international accounting standards (US GAAP or IFRS), thereby
improving the quality (and quantity) of information that is publicly
available.109 These corporations must disclose the existence of
their securities that are held by controlling shareholders.110 They
also hold public meetings with analysts and investors at least once
a year, present an annual calendar with the relevant events for the
forthcoming year (such as the dates of shareholder meetings,

financial statements in accordance with IFRS as issued by IASB, in lieu of
Brazilian accounting standards.”
107. CVM Ordinance No. 480 of 2009, art. 13, §§ 1st and 2d.
108. Under the argument that it violated a constitutional right to privacy,
the Brazilian Institute of Finance Executives of Rio de Janeiro (IBEF-Instituto
Brasileiro dos Executivos de Finanças do Rio de Janeiro) questioned in court the
constitutionality of the requirement on the remuneration of administrators. The
CVM wants listed corporations to disclose the maximum, average, and
minimum remuneration of the members of the board of officers and board of
directors. The IBEF accepts the disclosure of global amounts, but contends that
the illegality lies in that the proposed scheme allows the public to identify the
CEO‟s compensation. The IBEF obtained a provisional remedy (“medida
cautelar”) allowing its members not to disclose information on remuneration.
See SLS 1.210-RJ, Justice Cesar Asfor Rocha, April 13, 2010 available at
www.stj.gov.br (last visited April 21, 2011).
109. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 6.2 and Corporate Governance
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 6.2.
110. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 9.1; Corporate Governance Level
2 Listing Rules, item 9.1; and Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item
6.1.
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release of financial results, etc.),111 present detailed information
about related party transactions,112 and disclose on a monthly basis
a summary of the transactions with derivatives and securities of the
corporation that were carried out by the controlling
shareholders.113
Officers of listed corporations have to inform the stock
exchange, as well as publish in the press, any resolution of a
general meeting or of the corporation's managing bodies. Further,
they must disclose any material events which occur in the course
of business that may substantially influence the market price of the
securities issued by the corporation, or the decision of investors to
sell, buy, or exercise any right pertaining to the corporation‟s
securities.114 Under current CVM regulations, material events
include the signing of contracts for the transfer of control of the
corporation (even if under conditional provisions), changes in the
control of the corporation (including through the execution, or
amendments to a shareholder agreement), the authorization for
listing securities issued by the corporation (in any domestic or
foreign markets), changes in accounting criteria, and approval of
stock options plans, among others.115 Furthermore, CVM
regulations require the disclosure of information about sales of 5%
blocks of voting stock or more. Disclosure is also necessary when
the ownership of a type or class of stocks reaches 5% (or is
reduced by 5%) of the total of such type or class.116
111. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, items 6.6 and 6.7; Corporate
Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, items 6.6 and 6.7; and Corporate Governance
Level 1 Listing Rules, items 4.4 and 4.5.
112. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 6.8; Corporate Governance Level
2 Listing Rules, item 6.8; and Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item
4.6.
113. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, items 9.1.1 and 9.1.2; Corporate
Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, items 9.1.1 and 9.1.2; and Corporate
Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, items 6.1.1 and 6.1.2.
114. Corporations Law, art. 157 (Officers may however refuse to disclose
such information when they feel that such disclosure would subject a legitimate
interest of the corporation to risk (CVM Ordinance No. 258 of 2002)).
115. CVM Ordinance No. 358 of 2002.
116. CVM Ordinance No. 299 of 1999, art. 6; and CVM Ordinance No.
358 of 2002, art. 11 (administrators) and art. 12 (shareholders). (providing that
corporations listed in BM&FBovespa‟s special listing segments must also
disclose any direct or indirect ownership interest exceeding 5% of the
corporation‟s capital stock, up to the level of individual shareholders (Novo
Mercado Listing Rules, item 7.2, XV; Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing
Rules, item 7.2, (XV); Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item 5.2,
(XV).
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D. Procedural Rights
Procedural rights are the inherent abilities to litigate and to
demand legal remedies in court. Lawsuits against officers can be
brought to court by the corporation upon the request of the
minority shareholders, similarly to American-style derivative
lawsuits.117 However, the effectiveness of these lawsuits is
impaired by the fact that the shareholders‟ meeting (and not the
board of directors, as typically occurs in the United States) has to
approve them; and controlling shareholders have historically
disfavored such lawsuits.118 These efforts are further hampered by
the fact that in Brazil it is still common for officers to have close
personal ties (often family ties) with the controlling group.
If the shareholders‟ meeting fails to approve the filing of
derivative lawsuits, minority shareholders representing at least 5%
of the corporation‟s aggregate stock capital may still file the
claim.119 But the incentives for minority shareholders to file such
claims are low, because they will bear the initial costs of the
lawsuit and the verdict—which is somewhat uncertain and
typically takes a long time—will go to the corporation. Hence,
derivative lawsuits against officers are rare. Arguably, the
procedural mechanism that could really protect minority
shareholders is class action lawsuits. However, Brazilian
procedural laws do not make room for them. The result is that
minority shareholders remain more likely than controlling
shareholders to be hurt by actions of the officers. After all, if
officers hurt the controlling group they can be easily dismissed; yet
if they hurt only the minorities, they remain unlikely to be sued.

117. A shareholder derivative suit is a lawsuit instigated by a shareholder
of a corporation, not on the shareholder‟s own behalf, but on behalf of the
corporation. The shareholder brings an action in the name of the corporation
against the parties allegedly causing harm to the corporation. Often derivative
suits are brought against officers or directors of a corporation for violations of
fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders vis-à-vis the corporation. Any
proceeds of a successful action are rewarded to the corporation.
118. Any shareholder may bring the action if proceedings are not
instituted within three months from the date of the resolution of the
shareholders‟ meeting approving the lawsuit. Corporations Law, art. 159.
119. Id. at art. 159.
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E. Indirect Protection
Minority shareholders may also be indirectly protected through
a number of legal remedies that aim at safeguarding the
corporation from value-destructing actions of its controlling
shareholders and officers. These are means of “indirect” protection
because the immediate focus is on the protection of the
corporation, and the minority shareholders only benefit from such
actions to the extent that the improvement of the corporation‟s
state of affairs enhances their stock value and dividends payments.
The Corporations Law rules the exercise of voting in
shareholder meetings and the exercise of controlling power in the
course of the corporation‟s businesses. Accordingly, each
shareholder has a legal duty to vote in the corporation‟s interest.120
In practice, a vote will be deemed “abusive” if it is exercised with
the intent to cause damage to the corporation or to other
shareholders, or of obtaining an advantage for the shareholder or
for a third party to which neither is entitled, and which results or
may result in damage to the corporation or to other shareholders.121
In addition, each shareholder is barred from voting on any
corporate resolutions dealing with the evaluation report on the
property which he contributed to form the corporation's capital, or
on the approval of his own accounts as officer, or on any other
resolution which may benefit him personally or in which he and
the corporation may have conflicting interests.122
120. Id. at art. 115.
121. Id.
122. See id; Carvalhosa supra note 95, at 264 (both contending that the
verification of the conflict of interests require a formal, abstract and a priori
examination of the position of each shareholder in face of the corporation and
the law). But see FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO, CONTROLE CONJUNTO, ABUSO
NO EXERCÍCIO DO VOTO ACIONÁRIO E ALIENAÇÃO INDIRETA DE CONTROLE
EMPRESARIAL, DIREITO EMPRESARIAL, ESTUDOS E PARECERES 89 (1995)
(arguing that the prohibition for voting under certain circumstances should be
interpreted in such way that no shareholder shall obtain an advantage at the
expense of other shareholders). See also LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES,
CONFLITO DE INTERESSES, ESTUDOS E PARECERES SOBRE SOCIEDADES
ANÔNIMAS 9-27 (1989); ERASMO VALLADÃO AZEVEDO E NOVAES FRANÇA,
CONFLITO DE INTERESSES NAS ASSEMBLÉIAS DE S.A. 91 (1993); José Alexandre
Tavares Guerreiro, Conflito entre Sociedade Controladora e Controlada e ente
Coligadas, No Exercício do Voto em Assembléias Gerais e Reuniões Sociais, in
51 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 30 (1983) (all arguing that issues of
conflicts of interest should be approached a posteriori and on a case-by-case
basis). The CVM decisions do not follow a clear pattern. See Administrative
Probe (“Inquérito Administrativo”) RJ 2001/4977 (deciding that a controlling
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Controlling shareholders are required to use their controlling
powers in order to make the corporation accomplish its purpose
and perform its “social function,”123 and have duties and
responsibilities to the other shareholders of the corporation, to
those who work for the corporation and to the community in which
it operates, the rights and interests of which the controlling
shareholder must loyally respect and heed.124 The Corporations
Law also contains a detailed description of the duties and
responsibilities of the corporation‟s officers.125 Officers generally
have fiduciary duties of diligence126 and loyalty, as is common in
shareholder is a priori prevented from approving the payment of royalties under
a contract to be entered into with the indirect controlling company). For a
comment on this decision, see Erasmo Valadão Azevedo e Novaes França in
125 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 140-170 (2002). But see Administrative
Probe (“Inquérito Administrativo”) CVM 2002/1153 (deciding that conflicts of
interest should be analyzed a posteriori and on a case-by-case basis in order to
verify whether there is an actual loss for the corporation).
123. See Fábio Konder Comparato, A Reforma da Empresa, in DIREITO
EMPRESARIAL. ESTUDOS E PARECERES (1995) (examining the so-called “social
function” of corporations).
124. Corporations Law, article 117, § 1st contains a non-exhaustive list of
“abusive” actions which includes those circumstances where controlling
shareholders (i) guide the corporation towards an objective other than in
accordance with its corporate purposes clause or harmful to national interest, (ii)
provide for the liquidation of a viable corporation or for the transformation,
merger or spin-off of a corporation in order to obtain, for itself or for a third
party, any undue advantage to the detriment of the other shareholders, of those
working for the corporation or of investors in securities issued by the
corporation, (iii) to provide for a statutory amendment, an issue of securities or
an adoption of policies or decisions which are not in the best interests of the
corporation but are intended to cause damage to the minority shareholders, to
those working for the corporation or to investors in securities issued by the
corporation, (iv) elect a corporation officer or audit committee member known
to be unfit for the position or unqualified, (v) induce, or attempt to induce, any
officer or audit committee member to take any unlawful action, or, contrary to
their duties under this Law and under the bylaws, and contrary to the interest of
the corporation, to ratify any such action in a general meeting, (vi) sign contracts
with the corporation directly, through a third party or through a business in
which the controlling shareholder has an interest, incorporating unduly favorable
or inequitable terms, (vii) approve, or cause to be approved, irregular accounts
rendered by corporation officers as a personal favor, or to fail to verify a
complaint which he knows, or should know, to be well founded, or which gives
grounds for a reasonable suspicion of irregularity, and (viii) subscribe stocks
with the contribution of property unrelated to the purpose of the corporation. See
also FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO & CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, O PODER DE
CONTROLE NA SOCIEDADE ANÔNIMA (4th ed. 2005).
125. Corporations Law, arts. 153-160.
126. Brazilian case law on the duty of diligence is murky and offers no
clear articulation of a “Business Judgment Rule” or similar doctrine. The
Corporations Law states that the “officer shall not be personally liable for the
commitments he undertakes on behalf of the corporation and by virtue of action

2011] PROTECTIONS FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

177

modern corporate legislation around the world.127 There are also
responsibilities that apply to the corporation itself. For instance,
the corporation is liable for any loss caused to interested parties by
errors or irregularities found in its corporate books.128
The restrictions against trading stocks based on privileged
information held by officers and controlling shareholders is
another form of indirect protection of minority shareholders. The
prohibition against insider trading had been inserted in the
Corporations Law since its inception in 1976, but until recently
enforcement was rare. It was only with the 2001 reform to the
Corporations Law that the practice of insider trading was classified
as a criminal offense.129 However, it was not until 2009 that the
taken in the ordinary course of business; he shall, however, be liable for any loss
caused when he acts: (i) within the scope of his authority, with fault or fraud; (ii)
contrary to the provisions of the law or of the bylaws.” Corporations Law, art.
158. The 2008 financial crisis led to large losses to some listed corporations
exposed to foreign exchange fluctuation in derivatives markets. Noteworthy
cases include those of Sadia and Aracruz. In these cases, the corporations sued
some of their officers, particularly their chief financial officers (source: Sadia‟s
minutes of shareholders meeting (“assembléia geral extraordinária”) dated as of
April 6, 2009, and Aracruz‟ minutes of shareholders meeting dated as of
November 24, 2008, both available at www.cvm.gov.br (last visited April 21,
2011). Completion of these lawsuits is expected to still take many years.
127. Under Brazilian Law, each officer is prohibited from performing any
acts of generosity to the detriment of the corporation; borrowing money or
property from the corporation or using its property, services or taking advantage
of its standing for his own benefit or for the benefit of a corporation in which he
has an interest or of a third party, without the prior approval of a general
meeting or the administrative council; by virtue of his position, receiving any
type of direct, or indirect, personal advantage from third parties, without
authorization in the bylaws or from a general meeting; usurping a commercial
opportunity which may come to his knowledge, by virtue of his position, for his
own benefit or that of a third party (even if this is not harmful to the
corporation); failing to exercise or protect corporation rights or, in seeking to
obtain advantages for himself or for a third party, failing to make use of a
commercial opportunity which he knows to be of interest to the corporation
(although the law allows officers to contract with the corporation on arm-length
basis); acquiring for resale at a profit property or rights which he knows the
corporation needs or which the corporation intends to acquire. Corporations
Law, arts. 154 and 155. The 2001 reform to the Corporations Law also included
an express prohibition against insider trading. Art. 155 of the Corporations Law
now states that “any officer who may receive any confidential information not
yet revealed to the public shall not make use of such information to obtain any
advantages for himself or for third parties by purchasing or selling securities.”
128. Corporations Law, art. 104.
129. Id. at art. 155, § 4t and art. 117. CVM Ordinance No. 31 of 1984
reinforced the prohibition to administrators and controlling shareholders to use
privileged information for the obtainment of personal advantages while trading
with securities. In fact, CVM Ordinance No. 31 of 1984 extended such
prohibition to any person that could gain access to privileged information due to
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public prosecution and the CVM filed the first lawsuit based on
charges of insider trading. Charges were brought against persons
involved in the merger of Perdigão and Sadia that occurred in
2006.130
In spite of the myriad of regulations on the topic, the effective
protection of minorities in Brazilian stock markets still hinges on at
least two factors. First, on the improvement of the formal
regulation itself. Sensitive issues include the quality, quantity and
standardization of the information that is publicly disclosed, the
use of poison pills by corporations with concentrated ownership,
and the use of Brazilian Depositary Receipts by corporations with
large operations in Brazil, among others.131
Second, in developing countries it is not uncommon to find
fairly modern legislation that does not work well in practice. To a
large extent, this depressing note applies to Brazil. In particular,
Brazilian courts are largely deemed by corporate lawyers and other
market players to lack the necessary expertise to delve into the
intricacies of securities laws and the economic dynamics of
securities transactions. This trait can be partly attributed to the
absence of courts and judges specialized in corporate and securities
transactions. In fact, Brazilian courts are remarkably slow and their
decisions on corporate matters are somewhat unpredictable.132 As
so, the interpretation and doctrinal analysis of corporate law is
her function or position. In 2002, CVM Ordinance No. 358 of 2002 objectively
prohibited broader forms of insider trading. Accordingly, controlling
shareholders, administrators, members of the audit committee, members of the
board of directors, and members of any other statutory or advisory bodies to
trade securities before the formal release by the corporation of notices required
under the law in specific cases (“fatos relevantes”), or before the release of
financial statements or of information on mergers and acquisitions involving the
issuing corporation (art. 13). At the same time, the Capital Markets Law (Law
No. 6,385 of 1976) was amended in order to criminalize the practice of insider
trading (art. 27-D).
130. See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, MERCADO DE CAPITAIS E
INSIDER TRADING (1982); JOSÉ MARCELO MARTINS PROENÇA, INSIDER
TRADING: REGIME JURÍDICO DO USO DE INFORMAÇÕES PRIVILEGIADAS NO
MERCADO DE CAPITAIS (2005).
131. See generally, Alexandre di Micelli da Silveira & Sete Erros, Os
Equívocos Cometidos pelas Companhias que Aproveitaram o Boom de IPOs
CAPITAL ABERTO, Jul. 2009, at 62-63 (Part I) and Aug. 2009, at 58-59 (Part II).
132. See Luciana Gross Cunha et al, 2010, Relatório ICJBrasil, fourth
quarter
2009,
available
at
www.direitogv.com.br
/subportais/RelICJBrasil4TRI2009.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011) (with a
broad empirical research showing that the Brazilian Judiciary Power is
perceived by the Brazilian population as relatively slow, partial, dishonest, and
difficult to reach).

2011] PROTECTIONS FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

179

insufficient to reflect the reality of the standards of protection of
minority shareholders. The most sophisticated debates within
securities litigation take place in the course of administrative
disputes at the CVM. To understand the big picture, however, one
should also examine the actual enforcement of laws and
regulations, both in court and at the administrative level by the
CVM. This exercise is touched upon in the next section.
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS
Analyzing trends and identifying patterns in Brazilian case law
is not an easy task.133 First, the country does not adhere to
principles of stare decisis, and inconsistency in case law over
corporate matters is legendary. Second, the country adopts a
diffuse system of judicial review (meaning that any judge can
declare a law unconstitutional), making it harder to identify the
predominant judicial opinions.134 Finally, the degree to which
judicial decisions are available for consultation over the internet
varies depending on the topic and the state.
This situation reinforces the usefulness of conducting statistical
analysis to understand Brazilian case law. In a recent study,
Viviane Muller Prado and Vinícius Buranelli analyzed a sample of

133. Luciana Luk-Tai Yeung & Paulo Furquim Azevedo, Beyond
Conventional Wisdom and Anecdotal Evidence: Measuring Efficiency of
Brazilian
Courts,
available
at
www.anpec.org.br/"encontro2009/inscricao.on/arquivos/00084cae2373a83e83852e80f24733f709e.pdf (arguing that “little effort has been
made to objectively measure the efficiency in Brazilian courts. Studies that
combine quantitative and qualitative analysis are even harder to find”). See also
José Marcelo Maia Nogueira & Regina Silvia Pacheco. A Gestão do Poder
Judiciário nos Estudos de Administração Pública, available at
www.consad.org.br/sites/1500/1504/00000091.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011)
134. The Brazilian judicial review system is based on the coexistence of
centralized and decentralized judicial review. It is partly inspired by the
American model, in the sense that private parties bring constitutional issues
before ordinary courts in regular judicial proceedings. At the same time, it is
also possible to bring actions in relation to constitutional matters directly to the
Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF). The Federal Supreme
Court also has jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of statutes in
abstracto. See, Miyuki Sato, Judicial Review in Brazil. Nominal and Real, 3:1
GLOBAL
JURIST
ADVANCES,
art.
4
(2003)
available
at
www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol3/iss1/art4 (last visited April 21, 2011); see
also Joaquim Barbosa, Reflections on Brazilian Constitutionalism, 12 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 181 (2007).
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50 cases and 92 appeals135 ruling on the protection of minority
shareholders. This sample was comprised only of decisions given
between 1998 and 2005 by the Superior Court of the State of São
Paulo.136 This is the state where the BM&FBovespa is located, and
also the state where most listed corporations have their
headquarters.
As illustrated in Table 1, most of the cases (66%) were brought
to court by individuals, and institutional investors were the
plaintiffs in only 18% of the cases. This finding contradicted the
expectations of the researchers because the absence of class action
mechanisms and problems of “rational ignorance”137 would
suggest that the institutional investors—who have higher stakes
and are more sophisticated than the individuals—would be the
plaintiffs in most cases. The explanation could be that institutional
investors have enough powers to engender political arrangements
with the controlling groups that avoid the need of going to court, or
perhaps it has to do with the nature of the issues being litigated.
The corporations that issued the stocks were the defendants in
most cases (88%). Controlling shareholders were the defendants in
only 10% of the cases and the corporate officers in only 2%. In an
environment where private benefits of control have historically
been deemed to be high, the small amount of lawsuits against
controlling shareholders may suggest that the regulations are lax
on restricting controlling shareholders, and/or that proving a case
against controlling shareholders is very difficult.

135. Different aspects of a case can be appealed many times, explaining
why there are more appeals than cases in the sample. For methodological details
on this research see Viviane Muller Prado & Vinícius Correa Buranelli,
Relatório da Pesquisa de Jurisprudência sobre Direito Societário e Mercado de
Capitais no Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, Cadernos Direito GV. Relatório
de Pesquisa, no. 9, São Paulo, January 2006, available at
www.direitogv.com.br/interna.aspx?PagId=HTKCNKWI&IDCategory=4&IDS
ubCategory=68 (last visited April 21, 2011).
136. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo (TJSP).
137. Ignorance about an issue is said to be “rational” when the cost of
educating oneself about the issue sufficiently to make an informed decision can
outweigh any potential benefit one could reasonably expect to gain from that
decision, and so it would be irrational to waste time doing so.
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PLAINTIFFS
Institutional investors
Legal entities
Individuals
Public Prosecutor's Office
Total

PERCENTAGE
18
14
66
2
100

DEFENDANT
Corporation
Controlling shareholder
Officer
Total

PERCENTAGE
88
10
2
100
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The research also tried to identify the specific questions that
were being litigated. As expected, the sample showed a larger
proportion of lawsuits where shareholders tried to enforce their
own direct interests and a lower proportion of lawsuits trying to
hold officers or controlling shareholders liable.138 Common topics
included the request for recognition of dissent and appraisal,
request for higher dividends payments, and the request for the
exhibition of corporation‟s documents, etc.

138.

See supra notes 117-118.
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* Legal disputes with shareholders who received stocks of telecom public
utilities upon the purchase of new telephone lines in past decades.

The CVM is in charge of supervising, investigating and
punishing irregular acts that occur in the Brazilian capital market.
In a recent study, Maria Cecília Rossi, Viviane Muller Prado and
Alexandre Di Miceli have analyzed one hundred and one CVM
decisions dealing with corporate law issues in the period between
2000 and 2006.139 Approximately one in every four investors in the
Brazilian market is an individual,140 which highlights the
importance of the CVM because individual shareholders tend to be
less sophisticated and less powerful than corporate shareholders.
The CVM is in most cases responsible for initiating the
investigations that eventually lead to an administrative proceedings
seeking to punish some player in the capital market. In 61 of the
cases (around 60% of the sample), the CVM became aware of
some alleged wrongdoing by means of its own initiatives. Only in
29 cases (29%) did the CVM initiate the investigation after it was
139. Maria Cecília Rossi et al., Decisões da CVM em Matéria Societária
no Período de 2000 a 2006, 37 REVISTA DE DIREITO BANCÁRIO E DE MERCADO
DE CAPITAIS 88-106 (2007).
140. NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
OF
INVESTORS
HOME
PAGE,
http://www.ini.org.br/ini/site/informativo/Informativo_janeiro_ 2006 .pdf (last
visited April 21, 2011).
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notified by minority shareholders, by investors in securities other
than stocks, or by associations representing minority shareholders.
Moreover, in four cases the CVM acted upon a notification by the
Central Bank of Brazil, in three cases upon a notification of a
member of an audit committee, and in one case the CVM acted
upon a joint notification given by a member of the board of
directors together with the corporation. In the remaining seven
cases, the CVM acted because of other unrelated reasons.
Officers, directors, controlling shareholders were the main
targets of the CVM‟s administrative processes. Here there is a
sharp distinction with the judicial proceedings, in which the
corporation itself was most often the defendant. The CVM filed 80
proceedings against officers, 66 against directors, 40 against the
controlling shareholders, 11 against auditors, and 27 proceedings
were filed against members that are not in any of these categories.
The length of time between the date of the infraction and the
conclusion of the administrative proceeding lasted on average six
years. In spite of some investments that had been made by the
government to strengthen the CVM, the study could not identify
any trend demonstrating a decrease in the duration of the
proceedings.
Alleged infractions to disclosure requirements, abuse of
controlling powers and wrongdoings by officers were the themes
that appeared most frequently in the administrative proceedings.
The high number of disclosure issues being litigated can be
partially explained by the fact that these kinds of infraction are the
easiest detected by the CVM, yet that does not mean that
disclosure problems are the most relevant ones. Moreover, the
degree of acquittal of the individuals being prosecuted for
disclosure mistakes is rather high.
Table 2 below shows that the proportion of convictions over
time had increased for certain groups and decreased for others.
This is due to a change in the pattern of issuances of subpoenas by
the CVM, because in recent times the CVM has been adopting a
strategy of issuing subpoenas to a large number of individuals who
may be potentially involved in wrongdoing, even if there is not
clear evidence against any one of them individually sufficient to
initiate a proceeding.
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Conviction
Conviction + acquittal
Acquittal of all

*Updated as of June 2006.

The main reasons for acquittal of the defendants were the
inapplicability of the specific legal provision to the conduct that
gave rise to the investigation, the absence of responsibility of the
defendant for the specific conduct being prosecuted, and the
absence of sufficient evidence. The cases of insider trading
presented higher levels of acquittals, and this is probably due to the
fact that they are harder to prove. In the cases where there was a
conviction, the penalties most commonly applied were fines.
The relatively low levels of enforcement of the law and the
legal uncertainties prevailing in Brazil with respect to corporate
matters have contributed to the expansion of alternative dispute
resolution methods, particularly through arbitration proceedings.
Historically, Brazilian courts have been refractory to arbitration.
Because of this, the 2001 amendment to the Corporations Law has
expressly permitted the corporation‟s bylaws to specify arbitration
as a means to resolve disputes involving shareholders. Moreover,
BM&FBovespa has made the use of arbitration mandatory for
corporations listed in the Novo Mercado and Level 2.
While the study found no statistical evidence on effectiveness
and frequency of arbitration proceedings, anecdotal evidence
shows that the use of arbitration in corporate matters involving
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minority shareholders remains problematic.141 The election to use
arbitration does not preclude the parties from requesting
precautionary injunctions in court. Such precautionary injunctions
can be appealed, often leading to time consuming court battles that
can paralyze arbitration proceedings for a long time. Further and
more importantly, court enforcement of arbitration awards can
itself lead to lengthy court proceedings. This is particularly
problematic because it is not uncommon to find cases where judges
reopen the merits of the arbiter‟s decision. All of that suggest that
the improvement of Brazilian courts should remain an important
concern for investors, lawyers and policymakers in the years to
come.
V. CONCLUSION
The protection of minority shareholders in Brazilian listed
corporations is subject to a dual legal framework. The relative
laxity of the Corporations Law lies in direct contrast with the much
greater stringency of the rules established by BM&FBovespa for
stocks traded in its Novo Mercado. In any case, the effectiveness
of either framework is hampered by procedural problems both at
the judicial and administrative levels. However, the existence of
these problems should not obscure the fact that corporate
governance practices have dramatically improved in Brazil over
the past decade. BM&FBovespa would probably not have
advanced so dramatically had it not been for a major change in the
attitude toward corporate governance. A static approach leaves
some questions as to the quality of the legal protection currently
available to minority shareholders. Yet, examining a more
dynamic, or historical approach, suggests a promising trend.

141. See Adriana Braghetta et al, Arbitragem e Poder Judiciário: Uma
Radiografia dos Casos de Arbitragem que Chegam ao Judiciário Brasileiro, 6:6
CADERNOS DIREITO GV (Nov. 2009) (generally surveying arbitration
proceedings in Brazil).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Black slaveholding was not unusual in antebellum America.1 In
1830, one in seven slaves in New Orleans had a black master. 2 A
quarter of all free black families in many Louisiana parishes held
slaves.3 For over eighty years, scholars have disagreed over the
nature of this type of slavery. Was it ―real‖ and primarily profitdriven, like its white-master prototype? Or was black slaveholding
an ingenious use of law that kept families and couples together,
using nominal slavery to protect individuals from the dangers
accompanying freedom? In 1924, African American historian
Carter G. Woodson argued that black slaveholding was
predominantly non-commercial in aim.4 The Woodson thesis was
countered by a wave of literature asserting that most black
slaveholding was primarily for profit. Both flavors of black
slaveholding certainly existed. Since Woodson, however, the
commercial variety has received greater attention.5 As Ariela
1.
The device had a long history in Louisiana: black slaveholding had
been permitted by law since the period of Spanish rule. J.P. Benjamin & T.
Slidell, Valsain v. Cloutier, in DIGEST OF THE REPORTED DECISIONS OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE LATE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, AND OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUSIANA 383 (New Orleans, John F. Carter 1834). On
black slaveholding in Spanish Louisiana, see KIMBERLY S. HANGER, BOUNDED
LIVES, BOUNDED PLACES: FREE BLACK SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NEW ORLEANS,
1769-1803, at 70-77 (1997); GARY B. MILLS, THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE: CANE
RIVER’S CREOLES OF COLOR 23-49 (1977).
2.
Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Anton J. Rupert, The Manumission of
Slaves in New Orleans, 1827-1846, SOUTHERN STUD. 177 (1980).
3.
LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE SOUTH
1790-1915 105 (1990).
4.
Carter G. Woodson, Free Negro Owners of Slaves in the United
States in 1830, THE J. OF NEGRO HIST. 41 (1924). On the work of black
historians between 1913 and the 1940s, see Philip J. Schwarz, Emancipators,
Protectors, and Anomalies: Free Black Slaveowners in Virginia, 95 VA. MAG.
OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 317, 319-320 (1987).
5.
See e.g., Diary of William Johnson, in 1 WILLIAM JOHNSON’S
NATCHEZ: THE ANTEBELLUM DIARY OF A FREE NEGRO 34-35 (William R.
Hogan & Edwin A. Davis eds., 1968) (1951); R. Halliburton, Jr., Free Black
Owners of Slaves: A Reappraisal of the Woodson Thesis, S.C. HIST. MAG. 129
(July 1975); MICHAEL P. JOHNSON & JAMES L. ROARK, BLACK MASTERS: A
FREE FAMILY OF COLOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 141 (1984); NO CHARIOT LET
DOWN: CHARLESTON’S FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR
3 (Michael P. Johnson & James L. Roark eds., 1984); LARRY KOGER, BLACK
SLAVEOWNERS: FREE BLACK SLAVE MASTERS IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860
80-101 (1985); SCHWENINGER, supra note 3, at 22-25, 104-108 (1990); DAVID
O. WHITTEN, ANDREW DURNFORD: A BLACK SUGAR PLANTER IN ANTEBELLUM
LOUISIANA 57-67, 119-20 (1995). See also IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT
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Gross reminds us, conservative opponents of reparations for
slavery stress profit-driven black slaveholding. For them, such
emphasis assuages white guilt.6 A handful of scholars have swum
against this current, continuing to focus on other strain of black
slaveholding.7 This article joins their work, reinvigorating the
Woodson perspective through an analysis of the previously
unexamined legal papers of one familial black slaveholder in
newly American New Orleans.8 Marie Claire Chabert (1769-1847)
was a former slave who held her nieces and future husband in
slavery.

MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 274-76 (1974); H.E.
STERKX, THE FREE NEGRO IN ANTE-BELLUM LOUISIANA 202-220 (1972);
FRANCES JEROME WOODS, MARGINALITY AND IDENTITY: A COLORED CREOLE
FAMILY THROUGH TEN GENERATIONS 35-36 (1972); ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE
CHARACTER: SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN
COURTROOM 65 (2000). The same point has been made for Barbados and the
Danish West Indies. See JEROME S. HANDLER, THE UNAPPROPRIATED PEOPLE:
FREEDMEN IN THE SLAVE SOCIETY OF BARBADOS 146-153 (1974); NEVILLE A.
T. HALL, SLAVE SOCIETY IN THE DANISH WEST INDIES: ST. THOMAS, ST. JOHN,
& ST. CROIX 163 (1992).
6.
Ariela Gross, When is the Time of Slavery? The History of Slavery in
Contemporary Legal and Political Argument, 96 CAL. L. REV. 283, 302 (2008).
7.
Among these are LUTHER PORTER JACKSON, FREE NEGRO LABOR
AND PROPERTY HOLDING IN VIRGINIA, 1830-1860 200-229 (1969); Schwarz,
supra note 4, at 317-338; REBECCA J. SCOTT, DEGREES OF FREEDOM: LOUISIANA
AND CUBA AFTER SLAVERY 27 (2005).
8.
Papers Relating to the Estate of Marie Claire Chabert, Manumitted
Slave (1805-64) (on file with the Princeton University Library, Louisiana
Slavery and Civil War Collection, Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare
Books and Special Collections) [hereinafter the Chabert Papers]. Translations
from the French are my own. I am grateful to Jose-Luis Gastanaga for
translating the one Spanish document in the Chabert Papers: Untitled Act of Sale
(Feb. 7, 1805), in the Chabert Papers, folder 2. The Chabert Papers were
compiled by Felix Limonge, who came upon them while collecting postage
stamps some time before March 1926. He commented that ―[a]mong this mass
of papers, I have always prized very highly an account of its entirety and its
uniqueness, the papers concerning Jacques Tisserand and his slave for life Marie
Claire: in the hands of a fluent and competent writer, properly handled, they will
furnish the theme for a capital historical novel showing the institution of slavery
in a new light, never before attempted.‖ Felix Limonge, Account of the Life of
Marie Claire and Description of Documents (typescript) in the Chabert Papers,
folder 1, 1 recto. Limonge was probably a lawyer himself, possibly at Durant
and Homer, the New Orleans firm involved in litigation relating to Chabert’s
estate after her death. The firm was the law firm of republican politician and
lawyer T. J. Durant, best known for his role as counsel in the Slaughterhouse
Cases. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). I have supplemented
Chabert’s estate papers with death and notarial records from the Louisiana State
Archives [hereinafter LSA] and the New Orleans Notarial Archives Research
Center [hereinafter NONARC].
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Familial black slaveholding was widespread in antebellum
New Orleans.9 Louisiana case law is rich in examples of free
parents owning their slave children, and free lovers owning their
enslaved partners.10 At least 63 percent of the slaves emancipated
by free blacks in Louisiana were family members.11 Marie Claire
Chabert was not unusual, then, in privileging the integrity and
safety of her kin over their freedom. As an illiterate black woman,
she maneuvered the trilingual legal rapids of newly American
Louisiana by buying family members and a romantic partner,
owning real estate, obtaining loans, creating wills, and engaging in
litigation.12 The Chabert papers illuminate a remarkable vein of
African American involvement with the formal legal system.13

9.
Sumner Eliot Matison, Manumission by Purchase, 33 J. OF NEGRO
HIST. 153 (1948).
10.
For parent-child slaveholding, see Valsain v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170
(1831); Fuselier v. Masse, 4 La. 423 (1832); Mazerolle v. Françoise, in 3
JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 564 (Helen
Tunnicliff Catterall ed., 1932). For slaveholding between lovers, see Mingo v.
Darby, Negro Diocou (Tiocou) v. D’Auseville, and Lange v. Richoux, Id. at 407,
410, 500. In Lange, a free husband agreed to work for seven years without pay
to buy his enslaved wife. See also Succession of Marie Eva La Branche, Id. at
441.
11.
Kotlikoff & Rupert, supra note 2, at 180. For an example, see
Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights and Private Commerce: A Nineteenth-Century
Atlantic Creole Itinerary, 48 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 241 (Apr. 2007).
12.
Dating from between 1805 and 1864, Chabert’s estate papers span
an intriguing period in the legal history of Louisiana: the beginning of American
rule after a century of oscillation between French and Spanish control. In 1712,
Louis XIV issued a charter for the development of the Louisiana territory. Under
the Treaty of Fontainebleu, the French king placed Louisiana under Spanish
control in 1769. The French regained Louisiana under Napoleon in 1800, but
actual possession did not occur until 1803, then lasting only three weeks
(November 30-December 20 1803). The United States purchased Louisiana
from the French and took control of the territory in 1803. JUDITH KELLEHER
SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 3
(1994). See also LOUISIANA UNDER THE RULE OF SPAIN, FRANCE AND THE
UNITED STATES, 1785-1807 (James A. Robertson ed., 1911).
13.
Similarly, Judith Kelleher Schafer and Kelly Kennington have
unearthed a rich body of case records attesting to slaves’ freedom suits in the
Louisiana and Missouri courts, respectively. JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER,
BECOMING FREE, REMAINING FREE: MANUMISSION AND ENSLAVEMENT IN NEW
ORLEANS, 1846-1862 15-33 (2003); Kelly Marie Kennington, River of Injustice:
St. Louis’s Freedom Suits and the Changing Nature of Legal Slavery in
Antebellum America (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University)
(on file with author). On suits involving self-purchase contracts, see also
SCHAFER, (2003) supra at 45-58.
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Marie Claire Chabert was born into slavery in Louisiana in
1769.14 In her first will, she declared herself to be the legitimate
daughter of Stanislas and Marie-Louise.15 Unlike southern
common law, Louisiana’s European civil law legacy allowed
slaves to marry (with their masters’ consent), although notably
denying them any of the ―civil effects which result from such
contract.‖16 Louisiana had a formalized system of concubinage
known as plaçage, and many of the slaves who went on to be
manumitted were tied to white slave-owners through such
relationships—whether as the children or mistresses of white
slave-owners.17 Marie Claire Chabert was unusual in being neither
daughter nor concubine of a white man.18 When she was 26,
Chabert was purchased by Jacques Tisserand, a free black
carpenter. Marie Claire and Jacques had been slaves on the same
plantation before Jacques bought his own freedom.19 His will
ordered the manumission of Chabert. As a result, upon his death
Marie Claire became Marie Claire, ―free woman of color‖ (f.w.c.),
an epithet that would accompany her name from then on. The label

14.
Death Record for Marie Claire Chabert (died Apr. 2, 1847). LSA,
supra note 8.
15.
―Je me nomme Marie Claire, Je suis créole de la Louisiane, fille
légitime de Stanislas et de Marie-Louise, tous deux décédés.‖ Testament de
Marie Claire, Veuve Michel, Négresse libre (Nov. 5, 1845) in the Chabert
Papers, supra note 8, folder 20, 1 recto. See ROBERT CHESNAIS, LE CODE NOIR
44, Art. 7 (1998).
16.
CHESNAIS, supra note 16, at 44, Art. 7. On the other consequences
of slave status in Louisiana law, see also SCHAFER (2003), supra note 13, at
153-154. MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 182).
17.
Joan M. Martin, Plaçage and the Louisiana Gens de Couleur Libre:
How Race and Sex Defined the Lifestyles of Free Women of Color, in CREOLE:
THE HISTORY AND LEGACY OF LOUISIANA'S FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR 57-70
(Sybil Kein ed., 2000).
18.
Kotlikoff & Rupert, supra note 2, at 176, 180-181; David C. Rankin,
The Tannenbaum Thesis Reconsidered: Slavery and Race Relations in
Antebellum Louisiana, SOUTHERN STUD. 18, 23 (Spring 1979); SCHAFER,
(1994), supra note 8, at 180-200. Marriage between whites and blacks was
prohibited by the Code Noir of 1724. Chesnais supra note 15, at 43-34, Art. 6.
See Dupré v. Boulard, 10 La. Ann. 411 (1855). Presumably the same prohibition
applied to marriage between whites and people of mixed race.
19.
During the Spanish period of Louisiana’s history, slaves had the
right of self-purchase. In the American period, slaves sometimes sued to have
self-purchase contracts upheld, but they more commonly sought freedom
through purchase (and eventual manumission) by a third party. See SCHAFER,
(1994), supra note 12, at 2-6; SCHAFER, (2003), supra note 13, at 45-58; and
THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 384-385
(1996).
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was designed to separate free blacks from whites in all acts of legal
record.20
Between her manumission and death, Marie Claire purchased
and held four of her nieces as slaves. She also bought an older
male slave named Michel Bouligny, whom she later manumitted
and married. Michel was 66 years old when he married Marie
Claire. He died just a year later. Widowed, Marie Claire continued
to purchase her nieces from their white owners, and acquired
several lots of New Orleans property during the same period.21 In
her will, she bequeathed her estate to her nieces, having ordered
her executor to free them. She also ordered these nieces to buy and
free another niece. Marie Claire Chabert died at the age of 78 on
April 2, 1847.22
This article begins with a discussion of the black slaveholding
debate and the constant alternative against which familial black
slavery defined itself: the law of manumission. At times when
manumission was more difficult—and being free, more
hazardous—familial black slaveholding was a pragmatic
alternative. I next give an overview of Chabert’s legal life as
chronicled by her papers. Finally, the article focuses upon two
specific features of the Chabert Papers that reflect the legal
obstacle course through which a familial black slaveholder had to
20.
Ellen Holmes Pearson, Imperfect Equality: The Legal Status of Free
People of Color in New Orleans, 1803-1860, in A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN
THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL HISTORY 193-194 (Warren M. Billings & Mark F.
Fernandez eds., 2001).
21.
Marie Claire owned two lots in the Quartier du faubourg Ste Marie,
Compté d’Orléans. See map in Plan, Survey and Examination of Title of two
lots sold to Marie Claire Chabert by J. Bocage for $650 (Sept. 14, 1810) in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 8, 1 recto. Around the same time, Marie
Claire also seems to have held property outside of New Orleans. I am grateful to
Trish Nugent at the New Orleans Notarial Archives Research Center for
drawing my attention to the Act of Oct. 20, 1810. De Armas notarial volume
(1810), NONARC, supra note 8. At the time of Marie Claire’s second and final
will, she bequeathed property on faubourg Ste Marie and rue St Jean. Testament
de Marie Claire (Nov. 12, 1846) in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 23, 1
verso. Marie Claire died in a house on this property; it was probably her home.
Death Record for Marie Claire Chabert. LSA, supra note 8. The faubourg Ste
Marie property appears to have been prime real estate in the commercial center
of New Orleans. Samuel Wilson, Jr., Early History of Faubourg St. Mary, in 2
NEW ORLEANS ARCHITECTURE: THE AMERICAN SECTOR 3-48 (Mary Louise
Christovich et al. eds., 1972). Marie Claire’s property tax receipts are also
among her papers: Tax Receipts (1811-1845) for the City of New Orleans,
Parish of Orleans, Territory of Orleans, and State of Louisiana in the Chabert
Papers, supra note 8, at folder 24.
22.
Death Record for Marie Claire Chabert. LSA, supra note 8.
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navigate. First, I analyze clauses in the documents that underscore
the threat that banks and white wives posed to Chabert’s slave
ownership. Second, I look at the careful drafting of Chabert’s
wills, an acknowledgment of the risk of testamentary invalidation
under the law of slavery. By dissecting these legal features of the
Chabert Papers, the article offers a more textured picture of how
this alternative legal regime worked. In offering a microhistorical
approach to non-white Atlantic Creole family history, it joins a
body of work most recently exemplified by Rebecca Scott’s
masterful study of the Tinchant family.23
II. BLACK SLAVEHOLDING AND MANUMISSION
I adopt the term familial to describe one type of black
slaveholding because it is more apt than terms like benevolent or
protective. Families, like slavery itself, could be exploitative in
certain ways and protective in others. Familial black slaveholding
was protective in a narrow, legal sense. It protected the slave from
being forced to leave the state through removal laws or African
resettlement schemes. It protected him or her from being
kidnapped and sold back into ―real‖—or commercial—slavery.
However, these slaves were not protected against other forms of
exploitation. For instance, the fact that a person was held in slavery
by a friend, relative or spouse did not prevent profit-driven
elements from creeping into the relationship.24 The black
23.
Scott, supra note 11, at 237-256. See also comments by Cécile
Vidale in Scott, supra note 11, at 252.
24.
In the Louisiana case of Mathurin v. Livaudais, the free brother of a
slave opposed the slave’s manumission. Mathurin v. Livaudais, 5 Mart. (n.s.)
301 (1827). The free brother probably wanted to exclude the slave from
inheriting their father’s money. The judge called the free brother’s demand ―one
of the harshest . . . and the most revolting to every principle of equity and
justice, that has, as yet, fallen under our consideration.‖ Id. See also SCHAFER
(1994), supra note 12, at 216-217; SCHWENINGER, supra note 3, at 24-25. In an
1835 case, a mother bought her son then attempted to claim his property as her
own at the expense of her son’s widow on the basis of his slave status. The
judge called her claim ―novel and repulsive,‖ and rejected it: ―[a] mother. . .
comes forward, after his death, to claim the fruits of his industry, on the
allegation that her son lived and died her slave; that he was a mere thing.‖
Montreuil v. Pierre, in JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
THE NEGRO, supra note 10, at 508. In a case heard in 1854 and 1856, a free
woman of color inherited her brother’s estate then tried to sell her sister-in-law
and seven nieces and nephews, all of whom had lived as if free for over twenty
years. She was unsuccessful. Eulalie v. Long and Mabry, 9 La. Ann. 9 (1854);
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slaveholding at the heart of this article was familial in the widest
sense of the term: I include romantic partners and even friends who
were treated like kin.25
The law of manumission was the process against which
familial black slaveholding defined itself.26 Familial black
slaveholding linked itself to manumission law in a relationship of
inverse proportionality: the less manumission was feasible, the
more familial black slaveholding was sustained. To begin with,
behavior-based requirements for manumission in Louisiana limited
the number of slaves deemed eligible for manumission. Before a
manumission could be granted, a declaration of the intention to
manumit had to be posted on the courthouse door for forty days so
that any public opposition could be filed.27 To be eligible for
manumission, a slave had to be at least thirty years old and must
have ―behaved well at least for four years preceding his
emancipation.‖28 Michel’s petition of manumission to the police
jury attested to ―his good morals and character,‖ but not all slaves
would have fallen into the same non-subversive category.29
Even for those who were eligible for manumission, freedom
was a risky business. The assumption that liberty trumped safety
and family integrity ignores the many hazards of emancipation. In
many states, removal laws required freed slaves to leave the state
soon after being manumitted, forcing them to choose between

Eulalie v. Long and Mabry, 11 La. Ann. 463 (1856); SCHAFER (1994), supra
note 12, at 234-236. See also Jackson, supra note 7, at 213; Kennington, supra
note 13.
25.
It should also be noted that people of color who were unconnected
by blood, intimacy or friendship sometimes entered into master–slave
relationships. These slaves paid back their new master through their labor, after
which point the master emancipated them. See, e.g., the complex case of John
Berry Meachum, infra note 44. This genre of black slaveholding, which
arguably falls between commercial and familial varieties, sits beyond the scope
of this article. It deserves further scholarly attention.
26.
On Louisiana manumission law, see Ariela J. Gross, Legal
Transplants: Slavery and the Civil Law in Louisiana, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK,
May 18, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1403422
(last visited April 21, 2011). For the later period of 1855-1857, see SCHAFER
(2003), supra note 14, at 71-96.
27.
MORGAN, supra author’s note, at Art. 187.
28.
Id. at Art. 185. Nolé v. de St. Romes and wife, in JUDICIAL CASES
CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO, supra note 10, at 549;
SCHAFER (1994), supra note 12, at 237-241.
29.
Police Jury Petition (Apr. 6, 1835) in the Chabert Papers, supra note
8, folder 12, 1 recto.
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freedom, on the one hand, and friends and family, on the other.30
As intended, removal laws gave slaves one more reason to remain
slaves.31 Judith Kelleher Schafer notes cases in which freed people
of color sold themselves back into slavery to avoid being forced to
leave.32 Here was one place where familial black slaveholding did
its work: being a nominal slave owned by a loved one could be
preferable to de jure freedom in some unknown setting. This
function of familial black slaveholding may have been less critical
in Marie Claire’s state than elsewhere. In Louisiana, an Act of
1830 required freed slaves to leave the state within 30 days, their
former masters posting $1,000 security bonds to ensure their
departure.33 However, local manumission juries could permit freed
slaves to remain in the state—and they did. Virtually all freed
slaves in Louisiana were allowed to stay.34 Chabert’s manumitted
slaves were no exception.
Even with the removal laws softened, there were other dangers
to consider. Owning one’s loved ones could prevent them from
being kidnapped and re-enslaved by profit-driven masters.35
Equally, it could prevent them from being sent ―back‖ to the
African resettlement colony of Liberia, a process that was made
mandatory for all Louisiana manumissions within a decade of

30.
On the case of Baltimore, see RALPH CLAYTON, SLAVERY,
SLAVEHOLDING, AND THE FREE BLACK POPULATION OF ANTEBELLUM
BALTIMORE 9-11 (1993). On petitions from free people of color requesting
permission to remain in the state, contrary to the removal laws, see The Race to
Slavery Petitions Project (under ―Right to reside in state‖) (2009),
http://library.uncg.edu/slavery_petitions (last visited April 21, 2011).
31.
For a case of a woman who returned to slavery in order to remain
with her husband, see HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY
AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925 35 (1976). For cases of freed people of color who
chose to return to slavery, see SCHAFER (2003), supra note 13, at 152-162.
32.
SCHAFER (2003), supra note 13, at 145-162.
33.
SCHAFER (1994), supra note 12, at 181-182.
34.
Kotlikoff & Rupert, supra note 2, at 173; Judith Kelleher Schafer,
Forever Free from the Bonds of Slavery: Emancipation in New Orleans, 18551857, in A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 20, at 164.
35.
Writing on a slightly later period, Judith Kelleher Schafer notes that
―[f]ree people of color in the North and the South always lived in fear of being
abducted and sold as slaves for life.‖ SCHAFER (1994), supra note 12, at 128. See
also Id. at 103, 106-108; TOMMY L. BOGGER, FREE BLACKS IN NORFOLK
VIRGINIA 1790-1860: THE DARKER SIDE OF FREEDOM 99-101 (1997); CAROL
WILSON, FREEDOM AT RISK: THE KIDNAPPING OF FREE BLACKS IN AMERICA,
1780-1865- (1994); CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 45-50.
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Marie Claire’s death.36 In places like the French Antilles,
Barbados, and Jamaica, free people of color held their relatives as
slaves because they could not afford to pay the heavy emancipation
taxes introduced in the late eighteenth century.37 The duties and
risks associated with exiting slavery made freedom frightening. It
should come as no surprise that many preferred to structure their
lives through familial black slaveholding.
III. THE LEGAL LIFE OF MARIE CLAIRE CHABERT
Sometime before 1799, Jacques Tisserand bought his freedom
from his New Orleans master, Don Bartolomeo Le Breton.38
Jacques was a carpenter. Like most slaves who freed themselves
by self-purchase, he did so through the extra earnings of his
trade.39 After Le Breton died in 1799, Jacques Tisserand bought
―Maria Clara, negra,‖ from the Le Breton estate for $930 (930
piastres). This was a high price to pay, but it is possible that being
of child-bearing age increased Marie Claire’s value. It is also
possible that Marie Claire was attractive, and commanded a price
on par with other pretty young women sold in the ―fancy‖ trade.40
According to the Spanish Act of Sale, Marie Claire was a healthy
26-year-old woman ―with no visible defects.‖ She was a vendor
36.
SCHAFER (1994), supra note 12, at 8-12; Schafer, Forever Free from
the Bonds of Slavery: Emancipation in New Orleans, 1855-1857, in A LAW
UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 20,
at 149-151, 156. See also AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPLORATION IN WEST AFRICA:
FOUR NINETEENTH-CENTURY DIARIES 9-10 (James Fairhead et al. eds., 2003);
MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860:
CONSIDERATION OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 202-204 (1981); Heirs of
Henderson v. Executors, in JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY
AND THE NEGRO, supra note 10, at 647. On the African colonization movement
generally, see P. J. STAUDENRAUS, THE AFRICAN COLONIZATION MOVEMENT
1816-1865 (1961); CLAUDE A. CLEGG III, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY: AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND THE MAKING OF LIBERIA (2004).
37.
HANGER, supra note 1, at 71.
38.
On the right of self-purchase in Louisiana law, see supra note 19.
39.
Matison, supra note 9, at 156. See also DYLAN C. PENNINGROTH,
THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK: AFRICAN AMERICAN PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY IN
THE NINETEENTH–CENTURY SOUTH 51 (2003); Alison Carll-White, South
Carolina’s Forgotten Craftsman, 86 S.C. HIST. MAG. 32-38 (1985); Laura
Foner, The Free People of Color in Louisiana and St. Domingue: A
Comparative Portrait of Two Three-Caste Slave Societies, 3 J. OF SOCIAL HIST.
407 (1969).
40.
See WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE INSIDE THE
ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET 113-115, 155 (1999); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE,
AR’N’T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 37 (1999).
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and domestic slave.41 After many offers and counter-offers, she
was sold to her friend, ―Santiago Tixerand‖ (Jacques Tisserand),
the highest bidder.42
Jacques’ will was taken in 1808 on the plantation of Mr. I. Pé.
The former slave died soon after. In his will, Jacques revealed that
his ownership of Marie Claire was a means of emancipation: ―I
declare that I bought the negress Marie Claire with the intention of
giving her freedom, and that from then on I considered her to be
treated as free.‖43 Black slaveholding often functioned as a
temporary holding station, rather than a final destination. Enslaved
loved ones commonly waited in this intermediate state until
official manumission became practicable.44
The nature of Jacques and Marie Claire’s relationship was left
vague in the will. The sum of $930 would be a huge amount to pay
for a friend, but it is also possible that Marie Claire promised to
pay Jacques back.45 Jacques’ will named Marie Claire as his
universal heir and bequeathed to her his entire estate ―in
consideration for her good service and for the friendship that I had

41.
On urban peddling among slave women in Lousiana, see Lois
Virginia Meacham Gould, In Full Enjoyment of their Liberty: The Free Women
of Color of the Gulf Ports of New Orleans, Mobile, and Pensacola, 1769-1860
58 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D, dissertation, Emory University) (on file with
author).
42.
―. . . se puso en Venta otra Negra de la dicha succecion nombrada
María Clara, como de Veinte y seis años, sana, y sin tachas, Vendedora y
Doméstica, rematada despues de varias pujas y repujas, a favor del Negro libre
nombrado Santiago Tixerand por la Cantidad de nueve cientos y treinta ps.
como mayor postor.‖ Untitled Act of Sale (Feb. 7, 1805) (in Spanish) in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 2, 2 recto. Many thanks to Jose-Luis
Gastanaga for his translation.
43.
―Je déclare que j’avois acheté la négresse Marie Claire dans
l’intention de lui donner la liberté, et que je l’ai dès lors considérée traitée
comme libre.‖ Will of Jacques Tisserand (1808), in the Chabert Papers, supra
note 8, folder 3, 1 verso.
44.
See Rebecca Scott, Presentation at the Conference on ―L’Expérience
Coloniale Dynamiques des Echanges dans les Espaces Atlantiques à l’Epoque
de l’Esclavage (XVe-XIXe siècles)‖: Public Rights and Private Commerce: A
Nineteenth-century Atlantic Creole Itinerary (June 22, 2005).
45.
The use of black intermediary purchasers was a common practice.
An example was John Berry Meachum, a slave who freed himself and his family
through self-purchase, then bought twenty slaves over his lifetime, encouraging
them to buy themselves from him through reasonable repayment schemes.
Matison, supra note 9, at 166. For a more ambiguous interpretation of
Meachum, see Kennington, supra note 44, at 185-192.
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with her.‖46 His estate was worth about $600 before payment of his
bills for carpentry tools. He declared that he had never been
married but had one daughter named Manon. Jacques requested
that Marie Claire give $200 to his daughter. Manon was the slave
of her aunt, Constance Tisserand, Jacques’ then unmarried sister.
Marie Claire’s notice of manumission was issued on October
18, 1808.47 It was accompanied by certification that no opposition
to her manumission had been filed by any member of the public.48
Marie Claire was about forty years old when she became a free
woman of color.49
In the spring and summer of 1809, Marie Claire tried to give
$200 to Manon, as required by Jacques’ will. However, Manon’s
owner and aunt, now married to a Mr. Darreah, objected. In a
move that reminds us that familial slavery could be exploitative,
Jacques’ sister claimed the money for herself and her new
husband. She argued that because a slave could not hold property
by law, all property accruing to Manon passed automatically to
herself (Mrs. Darreah). Marie Claire eventually gave up. Her Act
of Payment of $200 to the couple acknowledged that, by law,
Manon could not possess property in her own right.50
Among Chabert’s papers are court-related documents probably
pertaining to the distribution of Jacques Tisserand’s estate.51 The
46.
―. . . en considération de ses bons services et de l’amitié que je lui ai
portée.‖ Will of Jacques Tisserand (1808), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8,
folder 3, 1 verso.
47.
Act of Manumission of Marie Claire (Nov. 18, 1808), in the Chabert
Papers, supra note 8, folder 4.
48.
Notice (Oct. 7, 1808), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 4.
49.
―[B]y virtue of a decree issued by the judge of the Parish and City of
New Orleans, His Honour Moreau Lislet . . . and by consequence of a
declaration of will by the said deceased Negro, [he declares] that he frees and
freely gives full and complete liberty to no longer be subjected to slavery to the
named Marie Claire, negress of about forty years of age, slave of this succession
. . . from this day on.‖ (―. . . [E]n vertu d’un décret rendu par le juge de la
Paroisse et Cité de la Nlle Orléans le Se Moreau Lislet . . . et en conséquence
d’une déclaration du testament du dit nègre décédé declare par [se] presenter
qu’il affranchit et donne liberté pleine et entière et gratuitement pour n’être plus
sujete à l’esclavage à la nommée Marie Claire négresse d’environ quarante ans
esclave de cette succession . . . à compter de ce jour.‖) Act of Manumission of
Marie Claire (Nov. 18, 1808), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 4, 1
recto.
50.
Act of Payment (July 29, 1809), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8,
folder 5, 1 recto.
51.
Bills for Court Expenses (for $75 on Apr. 19, 1809, and for $12,
undated), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 6.
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cataloguer noted the large number of legal services provided to
Marie Claire for free, she being of meager means.52 The next year
(1810), Marie Claire bought land from Joseph Bocage for $650, a
sum roughly equivalent to the money she inherited from Jacques
Tisserand.53 Marie Claire seems to have invested Jacques’ money
in real estate. This leaves unanswered the question of how Marie
Claire supported herself. Marie Claire may have learned to be a
good businesswoman while she was a vendor during her years as a
slave.54 Equally though, Marie Claire may have specialized in any
of a range of semi-skilled trades. She may have worked as a
seamstress, hairdresser, nurse, or midwife.55 There was also the
business of inn-keeping, an enterprise undertaken almost
exclusively by free women of color in port cities of the Gulf of
Mexico and the Caribbean. Innkeepers often doubled as brothel
madames. The joint trade allowed them to raise the capital needed
to launch other business ventures.56 Marie Claire Chabert owned
property in a neighborhood that suggests that she may have owned
a brothel. Her three lots were situated in an area where
prosecutions for brothel-keeping occurred.57 Most brothels in New
Orleans were run by free women of color in Marie Claire’s period,
and were generally tolerated by the authorities.58
In 1827, Marie Claire bought her niece, Marie Jeanne, from
Jean François Laville for $180.59 Marie Jeanne was about 55 years
old. The compiler of the Chabert papers stated that Marie Claire
52.
Limonge, Account of the Life of Marie Claire (typescript), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 1, 5 recto.
53.
Act of Sale (August 11, 1810), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8,
folder 8, 1 verso.
54.
Untitled Act of Sale (Feb. 7, 1805) (in Spanish), in the Chabert
Papers, supra note 8, folder 2, 2 recto.
55.
STERKX, supra note 5, at 231-232.
56.
Id. at 229-231; Annie Lee West Stahl, The Free Negro in
Antebellum Louisiana, 25:2 LA. HIST. Q. 372-373 (1942). On Bridgetown,
Barbados, see JEROME HANDLER, THE UNAPPROPRIATED PEOPLE: FREEDMEN IN
THE SLAVE SOCIETY OF BARBADOS 133-138 (1974).
57.
On Chabert’s property, see supra note 21. Schafer notes six brothelkeeping cases in 1853 from the same neighborhood (i.e., the Phillippa-GravierPerdido area). JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, BROTHELS, DEPRAVITY, AND
ABANDONED WOMEN: ILLEGAL SEX IN ANTEBELLUM NEW ORLEANS 139 (2009).
58.
Judith Kelleher Schafer’s study of brothel-owner prosecutions
suggests that New Orleans authorities tolerated prostitution: there was ―almost
no effort to restrain prostitution in antebellum New Orleans.‖ SCHAFER (2009),
supra note 56, at 144.
59.
Act of Purchase (Apr. 14, 1827), in the Chabert Papers, supra note
8, folder 9, 1 recto-verso.
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also bought another niece and manumitted the two women around
the same time.60 The second niece may have been Louise Jarreau, a
free woman of color who was treated generously in Marie Claire’s
last will. It is impossible to know whether Marie Claire or her
nieces provided the purchase money.
Five years later, in December 1832, Marie Claire bought a 63year old male slave named Michel from the widow of Francisco
Bouligny, Madame Louise d’Auberville. During Spanish rule,
Francisco Bouligny had been Lieutenant-Governor of Louisiana,
and had fought the British in the colony in the 1770s and 80s.61
Three years passed, then the files contain Marie Claire’s Police
Jury Petition for manumission of her slave Michel (April 6, 1835).
The petition was signed by Marie Claire’s attorney and notary
public Louis T. Caire, two men by the names of Monsieurs Garnier
and Strawbridge, and by Marie Claire. Marie Claire was illiterate;
she signed all legal documents with an X. The manuscripts do not
reveal how she obtained expert legal advice, nor how she did so for
free. However, particular notary publics in New Orleans
specialized in providing legal services for free people of color;
Louis R. Caire was one.62 The petition declared that Michel was ―a
good and faithful servant of good morals and character and that he
may be very easily maintain himself by his labor and industry.‖63
The police jury was a panel of six local government members who
exercised the police power to regulate everything from road
maintenance and poor relief to the manumission of slaves.64 They
considered Michel’s case in two sittings, ultimately manumitting
him with permission to remain in the state. It was standard to grant
permission during this period in New Orleans.65 Michel’s deed of
manumission followed on 12 June 1835.66
60.
Limonge, Compiler’s Account of the Life of Marie Claire
(typescript), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 1, 2 recto.
61.
See GILBERT C. DIN, FRANCISCO BOULIGNY: A BOURBON SOLDIER
IN SPANISH LOUISIANA (William J. Cooper ed. 1993).
62.
Sally Kittredge Evans, Free People of Color, in IV NEW ORLEANS
ARCHITECTURE: THE CREOLE FAUBOURGS 26-27 (Roulhac Toledano et al. eds.,
1974).
63.
Police Jury Petition (Apr. 6, 1835), in the Chabert Papers, supra note
8, folder 12, 1 verso.
64.
See JOHN R. FICKLEN, HISTORY AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF
LOUISIANA 160-162 (1901).
65.
Extract from Proceedings of Police Jury (Apr. 25, 1835, June 1,
1835), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 12, 1 recto. See Schafer,
Forever Free from the Bonds of Slavery:’ Emancipation in New Orleans, 1855-
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Later that year, Marie Claire married Michel. She was about 61
years old. He was about 66. Marie Claire and Michel had little
more than a year of married life together; Michel died late in 1836.
Marie Claire’s papers include a special permit from the night
watch to allow some friends to visit her home for Michel’s wake.67
Night assemblies for free blacks were generally forbidden.68 There
is also a bill for $30.25 from Fernandez, the undertaker, for
burying Michel.69
Marie Claire borrowed money from the Honoré family, in part
for Michel’s tomb and funeral expenses. Her files contain papers
relating to two loans of roughly $500, one in 1836 and the other
two years later.70 The Honorés charged 10% interest on the loan, a
rate of interest that, at least in the following decade, would be
considered so high as to constitute usury, forfeiting the creditor’s
claim to any interest at all.71 The compiler Limonge noted that the
1857, in A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 20, at 146.
66.
―There was no opposition to the manumission of the said slave . . .
Consequently, the said Marie Claire declares free and frees genuinely before
those present the said Michel to enjoy all the rights, advantages, and
prerogatives that freemen enjoy, to relinquish generally in favor of the said
Michel all property rights whatsoever which she may hold over him.‖ (―. . . [I]l
n’y a pas eu d’opposition à l’affranchissement du dit esclave… En conséquence
la dite Marie Claire déclare affranchie et affranchit réellement par les présentes
le dit Michel pour par lui jouir de tous les droits, avantages et prérogatives dont
jouissent les personnes libres, de dessaisissant en faveur du dit Michel de tous
les droits de propriété généralement quelconques qu’elle peut avoir sur lui.‖)
Affranchissement Marie Claire à Michel (June 12, 1835), in the Chabert Papers,
supra note 8, folder 12, 1 recto.
67.
Night Watch Permit (Nov. 18, 1836), in the Chabert Papers, supra
note 8, folder 13, 1 recto.
68.
Rankin, supra note 18, at 28.
69.
Undertaker’s Bill (Nov. 28, 1836), in the Chabert Papers, supra note
8, folder 14, 1 recto.
70.
Notes Acknowledging Loans (June 10, 1836) in the Chabert Papers,
supra note 8, folder 15, 1 recto; Règlement de Compte entre Marie Claire et
Isidore Honoré (Jan. 19, 1838), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 15, 1
recto. On freedwomen borrowing from white creditors in the French Caribbean,
see Susan M. Socolow, Economic Roles of the Free Women of Color of Cap
Français, in MORE THAN CHATTEL: BLACK WOMEN AND SLAVERY IN THE
AMERICAS 285 (David Barry Gaspar & Darlene Clark Hine eds., 1996).
71.
―Five per cent per annum is the rate of legal interest that is the
interest allowed in the absence of any special agreement on the subject; and
eight per cent is the highest rate of conventional interest now permitted to be
stipulated for. If more than eight per cent be agreed for, it is usury, the penalty
of which is a forfeiture of all the interest attempted to be made.‖ CHARLES S.
POMEROY, THE PEOPLE’S LAW BOOK: AN INDISPENSABLE ASSISTANT TO
BUSINESS MEN, DESIGNED PARTICULARLY FOR THE STATES OF PENNSYLVANIA,
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money was originally borrowed for Michel. When Michel died, the
Honorés advanced money for the purchase of his coffin and all
funeral expenses.72 Chabert also hired out the unidentified services
of her niece Rosalie (aged 49 at the time) in part payment of this
loan.73 Both the free legal services provided to Marie Claire, and
the unfair rate of interest charged by the Honorés probably
stemmed from the same fact: Marie Claire’s vulnerability as a
single and illiterate free woman of color.74
Marie Claire bought Rosalie around 1827. She manumitted this
niece on March 6, 1839. The police jury accepted that ―there was
no opposition to the freeing of the said slave, Rosalie.‖75 Rosalie
was granted permission to remain in the state.76 The police jury
also accepted that Rosalie was not acting as security on any loans
or mortgages taken out by Marie Claire, a point to which I return
below.77 Rosalie died five years after manumission. Marie Claire
held Rosalie’s funeral in St. Louis Cathedral, New Orleans. The
bill is among her papers.78 Marie Claire’s use of St. Louis
Cathedral on repeated occasions is significant. David C. Rankin
characterizes this church as particularly racist on the eve of the
Civil War. The Tribune, a paper owned by free black Catholics,
noted in 1862 that New Orleans’s St. Louis Cathedral ―was only a

OHIO, KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, INDIANA, ILLINOIS, MISSOURI, MICHIGAN, IOWA,
AND LOUISIANA 109 (1849).
72.
Limonge, Account of the Life of Marie Claire (typescript), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 1, 7 recto.
73.
Other cases of slaves being leased out by their black owners are
Tonnelier v. Maurin, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 206 (La. 1812) and Burke v. Clarke, 11 La.
206 (1837). See also Susan M. Socolow, Economic Roles of the Free Women of
Color of Cap Français, in MORE THAN CHATTEL: BLACK WOMEN AND SLAVERY
IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 69, at 289.
74.
That said, a number of other single illiterate free women of color
came to be successful property owners in New Orleans. Kittredge Evans, supra
note 61, at 27-31.
75.
―. . . il n’y a pas eu d’opposition à l’affranchissement de la dite
esclave Rosalie.‖ Affranchissement par Marie Claire de l’esclave Rosalie (Mar.
6, 1839), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 17, 1 recto.
76.
―. . . sans être tenue de quitter l’Etat.‖ Affranchissement par Marie
Claire de l’esclave Rosalie (Mar. 6, 1839), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8,
folder 17, 1 verso.
77.
―. . . il appert qu’il n’y a pas d’hypothèque enregistrée contre la dite
Marie Claire sur l’esclave Rosalie.‖ Affranchissement par Marie Claire de
l’esclave Rosalie (Mar. 6, 1839), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 17,
1 verso.
78.
Untitled Funeral Bill (Dec. 21, 1844) in the Chabert Papers, supra
note 9, folder 19, 1 recto.
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place where incense is burned in honor of the god of prejudice.‖79
Nevertheless, two decades earlier, Marie Claire Chabert was
allowed to hold both Michel’s and Rosalie’s funerals in the
cathedral.80 According to H. E. Sterkx, many of the freed elite of
New Orleans were also married in St. Louis’ Cathedral.81
In November 1845, Marie Claire wrote her first will.82 She
named her freed niece Louise as her universal legatee, on condition
that Louise buy two of Marie Claire’s other nieces, namely
Martine (owned by Gabriel Villeré) and Adélaїde (owned by
Hughes de Lavergne), with the proceeds of sale of Marie Claire’s
property. Adélaїde’s former master had been private secretary to
the governor of Louisiana, and, later, became the president of the
City Bank of New Orleans. His father-in-law was governor of
Louisiana between 1816 and 1820.83 Less than one year later,
Marie Claire was able to buy Martine from her master for $600. As
the compiler of Marie Claire’s papers noted, this was a surprisingly
high price for a 46 year-old female slave.84 Martine’s price may
have reflected the growing influence of the abolitionist movement.
As anti-slavery gained momentum, slaves became a more
contested—and more expensive—form of property. The Act of
Sale contained two interesting parts. First, Gabriel Villeré,
Martine’s owner, informed the buyer that Martine was the subject
of an ―hypothèque‖ or mortgage by the Banque de l’Union de la
Louisiane.85 Having used Martine as security for a loan from the
79.
Rankin, supra note 18, at 14.
80.
The father-in-law (Jacques Philippe de Villeré) of the owner
(Hughes de Lavergne) of Marie Claire’s niece Adelaїde was married at St. Louis
Cathedral. Michel’s former owner (Francisco Bouligny) was buried there, too.
DICTIONARY OF LOUISIANA BIOGRAPHY 95-96, 490 (Glenn R. Conrad ed.,
1988). For a history of the cathedral, see Rev. C. M. Chambon, IN AND AROUND
THE OLD ST. LOUIS CATHEDRAL OF NEW ORLEANS (1908). For an image, see
SCHAFER (2003), supra note 13, at 91.
81.
STERKX, supra note 5, at 14; see also JOHN W. BLASSINGAME,
BLACK NEW ORLEANS 1860-1880 14 (1973).
82.
Testament de Marie Claire, Veuve Michel, Négresse libre (Nov. 5,
1845), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 20, 1 recto-2 recto.
83.
Carolyn E. DeLatte, Jacques Philippe Villeré, in THE LOUISIANA
GOVERNORS 86-90 (Joseph G. Dawson III ed., 1990).
84.
Limonge, Account of the Life of Marie Claire (typescript), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 1, 8 recto.
85.
An Act of 1855 required the recorder of mortgages to produce a
certificate attesting to the mortgage-free status of slaves seeking manumission.
Schafer, Forever Free from the Bonds of Slavery’: Emancipation in New
Orleans, 1855-1857, in A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 20, at 153.
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bank, Villeré promised to pay back the borrowed money as soon as
possible. The Act refers to the mortgage ―which . . . he shall oblige
himself to eliminate as soon as possible, with which the said Marie
Claire Chabert declares herself satisfied.‖86 Secondly, the back
page of the Act contained a standardized printed form to be filled
in by the seller’s wife (here, Eulalie de Laronde). The statement
declared that the seller’s wife understood fully the nature of the
sale and consented to it, and that she was neither in the presence
nor under the influence of her husband.87 I will return to both
features shortly.
Probably because of the purchase of Martine, Marie Claire
rewrote her will. This time, she ordered her executor, a free
blacksmith named Antoine Remy,88 to use half the proceeds of sale
of her real estate to buy her niece Adélaїde from Madame Veuve
Lavergne, ―intending that immediately following acquisition she
be liberated from the bonds of slavery.‖89 Assuming that this
transaction would proceed as planned, she then named her two
nieces Martine and Adélaїde her universal legatees, giving her free
niece Louise Jarreau ―for use only‖ one third of the remaining half
of her real estate during her lifetime.90 By 1850, free people of
color owned large amounts of real estate in the center of New
Orleans.91 Marie Claire’s will was shrewdly drafted because it
contained two saving clauses that would prevent the entire will
from being declared void if Adélaїde’s manumission failed. I will
also return to this feature below.
Marie Claire died the year after her last will was written, on
April 2, 1847.92 Many of the documents in her files are annotated
86.
―. . . laquelle hypothèque il s’oblige à faire radier dans le plus bref
delais de laquelle déclaration la dite Marie Claire Chabert se reconnait satisfait.‖
Vente d’esclave de M. Gabriel Villeré à Marie Claire Chabert (Aug. 28, 1846),
in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 22, 2 verso.
87.
Id., folder 22, 3 verso.
88.
Remy was also the chief witness to Marie Claire’s death certificate.
Death Record for Marie Claire Chabert, LSA, supra note 8.
89.
―[V]oulant qu’aussitôt après cette acquisition elle soit afranchie des
liens de l’Esclavage.‖ Testament de Marie Claire (Nov. 12, 1846), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 23, 1 verso.
90.
―[E]n usufruit seulement.‖ Id.
91.
JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS 1860-1880 11
(1973); Schafer, Forever Free from the Bonds of Slavery: Emancipation in New
Orleans, 1855-1857, in A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 20, at 159.
92.
Death Record for Marie Claire Chabert. LSA, supra note 8.
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in burgundy ink dated 1847—possibly the notary’s confirmation
that her papers were in order after her death. The papers relating to
Marie Claire’s estate were compiled by the New Orleans law firm,
Durant and Horner.93 The firm appears to have organized the
documents for the purposes of litigation in the 1860s.94 New
Orleans fell to Unionist forces in April 1862, and they occupied the
city until 1877. Daily legal business would have been resumed by
early 1864, when a relatively stable provisional system of courts
was functioning.95 The litigation may have related to Marie
Claire’s will, but its exact nature is not described in Marie Claire’s
papers. Similarly, there is no information on the effect of the
Confederacy’s Civil War defeat upon this litigation.96
The mix of slaveholding arrangements in Marie Claire’s papers
illustrates the many factors that would have informed the decision
to sustain or terminate familial slavery. In the earlier period of her
free life, Marie Claire used the device to its fullest, holding her
nieces and future mate in slavery for significant periods of time
before freeing them. She probably bought Rosalie in 1827, but did
not free her officially until twelve years later, in 1839. In the
interim, Marie Claire hired out the services of her niece, as already
noted. The passage of the 1830 Removal Act in Louisiana may
partly explain the delay—Marie Claire may have wanted to wait to
see how often emancipated slaves were granted permission to
remain in the state before risking removal for Rosalie.
Marie Claire manumitted her later slaves more quickly. She
bought Michel in 1832, kept him a slave for 2.5 years, then freed
him in June 1835. She married him shortly afterwards: the
Louisiana Civil Code (1825) prohibited marriage between a slave
and a free person of color.97 Marie Claire manumitted others
93.
Princeton also holds miscellaneous papers of Durant and Hornor
(1854-1872) concerning Civil War claims by civilians against the Union Army
for the recovery of property and compensation. Louisiana Slavery and Civil War
Collection, Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare Books and Special
Collections, Princeton University Library.
94.
Handwritten notes confirming the authenticity of copies are dated
January 13, 1864. See Will of November 12, 1846. Chabert Papers, supra note
8, folder 23.
95.
Thomas W. Helis, Of Generals and Jurists: The Judicial System of
New Orleans Under Union Occupation, May 1862-April 1865, 29 LA. HIST.
143, 160-161 (1988).
96.
On slave-related litigation in Louisiana after the Civil War, see
SCHAFER (1994), supra note 12, at 289-304.
97.
See MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 95).
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almost immediately. The cataloguer Limonge noted that she
bought and emancipated two nieces, Marie Jeanne and another
(possibly Louise Jarreau) in 1827.98 Chabert’s papers indicate that
in 1846, she purchased one of her nieces, Martine, and freed her
within the next few months. Chabert also requested the purchase
and immediate manumission of her niece Adélaïde in both her
wills of the same period.99
It is likely that growing restrictions on manumission added an
element of urgency, making Marie Claire opt for immediate
emancipation while it was still available. Marie Claire may also
have been anticipating her own death as she grew older. She made
her first will in 1845, at the age of 66, nine months before buying
Martine. By the time Chabert wrote her second and final will, three
and a half months after the purchase, Martine was legally free.
Chabert must have realized that if she died while Martine was her
slave, Martine could inherit nothing. In the words of the Louisiana
Civil Code, ―[a]ll that a slave possesses belongs to his master; he
possesses nothing of his own, except . . . the sum of money or
movable estate which his master chooses he should possess.‖100
IV. THREATS TO FAMILIAL BLACK SLAVEHOLDING
A. Debts
The Chabert papers offer a sample of factors that could
threaten the security of the slaves held by familial black masters.
This article focuses on three. The first two consist of clauses in the
Act of Sale for Marie Claire’s niece, Martine. The clauses served
as a reminder of the ominous presence of banks and white masters’
wives in the background of Marie Claire’s slave transactions. Both
posed a potential threat to the security of familial black
slaveholders’ claims to own their slaves. The third feature I
consider is the careful phraseology of Marie Claire’s wills. Marie
Claire’s lawyers’ pragmatic drafting reflects the myriad ways wills
could be invalidated under Louisiana’s law of slavery. If Marie
98.
Limonge, Account of the Life of Marie Claire (typescript), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 1, 2 recto.
99.
These wills are dated November 5, 1845 and November 12, 1846.
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folders 20 and 23 (respectively).
100. MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 175).
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Claire’s will had been declared void, her nieces’ status as protected
slaves would be endangered.
Those engaged in familial black slaveholding must have felt ill
at ease whenever white creditors and wives appeared in the
background of a slave transaction. Creditors and planters’ wives
had claims on slaves that could defeat the claim of a new black
master. The most common scenario would have involved a loan
taken out by the new black master. If the master used his or her
slave as security for the loan, that slave would become the property
of the creditor—typically, a bank—if the loan was not repaid.
Familial black slaveholding could slide into ―real‖ slavery due to
the master’s unpaid debt. When Marie Claire bought her niece
Martine in 1846, she did so subject to the knowledge that the prior
owner had used Martine as security for a bank loan. In the deed of
sale, Gabriel Villeré promised to discharge the debt as soon as
possible.101 Marie Claire bought Martine even so, risking the
possibility that Villeré would default on his loan, and that the
Banque de l’Union de la Louisiane would become Martine’s new
owner.
Martine’s legal situation was particularly fragile because
repayment of the loan was out of Marie Claire’s hands. The
purchase of mortgaged property normally involved paying a
reduced sum, with the new purchaser or ―third possessor‖ agreeing
to pay the seller’s remaining mortgage payments to the original
creditor.102 But upon the sale of Martine, the duty to repay the rest
of the loan stayed with Villeré. Marie Claire paid full price (600
piastres or $600) for Martine, and Villeré’s loan did not transfer to
Marie Claire.103 In other words, Marie Claire had no control over
the repayment of the loan upon which Martine’s de facto freedom
depended. Furthermore, the Louisiana Civil Code clearly favored
creditors over ―third possessors‖ where the mortgage was
undertaken in the state.104 According to the Civil Code, the bank
would have the right to sue Marie Claire for possession of Martine
if Villeré did not repay the loan.105 Marie Claire would then be left
to sue Villeré for the value of Martine; small comfort when it was
101. ―[D]ans le plus bref delais.‖ Vente d’esclave (Aug. 28, 1846), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 22, 2 verso.
102. Balfour v. Chew, 4 Mart. (n.s.) 154 (1826).
103. See text accompanying note 86, supra.
104. MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 3362-3373).
105. Id. at Art. 3362-3364.
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possession of Martine, not her monetary value, that Marie Claire
wanted.106 The bank would recover the debt by selling Martine
back into ―real‖ slavery. If ever slaves were treated as pawns, it
was in mortgage transactions like these.
There was also the question of Villeré’s wife, Eulalie de
Laronde: could she have a property claim to Martine even after
Marie Claire had purchased her own niece? The answer was no,
but only because the bank made sure of it. Martine’s Act of Sale
included a section signed by Eulalie. In it, Eulalie acknowledged
that the notary had informed her that according to the laws of the
state, she had a tacit mortgage upon the immovables of her
husband.107 Under the Civil Code, slaves were considered
immovables, ―though movables by their nature.‖108 Eulalie also
agreed that she consented to the sale outside of her husband’s
presence and free of his influence.109 Here, common-law
influences seem to have been absorbed into the Roman law-based
substrate of Louisiana law.110 Louisiana’s Civil Code was silent on
106. Id. at Art. 3373.
107. ―[D]’après les lois de cet état, la femme a une hypothèque tacite sur
les biens immeubles de son mari.‖ Vente d’esclave (Aug. 28, 1846), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 22, 3 verso. See MORGAN, supra author’s
note, (Arts. 2355-2368).
108. See MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 461).
109. ―[L]aquelle étant hors de la présence et de l’influence de son dit
époux.‖ Vente d’esclave (Aug. 28, 1846), in the Chabert Papers, supra note 8,
folder 22, 2 verso.
110. Hybrid jurisdictions like Louisiana, Quebec, Mauritius, Sri Lanka
and South Africa are all the products of colonization by multiple European
nationalities. Despite Anglophone promises to continue applying earlier Romanbased law, common-law influences seeped into the law of these jurisdictions.
See, e.g., L. J. M. COORAY, THE RECEPTION IN CEYLON OF THE ENGLISH TRUST:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW AND STATUTORY PRINCIPLES RELATING TO
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES IN CEYLON IN LIGHT OF THE RELEVANT FOREIGN CASES
AND AUTHORITIES 22-24 (1971). On such doubly (or triply) colonized
jurisdictions, see William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil
Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 677-728 (2000). There is
debate over whether Louisiana leaned more toward its civilian past or commonlaw present after 1803. The New Louisiana legal historians argue for the latter.
See A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 20. On Louisiana and the law of slavery specifically, see Ariela
Gross, Legal Transplants: Slavery and the Civil Law of Louisiana (May 12,
2009)(USC Law, Legal Studies Working Paper No. 09-16), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403422 (last visited April 21, 2011). Gross’s work is
the latest contribution to the Tannenbaum debate, a discussion that asks whether
common-law systems were less humane than slave systems based upon Roman
law. See FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN(Beacon Press 1992); ALAN
WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS (1989); Alejandro de la Fuente, Slave
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the situation in which a husband might use his coercive influence
to secure his wife’s consent to mortgage a portion of their shared
property, which included slaves.111 He had the power to dispose of
joint property without his wife’s consent, except where he had
used fraud.112 In common-law systems, on the other hand, the
doctrine of undue influence was a well-developed part of equity by
this time, operating to invalidate coerced contracts and wills, and
to create constructive trusts in favor of the weaker party.113
The standardized form in Marie Claire’s papers was an attempt
to protect the bank against a claim of undue influence by the white
seller’s wife. The doctrine of undue influence grew out of the
equitable tradition of Anglo-American law, and talk of equity
seeped into Louisiana case law in the early American period.114
Both historically and today, undue influence cases arose in
jurisdictions under English-speaking rule where a husband
defaulted on a mortgage.115 When the bank tried to collect the
property that secured the loan, the wife would argue that her claim
to the property should defeat the bank’s because she had only
consented to the mortgage under the coercive pressure—or undue
influence—of her husband.116 Such cases existed in American
Louisiana, and with slaves as security.117 White wives enjoyed
considerable power in Louisiana’s slave-law regime, as they did in
Caribbean jurisdictions like Jamaica and Barbados.118 The special
clause pertaining to the wife’s situation in Martine’s Act of Sale
was intended to protect the bank against the wife’s claim. Its
Law and Claims-Making in Cuba: The Tannenbaum Debate Revisited, 22 L.
AND H IST. REV. 339, 340-353 (2004).
111. MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Arts. 2369-2392) The ―community
of gains‖ applied to property gained during the marriage.
112. MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 2373).
113. See, e.g, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE BY HON. MR.
JUSTICE STORY 98-99 (A. E. Randall ed., 1920); ALFRED G. REEVES, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 544, 1548 (1909).
114. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITABLE JURISPRUDENCE:
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA I, 243-244 (1836); Bourcier v
Lanusse 3 Mart.(o.s.) 581, 1815 WL 794 (La.).
115. See Christine N. Booth, Undue Influence and Triangular Situations:
The Husband, the Wife, and the Bank, 26 HONG KONG L. J. 58 (1996).
116. For a leading British imperial case, see Turnbull and Co. v. Duval
[1902] A.C. 429.
117. See Webb v. Union Bank of Louisiana 2 La. Ann. 585, 1847 WL
3172 (La.). For a non-slave case, see Beatty v Tete 9 La. Ann. 131, 1854 WL
4029 (La.).
118. KATHLEEN MARY BUTLER, THE ECONOMICS OF EMANCIPATION:
JAMAICA AND BARBADOS, 1823-1843 92-97 (1995).
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presence underscores the vulnerability of mortgaged slaves, even
while held within the familial black regime.119
B. Wills
The careful phraseology of Marie Claire’s wills is a third
feature to note. In the construction of wills, the intention of the
testator was ―the first and great object of inquiry,‖ wrote James
Kent, paying homage to the rights of property owners in his
Commentaries on American Law.120 Nevertheless, courts
intervened often in deciding what property owners could do with
their property after death: ―To allow the testator to interfere with
the established rules of the law, would be to permit every man to
make a law for himself, and disturb the metes and bounds of
property.‖121 In passing from the world of the living to that of the
dead, the property owner ceded ―despotic dominion‖ over personal
property to the greater public interest.122
A careful choice of words was critical to the writing of valid
wills.123 An imprudent comma or a polite use of the conditional
instead of the present indicative had the potential to invalidate a
clause in a will.124 A charitable judge might have minimized the
damage by performing a tidy surgical excision of the offending
line. A less generous judge could void the entire will. Imprudent
grammar and unsympathetic judges (often slaveholders
themselves) made for dire consequences.125
119. Some black slave-owners also mortgaged their slave property to
further other financial ventures. See HANGER, supra note 1, at 75.
120. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 534 (1832).
121. Id. at 535.
122. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
17 (1803).
123. In the context of slavery, see BERNIE D. JONES, FATHERS OF
CONSCIENCE: MIXED-RACE INHERITANCE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (2009).
124. For instance, southern common-law courts distinguished between a
declaration of intention to manumit (e.g. ―I would like my slaves to be free‖) and
an actual declaration of manumission (e.g. ―I hereby declare my slaves free‖).
Thomas R. R. Cobb, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United
States of America to which is Prefixed an Historical Sketch of Slavery 286
(1858). The former was void. Id.
125. Executors of Henderson v. Heirs (1846) and Rost and Montgomery
v. Heirs of Doyle (1860), in JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY,
supra note 10, at 575, 668 (respectively). Also available as Rost v Henderson 12
Rob. (LA) 549; Rost v Doyal’s Heirs 15 La. Ann. 256 (respectively). See also
Bailey v. Poindexter’s Executor, 14 Gratten (Va.) 132, 428-455 (1858). In
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Not surprisingly, southern judges voided wills for being
contrary to the spirit of slave law. As Mark Tushnet observes, ―[a]
master might find his or her most carefully structured will
destroyed by the use of one of the doctrines floating throughout the
South.‖126 A will that gave a slave freedom—or, ―in the event of a
change in the law,‖ a right of action for his or her freedom—was
declared void for attempting to navigate around a future change in
the law.127 Where a state prohibited the testamentary manumission
of slaves, any attempt to circumvent the law in one’s will by
creating a trust for the benefit of slaves was void.128 The testator
might order that his slaves be taken to another state and
manumitted there. If that state subsequently passed a law
forbidding the entry of new free people of color into the state, the
manumission order would be declared void.129
Judges took the liberty of voiding wills for uncertainty or
vagueness, and for offending against public policy. A will in North
Carolina was struck down because the request to emancipate the
slave ―when the owner thinks proper‖ was too vague to be
enforced by a court at any given time.130 A prime example of
public policy violations related to statu liberi, slaves set by
contract to be emancipated at a future date. Most states had the
policy of discouraging statu liberi in the belief that the status
undermined the current authority of a master over his or her slave.
Testators in a state that prohibited manumission could order the
immediate removal of their slaves upon their death to another state
where the slaves would be manumitted. However, should they use
a phrase that implied a slightly more delayed reaction (e.g. ―for
future transfer there‖ as opposed to ―immediate removal‖), the will
common–law jurisdictions, the doctrine of cy pres (old legal French related to
the modern French près d’ici or ―near here‖) allowed the judge to adjust a trust
to the new conditions that threatened to invalidate it, in the spirit of the testator’s
original wishes. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). On southern judges’
hostility to the doctrine’s use in slave cases, see the Georgian joined cases of
Hunter v. Bass and American Colonization Society v. Bass (1855), in JUDICIAL
CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 10, at 42; MORRIS, supra
note 19, at 376-377.
126. TUSHNET, supra note 35, at 228.
127. Jamison v. Bridge, 14 La. Ann. 31 (1859).
128. MORRIS, supra note 16, at 379; COBB, supra note 112, at 291-292,
296.
129. Theoretically, judges could rescue the order through the doctrine of
cy pres. COBB, supra note 112, at 302. But see supra note 113.
130. Bryan v. Wadsworth, in COBB, supra note 112, at 295. Also
available at 18 N.C. 384 (1835).
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could be voided for increasing the number of statu liberi in the
state, working against public policy.131 According to Justice
Lumpkin in the Georgia case of Vance v Crawford (1848), it had
been the constant project of the state to prevent the increase of
freed slaves: ―[n]either humanity, nor religion, nor common
justice, requires us to sanction domestic emancipation.‖132
Writing a valid will with respect to slaves was no easier in
Louisiana than in common-law jurisdictions.133 A slave-owner
could not free a slave whose value represented more than ten
percent of his estate.134 If he had lived with a slave mistress in
―open concubinage,‖ he could not leave her any immovable
property even if he did succeed in freeing her.135 Nor could he
leave her movables representing over ten percent of his estate.136
Perhaps worse still was the general uncertainty surrounding the
invalidation of wills in Louisiana and French law alike. Even in the
late nineteenth century, textbooks on Louisiana succession law
expressed frustration over the vagueness of both bodies of law.137
The only general principles that offered guidance were those with
which the Civil Code opened. Individuals could not by their
conventions derogate from the force of laws made ―for the
preservation of public order or good morals.‖138 Whatever was
done in contravention of a prohibitory law would be void.139 This
included orders prohibited only indirectly by the intent and policy
of the law.140 Further, the Code made testamentary manumission
valid only when ordered in express and formal terms. It would not
be implied by any other circumstances of a will.141 Given this
131.
132.

COBB, supra note 112, at 290-291.
4 Ga. 445 (1848); JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN
SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 19. On Lumpkin, see PAUL DEFOREST HICKS, JOSEPH
HENRY LUMPKIN: GEORGIA’S FIRST CHIEF JUSTICE (2002); TUSHNET, supra note
35, at 218-227.
133. On freeing slaves by will in Louisiana in a slightly later period
(1846-1862), see SCHAFER (2003), supra note 13, at 59-70.
134. SCHAFER (1994), supra note 12, at 185-187.
135. Id., at 185.
136. Id. at 199.
137. K. A. CROSS, A TREATISE, ANALYTICAL, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL
ON SUCCESSIONS 105 (1891).
138. MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 11).
139. Id.
140. CROSS (1891), supra note 137 at 108.
141. MORGAN, supra author’s note, (Art. 184) Testamentary
manumissions had to be carried out by executors, many of whom neglected their
duty. See SCHAFER, supra note 13, at 59-70. Manumission of all kinds was
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generally strict approach to testamentary manumission, Louisiana
courts may have looked to other southern states for guidance,
reflecting the model suggested by the new Louisiana legal
historians.142 The common law offered a number of specific
doctrines that put the more general civilian principles into action.
Given that so many wills were ―wrecked on the shoals of legal
technicalities, greed, or racial prejudice,‖ Chabert’s wills reflected
shrewd and careful draftsmanship by her lawyer.143 Crucially, he
included two provisions to save her final will from invalidation in
the event that her niece, Adélaїde, could not be manumitted. The
first read: ―I name and institute as my universal legatees my two
nieces Martine and Adélaїde, and in the event that half of the
property designated below is insufficient for the acquisition of my
said niece Adélaїde, Martine shall be my sole universal legatee.‖144
In the second security clause, Marie Claire’s free niece Louise was
given one sixth of Marie Claire’s land for use during her lifetime
only. After Louise’s death, the land was to return to Martine and
Adélaїde. If Adélaїde could not be purchased due to lack of funds
or because her mistress did not consent, the land would go to
Martine alone.145 As the compiler Limonge advised his reader,
―[p]lease do not forget that slaves could not inherit, that Marie
Claire knew it and was careful that her legacy to Adelaide would
not revert to Madame Lavergne.‖146 Furthermore, Marie Claire’s
lawyers could have been tempted to use less specific terms in order
to ensure the purchase of Adélaїde. Marie Claire could have left
the maximum amount of money available more open-ended than
she did when she specified that half of her property was to be sold.
But this could have put the clause—and possibly the entire will—
prohibited by legislation in Louisiana in 1857. See SCHAFER , supra note 12, at
183-184.
142. A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL
HISTORY (Warren M. Billings & Mark F. Fernandez eds., 2001).
143. Frank Mathias, Manumission, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN
HISTORY: LOUISIANA 778 (David C. Roller & Robert W. Twyman eds., 1979).
144. ―Je nomme et institue pour mes légataires universelles mes deux
nièces Martine et Adélaїde, et dans le cas où la moitié du terrain susdésigné ne
suffirait pas à l’acquisition de ma dite nièce Adélaїde, Martine sera seule
légataire universelle.‖ Testament de Marie Claire Chabert (Nov. 12, 1846), in
the Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 23, 1 verso.
145. ―[O]u de Martine seule, dans le cas où l’on ne pourrait faire
l’acquisition d’Adélaїde ainsi qu’il a été dit ci-dessous, faute de moyens ou faute
de consentement de sa maitresse.‖ Id.
146. Limonge, Account of the Life of Marie Claire (typescript), in the
Chabert Papers, supra note 8, folder 1, 9 recto.
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in jeopardy of being void for vagueness. Had Marie Claire
attempted to ensure the purchase even despite future frustrating
laws, the will could have been declared contrary to law. The
shrewdest strategy was a simple, specific set of clauses that
prepared for the possible failure of the purchase of Adélaїde. Marie
Claire’s lawyer was well aware of the delicate and insecure nature
of slave-related testamentary dispositions. He adjusted the will’s
text—and perhaps Marie Claire’s expectations—accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
Marie Claire exhibited a striking degree of legal agility in her
dealings. She did so as a woman who was unmarried for most of
her life, and who forged no close alliances with white men. She
signed her documents with an X, preceded by the note, ―[t]he said
Marie Claire having declared not to know how to write or sign has
made her usual mark after having [had the document] read.‖147
Remarkably, this illiterate woman of color was a party to five slave
purchases, six manumissions, two major loans, court proceedings
over Jacques Tisserand’s estate, the legal dispute over Jacques’
enslaved daughter Manon, the purchase of real estate, a marriage,
two deaths, and the creation of two wills.148 Lois V. M. Gould
observes that free women of color generally went unnoticed in
most of the antebellum South. They owned little property and
rarely participated in court cases.149 Marie Claire Chabert was a
notable exception. Her manumission created the possibility for a
chain of familial black slaveholding that would draw five others
into this strategic legal regime.
Woodson’s critics argue that most black slaveholders, like their
white counterparts, were primarily profit-driven. They downplay
or ignore familial black slaveholders like Marie Claire Chabert.
147. ―[L]a dite Marie Claire ayant déclaré ne savoir écrire ni signer a fait
sa marque ordinaire après lecture faite.‖ Affranchissement Marie Claire à
Michel (June 12, 1835), in the Chabert Papers, folder 12, 1 verso. Literacy rates
amongst freedwomen using notarial services in French Saint Domingue were
about 25% between 1775 and 1789. David P. Geggus, Slave and Free Colored
Women in Saint Domingue, in MORE THAN CHATTEL: BLACK WOMEN AND
SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 69, at 271.
148. Davis notes that it was common for free people of color not to leave
wills at all. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An
Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 238 (Jan. 1999).
149. Gould, supra note 40, at 20-22.
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Familial slaveholding did not by definition exclude a profit motive.
Families can be both protective and exploitative, and Marie
Claire’s slaves occasionally generated income for her. It is equally
important to note that as a legal device, familial black slaveholding
was not unassailable. Marie Claire’s papers reveal mortgage and
inheritance-related vulnerabilities. They reflect her purchase of a
niece on precarious terms. The niece would return to ―real‖ slavery
if her former white owner defaulted on a loan. The Chabert papers
also exhibit the forced modesty of manumission provisions that
Marie Claire’s legal adviser wrote into her will: he was trying to
ensure the will’s validity.
Familial black slaveholding was legally fragile and had profitgenerating potential. But it also offered protection of a particular
type. Familial black slaveholding shielded kin from the risks of
being kidnapped and re-enslaved. It prevented them from being
sent to Liberia through African recolonization schemes. And in
many parts of the American South, it kept newly freed people of
color from being expelled from the state through removal laws. It
is a type of black slaveholding that deserves greater
acknowledgment and attention, not just from historians of slave
law, but equally on the politically charged stage of the reparations
debate.

BOOK REVIEW
RIGHTS OF PERSONALITY IN SCOTS LAW:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Dundee
University Press, 2009)
Reviewed by Olivier Moréteau*
This book features a collection of papers presented at a
Conference organized on May 5 and 6, 2006, at the University of
Strathclyde in Glasgow. The Conference aimed at giving an
overview of issues and options available in Scots law regarding the
protection of personality rights. The perspective was comparative,
covering various civil law and common jurisdictions and other
mixed jurisdictions. The concept of personality right is of civil law
fabric. Rooted in Roman law, the term „rights of the personality‟
was coined by 20th century civilian doctrine to describe the
protection of non-patrimonial aspects of the human person, such as
life, bodily integrity, personal security, physical liberty, reputation,
dignity, privacy, image, moral right to copyright, family
relationships, rights of deceased‟s relatives. The essays gathered in
the book tend to prove however that the Scottish approach is more
remedy-based than right-based, the focus being on the tort action
and its conditions. Personality rights are all too often entangled
with patrimonial rights, and the identification of a personality
rights will at most help identify a primary right that deserves
protection even where the loss is entirely non-pecuniary.
There is much focus on the taxonomy of personality rights,
checking what is included here and excluded there. It is common
knowledge, at least in civil law jurisdictions, that personality rights
are inalienable, imprescriptible, and cannot be abandoned. The
book offers little discussion however of what personality rights are
in essence. Such rights can indeed be monetized, and the

*

Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair,
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University; Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Civil Law Studies.

218

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

borderline between the extra-patrimonial and the patrimonial rights
is not always an easy one to draw, as some cases discussed in the
book may show. The right an actress has on her image under
French law may serve as an example. A case decided in Paris in
1975 featured French superstar Catherine Deneuve.1 She had
consented to the publication of photos taken at a time when she
was acting as a professional model, occasionally posing in the
nude. The magazine who had published such photos sold them to
another magazine that republished those years later, at a time when
Catherine Deneuve had become an iconic and highly respected
actress. Though the magazine owned the pictures, Catherine
Deneuve was allowed to object to the publication and argue that
her personality right to her image had been invaded. The court held
that the magazine was supposed to request her consent prior to
publication. Any attorney or scholar familiar with French cases
knows that the more a person protects her privacy or image rights,
the more likely she is of being awarded higher damages in case of
infringement of such rights. On the contrary, famous people who
usually tolerate the publication of gossip and photos taken within
the realm of their private life, though not losing the right to
protection—after all it is inalienable and may not be abandoned—
are more likely than not to get minimal or nominal damages. Given
the fact that tabloids will anyway publish gossip to maximize their
sales, celebrities, by choosing not to tolerate any infringement, can
monetize their private life and image by selling ex ante the right to
publish under pre-determined conditions, or collecting ex post in
the form of damages that French courts try to keep sufficiently
high to serve as deterrent. That point is strongly criticized by both
editors of the book: Niall Whitty in his essay in the book2 and
Reinhard Zimmermann in his major book on the law of
obligations.3 The reading of the book shows that Scotland looks at
personality rights with tort law lenses rather than with overpermissive subjective rights lenses, thereby limiting the risk of
commodification of extra-patrimonial rights, all too real in French

1.
Dame Dorléac dite Catherine Deneuve v. Société anonyme PresseOffice, Dalloz 1976, 291, note R. Lindon (Court of Appeal of Paris, judgment of
May 14, 1975).
2.
At 197.
3.
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 1089 (1990).

2011]

BOOK REVIEW

219

jurisprudence, where the right to respect of one‟s image was once
based on property rights.4
One may compare this with the moral right of the author or
artist under copyright law. In most civil law jurisdictions and under
the Bern Convention, the artist or author of copyrighted work may
sell the copyright, which is intellectual property and therefore
patrimonial, yet keeping at all times a moral right allowing her to
object to a use of the work that in the opinion of the author would
distort the artistic value of the work. This moral right being
attached to the personality of the creator is inalienable and cannot
be abandoned, and is therefore a personality right. The study by
David Vaver (Chapter 8)5 shows that the moral right is much
weaker at English law where it may be waived. In jurisdictions
where it is stronger, it may be monetized much like the right to
one‟s image in the example above.
Born and developed in the matrix of private law, the concept of
personality right has grown a constitutional dimension, which is
not surprising given the fact that it enshrines personal freedom and
human dignity. This constitutional dimension is a central feature of
several of the papers gathered in the book. The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) indeed strengthens the
fundamental rights dimension with Article 8(1) that provides:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence,” the same Convention protecting
liberty of expression and freedom of the press in its Article 10. It
was not until the year 2000 that the ECHR was to acquire the force
of law in the United Kingdom and therefore in Scotland, by the
effect of the Human Rights Act 1998. The impact of the ECHR in
Scotland is carefully researched by Elspeth Reid (Chapter 4),6 who
investigates to what extent Convention rights, in so far as they
address rights of personality, already find protection in Scots law.
She uses comparative law to identify possible gaps and

4.
Karine Anterion & Olivier Moréteau, The Protection of Personality
Rights Against Invasions by Mass Media in France, in THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONALITY RIGHTS AGAINST INVASIONS BY MASS MEDIA 124, (Helmut
Koziol & Alexander Warzilek eds. 2005).
5.
Does Intellectual Property Have Personality?, 403.
6.
Protection of Personality Rights in the Modern Scots Law of Delict,
247.
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developments that may be needed. She clearly indicates that one
has to look beyond England, and points out to South Africa,
another mixed jurisdiction, and countries of continental Europe.
South Africa is ubiquitous in the volume, which is not
surprising, since much like Scotland, it is a mixed jurisdiction
without a civil code. Jonathan Burchell offers a detailed
presentation in Chapter 6, with a focus on human dignity.7 He
shows the use of the actio iniuriarum, “the general Roman remedy
for impairments of personality rights to physical integrity,
reputation, and dignity”8 as a basis of the protection of personality
rights in South Africa before and after the Constitution of 1996.
Post-apartheid developments include the right to housing, the right
to social security and appropriate social assistance for those unable
to support themselves,9 the right to family life, due process rights,
showing flexible adjustments. The Roman law concept of iniuria
indeed easily adjusts to the new constitutional and legislative
requirements to favor the enforcement of human rights. Professor
Burchell‟s contribution is a plea in favor of the delictual actio
iniuriarum: “The objective criterion will allow a court to balance
the interests involved, engage in a proportionality inquiry weighing
issues such as need, available resources, degree of harm, urgency
of relief, including availability of alternative remedies, and
recognize those defences that reflect reasonable behavior.”10 He
shows “the pivotal nature of dignity” as a right and not just a value.
He reminds the Scots that T.B. Smith was in favor of a rejuvenated
actio iniuriarum focused on the concept of “affront”
(contumelia).11 Much in this contribution is of great interest for
Scotland as well as other mixed jurisdictions such as Louisiana.
The laws of Continental Europe are explored in Chapter 5,
written by Gert Brüggemeier, covering France, Germany, and
Italy.12 Professor Brüggemeier rightly points to the hybrid nature
of personality rights, which constitute in his opinion a sort of

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Personality Rights in South Africa: Re-Affirming Dignity, 349.
At 351.
At 367.
At 377.
At 381. See T.B. SMITH, A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF
SCOTLAND 653-654 (1962).
12.
Protection of Personality Interests in Continental Europe: The
Examples of France, Germany and Italy, and a European Perspective, at 313.
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“private human rights.”13 Born in the realm of private law from the
Roman law of injuries (actio iniuriarum), it was given
constitutional protection after World War II, in national
constitutions and also in the ECHR. He concludes his survey of the
law in the three countries by a section on the ECHR and an
analysis of the Caroline von Hannover v. Germany case, decided
by the European Court of Human Rights in 2004. The case shows
how difficult it is to balance the protection of private life (Art. 8
ECHR) with freedom of expression and of the press, also protected
by the Convention (Art. 10 ECHR), an issue that has been
carefully studied in the context of European tort law.14 It also
indicates a possible diversity of approach regarding the protection
of the private life of celebrities. French courts insist that everyone,
including celebrities, is entitled to the protection of one‟s private
life on the basis of the overreaching provision of Civil Code, Art.
9. This places the burden on journalists to prove that they have
obtained prior consent before publishing stories or pictures
featuring celebrities in their private life, even when the story takes
place outside private walls, in the eye of the public. Neglecting
these details, the author rightly insists on the somehow
constitutional nature of Art. 9.15
Germany has a different approach in the sense that courts,
following a law enacted in 1907, accept that pictures of public
figures can be taken and published without their express consent
except where taken within their residential areas.16 In Caroline von
Hannover v. Germany, the European Court held that even pictures
taken outside the private residence had to be authorized, Art. 8
extending the protection to everyone, including celebrities. It is
only when public figures perform in an “official function,” that the
right to privacy is not to be applied, a position long adopted by
French law, which is in compliance with Art. 8 ECHR. Regarding
the right to informational privacy, Scots law had a restrictive

13.
At 317.
14.
The Protection of Personality Rights against Invasions by Mass
Media, supra note 4.
15.
At 322. After all, the French Civil Code has been represented to be
the “civil constitution” of the country: see Olivier Moréteau, The Future of Civil
Codes in France and Louisiana, 2 JCLS 39, 44 (2009).
16.
Details at 342.
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approach in the sense that protection was only afforded when the
information was wrong or malicious (malicious falsehood). The
scope is considerably enlarged with the implementation of ECHR,
Art. 8.
Whether they are familiar with Scots law or not, readers will
learn a lot reading the first chapters of the book. Issues and options
are clearly exposed by the editors in Chapter 1, which gives an
overview of the subject insisting on the historical and political
background that makes Scotland such a unique place before and
after devolution.17 The editors then focus on what they view as the
key issues, and not surprisingly these include the integration of the
ECHR right to privacy. Other questions pop up such as how to
protect rights of personality, whether a right to publicity should be
introduced, and whether personality rights should be codified, a
question that in their opinion deserves a negative answer.
Following chapters address these questions. In what appears to
be the longest contribution in the book (Chapter 2 counts over 110
pages), John Blackie gives a rich and detailed overview of the
history of personality rights in Scots law, from the 16th century to
the mid-19th century,18 looking backwards (doctrinal history),
sideways (comparative law), and forward (law reform proposals)
to make informed decision as to where to go.19 Readers having a
lesser interest in legal history will value the Editors‟ summary of
John Blackie‟s findings.20 His well-documented exploration shows
how much Scots law was based on the ius commune until it
received English influence during the 19th century. Real injury
(iniuria realis) and verbal injury (iniuria verbalis) evolved and
developed as sub-categories of iniuria, generating a complex and
confusing taxonomy. The full page figures at p. 38 (the delict of
iniuria in Scotland in 1700) and 103 (the delict of injury in 1850)
give a fascinating overview of shifting categories and the text
reveals the fertility and flexibility of the delict of injury to cover
new situations, such as invasions of privacy once people‟s sphere
of privacy started to expand.

17.
18.
31.
19.
20.

Rights of Personality in Scots Law: Issues and Options, at 1.
Unity in Diversity:The History of Personality Rights in Scots Law, at
See the Editors comment, at 24.
At 10-12.
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Niall Whitty, co-editor of the book, gives a full overview of
rights of privacy in Scots law (Chapter 3).21 His hundred-page long
chapter insists on categories that vary from one system to another.
After defining the fundamental concepts, and particularly those of
real and verbal injury derived from Roman law, but also those of
dignity, autonomy, and privacy, he ventures into categorizing,
using Johan Neethling‟s typology as a starting point.22 Such
personality rights are primary rights and their infringement is a
delict, imposing a secondary obligation on the wrongdoer to repair
or remedy. The primary right might be imprescriptible, the
secondary one is not and may be extinguished by prescription. He
then describes the thirteen personality rights identified by
Neethling: right to life, the rights to bodily integrity and to
personal security, the right to physical liberty, the right to honor
and reputation, the right to dignity in the narrow sense (selfesteem; honor; and freedom from insult), the right to privacy
(seclusion from intrusion), the right to informational privacy (nondisclosure of private information), the right to identity or image,
the right to publicity (appropriation of image and reification of
right to privacy and image), the moral right to copyright, the right
to autonomy (still debated in Scotland), personality rights in family
relationships, personality rights after death. Professor Whitty‟s
treatment of the elements of liability for infringing rights of
personality shows the paramount importance of tort law concepts
in this area and as everywhere in his essay the approach is
comparative, showing familiarity with European projects such as
the Principles of European Tort Law. Transmissibility of the action
and remedies are also discussed in this very rich essay.
There is much more in the book, including the already
mentioned Continental European and South African perspectives
to which one must add a very informative discussion of English
law perspectives, by Hazel Carty, showing how English law
remains “mistrustful of generalised rights” (Chapter 7).23 The final

21.
Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law, at 147.
22.
At. 164. Reference is made to JOHAN NEETHLING, J.M. POTGIETER &
P.J. VISSER, NEETHLING‟S LAW OF PERSONALITY (2d ed. 2005). See also J.
Neethling, Personality Rights, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(J. Smits ed. 2006), at Chapter 48.
23.
Personality Rights and English Law 383, at 384.
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chapters cover defamation,24 autonomy in medical law,25 and a
presentation of the very impressive personality database covering a
number of significant legal systems, that has fed a comparative
survey, discussed by Charlotte Waelde and Niall Whitty.26 Hector
McQueen‟s Hitchhiker‟s guide to personality rights in Scots law
concludes the volume, road mapping the complex personality
rights galaxy in Scots law.27 May be for the reason that it primarily
addresses privacy, it has not been placed at the beginning of the
volume, where the reader would be happy to find a road map. It
inevitably repeats some information available elsewhere in the
book but offers a most valuable guide, starting with the impact of
the Human Rights Act 1998 and ending with a survey of other
relevant statutes, also promenading through English cases on
breach of confidence and the actio iniuriarum of Scots law.
Altogether, this is a remarkable and most informative
comparative law book that every scholar interested in personality
rights in Scotland, Europe, or in any other jurisdiction must read or
consult. More generally, the book shows the great vitality of the
civil law tradition of Scotland and the many ways it interacts both
with English law and European law and keeps developing as a very
dynamic mixed jurisdiction, connected to so many others. In the
reviewer‟s opinion, there is no better place than mixed jurisdictions
to test legal theories and doctrines, see how they interact and
identify what is working best. Scotland has developed a pragmatic
view of what personality rights are, half way between the
generalization of the French and the casuistic approach of the
English, proving in this field as in others that Scots law is a
modern continuation of Roman law. A French scholar trained in
France and having migrated to another mixed jurisdiction, the
reviewer cannot help thinking that the late Hélène David28 and

24.
Kenneth Norrie, The Scots Law of Defamation: Is there a Need for
Reform?, at 433.
25.
Graeme Laurie, Personality, Privacy and Autonomy in Medical Law,
at 453.
26.
This is a major project conducted at the University of Edinburgh: A
Right of Personality Database, at 485.
27.
A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Personality Rights in Scots Law, Mainly with
Regards to Privacy, at 549.
28.
HELENE DAVID, INTRODUCTION A L‟ETUDE DU DROIT ECOSSAIS (Paris,
1972).
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T.B. Smith29 would have liked and valued this book, much as they
would also have enjoyed Mixed Jurisdictions Compared, Private
Law in Louisiana and Scotland, edited by Vernon Palmer and
Elspeth Reid,30 published that very same year, also containing an
essay on personality rights.31
Together with the Dundee University Press, the editors have
done a great job making the book easy to read and navigate, with a
sequential numbering of chapters and sections, detailed tables of
content at the beginning of every chapter, and useful indexes and
tables. This review will end where the book starts: the short
foreword by Lord Hope is a must read. It offers insightful thoughts
on the impact of academic work on the judiciary and the vital
importance of comparative law on the development of Scots law,
of which the book is a brilliant demonstration.

29.
See A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, T. B. SMITH AND THE
PROGRESS OF SCOTS LAW, (Elspeth Reid & David Miller eds. 2005).
30.
Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
31.
Elspeth Christie Reid, Personality Rights: A Study in Difference, at
387.

